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ABSTRACT 
Allison Ann Rodriguez: “Silesia at the Crossroads”: Defining Germans and Poles in Upper 
Silesia During the First World War and Plebiscite Period 
(Under the direction of Chad Bryant) 
 
On March 20, 1921, nearly 1.2 million Upper Silesians went to the polls, participating in 
a plebiscite to determine if they would belong to Germany or Poland.  A part of German Prussia 
since the mid-eighteenth century,  Upper Silesia differed from other areas of Prussian Poland in 
that it was never a part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.  The area was ethnically and 
linguistically mixed but religiously homogenous, with Catholics comprising 90 percent of the 
population.  Many inhabitants held fast to a regional or religious identity rather than a national 
one.  In the age of national self-determination, however, non-national identities would not do. 
Much of the historiography of nationalism in East Central Europe has focused on lands of 
the Habsburg Empire.  This dissertation, set in a different national context, argues that the Upper 
Silesian Plebiscite and its preceding two-year propaganda campaign gave nationalists the space 
in which to define and refine what it meant to be German or Polish.  As the German Revolution 
remade Germany into a Republic and Poland was reconstituted, a myriad of possibilities became 
available for Upper Silesians.   The area was inundated with plebiscite propaganda for almost 
two years.  I argue that the German and Polish Plebiscite Commissariats, with the backing and 
blessing of their respective governments, appropriated the new post-war situation to continue the 
work of previous national activists in the region with new tactics.  Through the plebiscite 
propaganda, Germans and Poles redefined themselves and each other.  The propaganda 
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employed a variety of techniques, stressing not only the importance of one’s ethnicity but also 
the economic consequences of “staying in Germany” or “becoming Polish.”  In addition, class 
and gender distinctions, the latter of which has not been explored in the historiography on the 
region, feature prominently and add to the conceptions of what it meant to be German or Polish.  
Finally, this dissertation examines the plebiscite results and the ultimate decision, made by 
international leaders, to divide the region.   
v 
To Jack and Ben 
You are my sunshine. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On 20 March 1921, the residents of a small territory in East Central Europe went to the 
polls.  A part of German Prussia, Upper Silesia, like other regions of East Central Europe, was 
ethnically mixed with a strong regional identity.  However, in the wake of the First World War, 
and with the subsequent reshuffling of territories and the creation of new nation-states, national 
ambivalence would hardly do.  The Allied Powers had decided in late spring 1919 to hold a 
plebiscite in Upper Silesia, in order to determine the borders that would divide reconstituted 
Poland and reorganized Germany.  The plebiscite would also resolve the issue of which country 
would receive the territory’s rich deposits of coal, which had helped power Germany during the 
war.  For nearly two years the nascent German and Polish governments inundated the region 
with various forms of propaganda, calling on Upper Silesians to “stay with Germany” or 
“become Polish.”  And so, on Palm Sunday, 1921, Upper Silesians were ordered to put aside any 
regional or supranational identities and decide whether to be German or Polish. 
The plebiscite occurred at a moment of flux.  Beginning in the late nineteenth century, 
Upper Silesians experienced intensive nationalizing efforts from both German and Polish 
nationalists.  Large portions of its population, however, seem to have stayed remarkably resistant 
to these attempts; they identified themselves first and foremost as Catholic Upper Silesians.1  
 
1 See especially James Bjork, Neither German nor Pole: Catholicism and National Indifference in a Central 
European Borderland (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008).  Also see Tomasz Kamusella, Silesia and 
Central European Nationalism: The Emergence of National and Ethnic Groups in Prussian Silesia and Austrian 
Silesia, 1848-1918 (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2007) and Schlonzska mowa: Język, Górny 
Śląsk i nacjonalizm, tom II (Zabrze: Narodowa Oficyna Śląska, 2006). 
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Never a part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Upper Silesia did not experience the 
Polish partitions of the late eighteenth century and, unlike Posen/Poznań,2 its neighbor to the 
north, had no strong Polish nationalist movement until the turn of the twentieth century.  The 
First World War, however, brought a host of new possibilities, not just for Upper Silesia, but 
East Central Europe at large.  With the collapse of the three eastern empires – Austro-Hungarian, 
German and Russian – a Polish state returned to the map of Europe.  The German Revolution 
transformed the country from Reich to Republic.  Citing American President Woodrow Wilson’s 
Fourteen Points and doctrine of national self-determination, new nation-states arose from the 
ashes of the old empires.  In the heady chaos following the end of the war, Upper Silesia found 
itself at a crossroads.   
 This was not the only plebiscite to occur in the years immediately following the First 
World War.  Plebiscites had been held in Central and Northern Schleswig, determining 
Germany’s new borders with Denmark, and in Allenstein and Marienwerder, defining its border 
with Poland, a year earlier.3  The Upper Silesian example, however, stands out.  For one, this 
plebiscite encompassed many more people.  Over one million Upper Silesians cast votes in the 
plebiscite.  This was over three times the number of votes cast in Allenstein, the next largest 
plebiscite.  The percentage of participation - 97.5 percent - was also the highest (although the 
 
2 Place names seem to be a problem for all historians of Central and Eastern Europe.  Some, such as Pieter Judson, 
use all the linguistic variations, but I find the multiple hyphens to be a bit tedious.  Therefore, I will use both the 
German and Polish variants the first time a city or region is mentioned, and thereafter use only the historical name. 
 
3 The Schleswig plebiscites occurred in February and March of 1920; the Allenstein and Marienweder plebiscites 
were held in July 1920.  For a comprehensive look at these and other plebiscites, see Sarah Wambaugh, Plebiscites 
since the World War with a Collection of Official Documents, v. 1-2 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1933).  For more on the plebiscites, see: Peter Thaler, Of Mind and Matter: The Duality of 
National Identity in the German-Danish Borderlands (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2009); Richard 
Blanke, Polish-Speaking Germans?: Language and National Identity among the Masurians since 1871 (Cologne: 
Böhlau, 2001). 
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first Schleswig plebiscite came close, with 91.5 percent).4  More important than numbers, the 
Upper Silesian plebiscite was also the most fiercely contested.  Both the German and Polish 
states hurried to establish plebiscite commissions in the region and then flooded the territory with 
posters, pamphlets, leaflets and brochures in an attempt to win the vote.  While such tactics were 
also practiced in the other plebiscite zones, they did not match the frenetic intensity found in 
Upper Silesia.  Though the results of the others were clear-cut (74.2 percent for Denmark in 
Northern Schleswig, 79 percent for Germany in Central Schleswig), if not ridiculously lop-sided 
(Germany won 92 percent of the vote in Marienwerder and 98 percent in Allenstein), in Upper 
Silesia Germany carried the vote by a comparatively smaller majority, earning sixty percent to 
Poland’s forty.5 
 These percentages are almost the exact inverse of the 1910 language census, in which 57 
percent of Upper Silesians declared Polish to be their mother tongue.  This was down from 
roughly 66 percent in a survey taken ten years earlier, causing Polish national activists to 
renounce the results of the 1910 census and argue that reality was closer to the earlier figures.6  
The Polish nationalists claimed that the number of Poles in the region was higher than the 1910 
language census indicated, because many “Polish” children were no longer able to speak Polish 
fluently as a result of the intensive nationalizing efforts of the Prussian state and the German 
Empire in this region.7   
 
4 Wambaugh, Plebiscites since the World War, vol. 1, 82. 
 
5 Wambaugh, vol. 1, 82-86; 132-134. 
 
6 Ibid, 211 and T. Hunt Tooley, National Identity and Weimar Germany: Upper Silesia and the Eastern Border, 1918-
1922 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 13.  Both argue that bilinguals were counted as German-speakers 
in the 1910 census. 
 
7 By 1908, when a new law officially forbade it, Polish was rarely taught in schools.  Already in 1886 Silesians who 
claimed Polish as their mother tongue could not work as governmental officials.  The 1908 law, then, was more a form 
 4 
  The results of the language surveys in 1900 and 1910 lead not only to the question of 
how to interpret the change in percentages, but also suggest questions with respect to the 1921 
plebiscite’s results.  Here, Upper Silesians were supposed to be declaring and expressing their 
“true” national identity through the act of voting.  The discrepancy in the figures of the 1910 
language census and the 1921 plebiscite indicate, however, that a significant proportion of Upper 
Silesians were not voting, as nationalists on both sides expected, along purely ethnic-national 
lines, but rather that they considered a much broader variety of factors, most importantly their 
economic and social prospects, when casting their ballot.  
These factors were reflected in the language and imagery of the plebiscite propaganda 
produced by the German and Polish Plebiscite Commissariats, the organizations tasked with 
overseeing the plebiscite campaign.  Alongside ethnic-national differences, they emphasized 
economic and social distinctions.  Religion played an important role in the Polish propaganda; 
while the high percentage of Catholics in the region (90 percent) meant that the majority of 
Germans also practiced this faith, the Polish propaganda represented all Germans as Protestants.8  
The plebiscite propaganda was also highly gendered; a common motif found in both the German 
and Polish propaganda was that of the nation as a family.  Woman appeared almost exclusively 
as mothers, charged with not only caring for their children but also teaching them the language 
and culture of their given nation.  Men, as husbands and fathers, protected their families – and, 
thus, their nation – from external and internal enemies.  These propaganda images were an 
important component in the construction of a new German and Polish identity.   
 
of Prussian harassment against the Poles.  See: Tooley, National Identity and Weimar Germany; Kamusella, Silesia 
and Central European Nationalism. 
 
8 James Bjork, Neither German nor Pole, 7.  Neither German nor Polish propaganda addressed the Jewish minority. 
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The plebiscite propaganda was not the only context in which German and Polish 
nationalists strove to define themselves and each other.  With the end of the First World War, a 
myriad of options became possible for the lands of East Central Europe.  It was not just a 
question of whether Upper Silesia belonged to Germany or Poland, but what being German or 
Polish meant in the wake of the First World War.  In the immediate weeks and months following 
the war, before the Allied Powers’ decision to hold a plebiscite, various groups scrambled to put 
forth their own, often competing, visions of Upper Silesia’s future.  These were divided along 
national and political lines, as especially nationalists and socialists offered their own definitions 
of what it meant to be “good” Germans or Poles. 
 This dissertation asks four main questions.  First, what political possibilities for Upper 
Silesia arose during the First World War and, especially, in its aftermath?  How were these new 
options presented, and how did Upper Silesians receive and react to them?  Second, how did 
various groups co-opt the language of nationalism to promote their own agendas?  Third, what 
arguments did propagandists use in the plebiscite propaganda?  How did these differ across 
various mediums – newspapers, magazines, brochures, posters, etc.?  Finally, how did German 
and Polish nationalists use the plebiscite to define or redefine their nation and each other?  In 
what ways were these images defined by gender, class and ethnicity? 
 This dissertation argues that the numerous possibilities open to Upper Silesia in the 
immediate aftermath of the First World War were all filtered through a nationalist lens.  When 
members of the SPD or PPS argued from socialism, they put forth their own specific, national – 
German or Polish – brand of socialism, which stood in opposition to the other.  Municipal 
election results were used to determine Upper Silesians’ national sentiment and loyalty.  When 
the Allied Powers conceived of the post-war world, it was ordered around the nation; the 
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plebiscite was to be the purest form for national self-determination.  Thus, I also argue that the 
German and Polish Plebiscite Commissariats, with the backing and blessing of their respective 
governments, appropriated the new post-war situation to continue the work of previous national 
activists in the region with new tactics.  Through the plebiscite propaganda, Germans and Poles 
redefined themselves and each other.     
While proving reception is the bane of many a historian, I argue that, in the case of Upper 
Silesia, we can use the results of language surveys, the regional outcome of elections and, most 
importantly, the results of the plebiscite itself as an indicator for Upper Silesians’ responses.  It is 
important, however, to not interpret these results as Upper Silesians declaring their nationality; 
this was the nationalists’ logic and reading of the situation.  Instead, other factors besides the 
nation and nationality must be considered, especially with respect to the plebiscite.   
One of the main reasons Germany and Poland so fiercely campaigned in the run-up to the 
plebiscite was to secure access to Upper Silesia’s industrial might and resources – especially its 
coal.  At the outbreak of the First World War, Upper Silesia was second only to the Ruhr in coal 
production in Germany, supplying about twenty-three percent of the nation’s coal.  Clustered on 
its eastern border, the cities of the “Industrial Triangle” (defined by those enclosed within 
Kattowitz/Katowice, Gleiwitz/Gliwice and Beuthen/Bytom), dominated the region.  While this 
area comprised of only five percent of Upper Silesian territory, almost half of the region’s 2.28 
million people (47 percent) lived in the cities or their surrounding industrial lands.9  By 1910, all 
three cities had a German-speaking majority.  The countryside, however, was predominantly 
populated by Polish-speakers who worked in the mines and smelting industries.  They were not 
 
9 Wambaugh, vol. 1, 207. 
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farmers and peasants like their contemporaries to the north and west; they were a proletarian 
workforce.   
Because of this ethnic and social mix, as well as the importance of the region to Germany 
and Poland, each nation’s propaganda initiatives specifically targeted the Industrial Triangle, 
making it the most contested area in the years preceding the plebiscite.10  Both states hurried to 
establish their plebiscite commissariats’ headquarters in the region, Germany in Kattowitz and 
Poland in Beuthen.  The propaganda produced by both nations stressed the importance of the 
Industrial Triangle, and the commissariats focused especially on winning the votes of Upper 
Silesians in this economically important region.  In fact, it could be argued that the whole reason 
for the Upper Silesian plebiscite was to determine which nation would receive these lucrative 
industries.  Because of all these factors, the Industrial Triangle is the ideal location in which to 
set this study. 
Historiography  
This dissertation is situated in several main fields of historiography: the history of Upper 
Silesia specifically; the First World War and its immediate aftermath in East Central Europe; and 
nation and gender in East Central Europe.  While most works on the region discuss the former 
Habsburg lands, my focus on another multi-ethnic region, situated in a different national context, 
provides another vantage point from which to study the area.  Of particular importance here are 
the works that highlight the national indifference and ambiguity of the people in this region.  
While the First World War and its immediate aftermath in Western Europe have been intensively 
studied, the war in East Central Europe during this time remains in many ways a blank page. 
 
10 Bjork, “Neither German nor Pole,” 17-18. 
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Before examining the historiography of Upper Silesia in more detail, it is necessary to 
separate the region from its northern neighbor—Posen/Poznań.  In retelling the story of Prussian 
Poles, most historians have focused on this latter region, which was a stronghold for Polish 
nationalism within the Prussian/German partition.  This is true of classic studies, such as William 
W. Hagen’s Germans, Poles and Jews, as well as more recent additions to the historiography; 
Mark Tilse’s 2011 Transnationalism in the Prussian East offers tangential references to Upper 
Silesia, but focuses predominantly on Posen and West Prussia.11   It is important, however, to 
distinguish between the two regions.  Upper Silesia stands apart from Posen for several reasons, 
perhaps most important of which is the fact that the region was not a part of pre-Partitioned 
Poland.  Poles in Posen needed only to look into the relatively recent past to find their connection 
to the old Polish state; Upper Silesians, in contrast, had not been a part of the Polish kingdom for 
nearly a millennium.  Upper Silesians were almost universally Catholic, whereas in Posen 
religious differences fell along national lines; Protestants tended to be Prussians/Germans, while 
Catholics were Polish.  Posen was largely agrarian and had retained its Polish nobility (szlachta) 
class; no such class existed in Upper Silesia, and, as will be seen, the region underwent rapid 
industrialization in the last half of the nineteenth century.  Therefore, Upper Silesia does not fit 
into the model established by the historiography of the Posen Poles.  Studying this region 
 
11 William W. Hagen, Germans, Poles and Jews: The Nationality Conflict in the Prussian East, 1772-1914 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Mark Tilse, Transnationalism in the Prussian East: From National 
Conflict to Synthesis, 1871-1914 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).  For more literature, see especially: 
Richard Blanke, Prussian Poland in the German Empire (1871-1900) (Boulder, CO.: Eastern European 
Monographs, 1981); John J. Kulczycki, School Strikes in Prussian Poland, 1901-1907: The Struggle over Bilingual 
Education (Boulder, CO: Eastern European Monographs, 1981); Richard Wonser Tims, Germanizing Prussian 
Poland: The H-K-T Society and the Struggle for the Eastern Marches in the German Empire, 1894-1919 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1941); Lech Trzeciakowski, The Kulturkampf in Prussian Poland Trans. 
Katarzyna Kretkowska (Boulder, CO: Eastern European Monographs, 1990).  For literature on East Prussia, 
especially the Masurians, see: Richard Blanke, Polish-speaking Germans?: Language and National Identity among 
the Masurians since 1871 (Colonge: Böhlau, 2001); Andreas Kossert, Preußen, Deutsche oder Polen?: Die Masuren 
im Spannungsfeld des ethnischen Nationalismus, 1870-1956 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2001); Helmut Walser 
Smith, “Prussia at the Margins, or The World that Nationalism Lost,” in Niel Gregor, Nils Roemer and Mark 
Roseman, eds., German History from the Margins (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006). 
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requires a different set of questions and approaches, which are visible in the scholarship on 
Upper Silesia and the plebiscite. 
Almost immediately after the plebiscite, and continuing through the Second World War, 
several studies on the region appeared, written predominantly by German and Anglo-American 
scholars.  Here, the results of the plebiscite and the decision to split the region were rehashed and 
reargued.  These publications clearly served a nationalist agenda and considered the German and 
Polish nation and nationalism in Upper Silesia to be innate and immutable; there was no 
discussion or acknowledgment of regional or religious loyalties.  German works stressed the 
integration of Upper Silesia into the German nation — an integration that was interrupted by 
invading Polish national activists.  Ilse Schwidetsky’s Die Polnische Walhbewegung in 
Oberschlesien, which is still one of the standards of German historiography on the region, calls 
the appearance of the Polish party on Upper Silesia’s political scene an “invasion.”12  Several 
other works of this time were written by men who were born in the region and experienced first-
hand the events of the plebiscite period; Karl Hoefer’s Oberschlesien in the der Aufstandszeit, 
for example, is part history, part document collection, and part memoir of a man who served as 
commander of the German units during the Third Silesian Uprising.13  In this period, Rudolf 
Vogel’s 1931 dissertation on the German press and propaganda stands out for not being so 
overtly nationalistic.14  Written only ten years after the plebiscite, and including interviews with 
 
12 Ilse Schwidetsky, Die Polnische Wahlbewegung in Oberschlesien (Breslau: Osteuropa Institut, 1934). 
 
13 Karl Hoefer, Oberschlesien in der Aufstandszeit, 1918-1921, Erinnerungen und Dokumente (Berlin: Verlag von 
E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1938); see also: Rudolf Schricker, Blut Erz Kohle: Der Kampf um Oberschlesien (Berlin: 
Verlag und Vertriebs-Gesellschaft m.g.H, 1933).  
 
14 Rudolf Vogel, “Deutsche Presse und Propaganda des Abstimmungskampfes in Oberschlesien” (PhD diss., 
Universität Leipzig, 1931). 
 10 
many of the major German players, Vogel’s work is still essential to the historiography of the 
region. 
Published at the same time, Anglo-American studies on the region — such as J. 
Weinstein’s Upper Silesia: A Country of Contrasts (1931), William J. Rose’s The Drama of 
Upper Silesia (1935) and Robert Machray’s The Problem of Upper Silesia (1945) — shared a 
nationalist approach.  They, too, perceived nations as “naturally” given, but supported the Polish 
side and were driven mainly by a structural approach, which measured everything from language 
use to coal output, and assumed “Poles” and “Germans” to be fixed categories. 15  While written 
by Anglo-Americans, the main aim of these three works appears to be to defend and justify 
Poland’s claim to the region, as did most historians of this time, thereby defending the policy 
pursued by the Western Allies in the Treaty of Versailles. 
One of the few to espouse Germany’s needs was Sidney Osborne, in his 1920 The Upper 
Silesian Question and Germany’s Coal Problem.16  Still, Osborne (an American) is quick is 
stress that his views, “much they may seem favorable to German interests, are in no sense the 
result of German influences or pro-German bias,” and adds that he “sympathized with the aims 
and ideals enunciated by the Allied and Associated Governments during the war.”17  Osborne is 
more explicit in his support for Germany in his The Problem of Upper Silesia, in which he 
argues that the region must not be divided, and as such, giving the whole region to the Poles 
would prove the plebiscite to be “a mere farce,” whereas granting the territory to Germany would 
 
15 J. Weinstein, Upper Silesia: A Country of Contrasts (Paris: Gebethner and Wollf, 1931); William J. Rose, The 
Drama of Upper Silesia (Brattleboro, VT.: Stephen Daye Press, 1935); Robert Machray, The Problem of Upper 
Silesia (London: G. Allen and Inwin, 1945). 
 
16 Sidney Osborne, The Upper Silesian Question and Germany’s Coal Problem  (London: George Allen and Unwin 
Ltd., 1920). 
 
17 Osborne, The Upper Silesian Question, 5. 
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uphold the much-vaunted “doctrine of self-determination.”18  Writing seven years after the 
division of Upper Silesia, Graham Seton Hutchinson likewise argues that Germany should have 
retained, if not all of Upper Silesia, than the whole of the industrial region – although one of his 
main reasons for this is that Poland was proving to be a strong competitor against Britain in the 
coal market.19   
As interest in the region waned among German and Anglo-American scholars after 1945, 
it was in this new post-war setting that Polish historians began studying Upper Silesia in earnest.  
Like earlier works, these studies held to the traditional national narrative, with Upper Silesian 
Poles regaining their “national consciousness” after decades of suffering under the German yoke.  
Emphasizing Poland’s “natural” claims in Upper Silesia helped solidify and justify Poland’s new 
post-1945 western borders, which encompassed the whole of Silesia as well as other formerly 
German lands.  As might be expected, the plight of the working classes was of particular interest 
for historians writing in Communist Poland.  Marian Orzechowski’s 1965 Narodowa 
Demokracja na Górnym Śląsku (do 1918 roku), for example, examines the National Democratic 
Party in Upper Silesia through a class lens, arguing that the party supported middle class ideals at 
the expense of the working class.20  This emphasis on class, in combination with a Marxist 
interpretation of historical development, carried on throughout the Communist period, although 
 
18 Osborne, The Problem of Upper Silesia, with Five Maps (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1921), 4. 
 
19 Graham Seton Hutchinson, Silesia Revisited 1929 (A Examination of the Problems Arising from the Plebiscite and 
Partition and the Relation between the British Coal Problem and Silesia) (London: Simpkin Marshall LTD, 1929). 
 
20 Marian Orzechowski,  Narodowa Demokracja na Górnym Śląsku (do 1918 roku) (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. 
Ossolińskich-Wydawnictwo, 1965).  For an example of working class conditions and industrialization, see: Karol 
Jońca, Położenie Robotników w Przemyśle Górniczo-Hutniczym na Śląsku w Latach 1889-1914 (Wrocław: 
Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1960). 
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works in the 1970s and 1980s, such as the last of the three-volume Histora Śląska, did discuss 
the development of national politics as well.21 
 Of special import in the Polish historiography are the three Upper Silesian Uprisings of 
1919, 1920 and, especially, 1921.22  The Uprisings are viewed almost exclusively in the 
nationalist context; historian Kai Struve notes they are “the Polish national symbol in the history 
of Upper Silesia of the 19th and 20th centuries.”23  These three events were held up as proof that 
Upper Silesians never lost their Polish-character; in addition, the Polish historiography stressed 
the atrocities and “terrors” committed by Germans during these Uprisings, while ignoring or 
denying those committed by Poles.  This view of the Uprisings is still present today.  As recently 
as 2003, in a collection of papers prepared during the eightieth anniversary of the Third Uprising, 
Wiesław Lesiuk could quote at length from the 1982 Encyklopedia powstań śląskich – “The 
Silesian Uprisings are among the most beautiful pages in the history of the Polish nation” – and 
call it “still fully valid today.”24   
 
21 Stanisław Michałkiewicz , ed., Historia Śląska (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1976, 1984).  
For more on Upper Silesia, see: Jan Przewłocki, Międzysojusznicza Komisja Rządząca i Plebiscytowa na Górnym 
Śląsku w Latach 1920-1922 (Katowice: Śląski Intytut Naukowy, 1970); Maria Wanda Wanatowicz, Historia 
społeczno-polityczna Górnego Śląska i Śląska Cieszyńskiego w latach 1918-1945 (Katowice: Wydawnictwo 
Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 1994). 
 
22 For literature, see: Roman Horoszkiewicz, W Trzecim Powstaniu Śląskim (Warsaw: Gebethner i Wolff, 1936); 
Mieczysław Wrzosek, Powstania Śląskie, 1919-1921 (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 
1971); Tadeusz Jędruszczak, Powstania Śląskie 1919-1920-1921 (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Śląsk, 1972); Henryk 
Zieliński, “The Social and Political Background of the Silesian Uprisings.”  Trans. Antoni Szymanowski.  Acta 
Polonaie historica 26 (1972): 73-108; Jan Ludyga-Laskowski, Zarys historii trzech Powstań Śląskich, 1919-1920-
1921  (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawn, Naukowe, 1973); Włodzimierz Dąbrowski, Trzecie Powstanie Śląskie, rok 
1921 (London: Odnowa Limited, 1973); Marian Anusiewicz and Mieczysław Wrzosek, Kronika powstań śląskich 
1919-1921 (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1980). 
 
23 Kai Struve, “Einleitung: Geschichte und Gedächtnis in Oberschlesien.  Die polnischen Aufstände nach dem Ersten 
Weltkrieg,” in Struve, ed., Oberschlesien nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg: Studien zu einem nationalen Konflikt und 
seiner Erinnerung (Marburg: Verlag Herder-Institut, 2003), 2.  Emphasis in original. 
 
24 Wiesław Lesiuk, “Plebiscyt i powstań śląskie z perspektywy osiemdziesięciolecia,” in Powstania śląskie i 
plebiscyt z perspektywy osiemdziesięciolecia, ed. Marek Masnyk (Opole: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Opolskiego, 
2003), 20. 
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German and Anglo-American historiography on the region started again in the 1960s and 
1970s in the context of the rising social history, which replaced the traditional political history.  
Now scholars mostly interpreted nationalism as a political and social phenomenon of modernity.  
In this historiographic context the new studies on Upper Silesia by German and Anglo-American 
historians, too, emphasized the level of industrialization and the related class differences in their 
research on Upper Silesia — but they rejected any dogmatic Marxist approach.  One early 
example is Wolfgang Schumann’s 1961 Oberschlesien 1918/1919: von gemeinsamen Kampf 
deutscher und polnischer Arbeiter.25  Later work by West German scholars, such as Günther 
Doose in his 1987 Die Separatische Bewegung in Oberschlesien nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg 
(1918-1922), focused more on the phenomenon of nationalism in the region and the separatist 
movement after the First World War.26  Lawrence Schofer’s 1975 The Formation of a Modern 
Labor Force: Upper Silesia, 1865-1914 was one of the first of these new histories to appear in 
the Anglo-American historiography.  Here, he uses the region as “a test case for suppositions 
about the special problems inherent in the formation of a modern industrial labor force.”27   
Beyond the attention given to Upper Silesia as a region of accelerated industrialization 
and class conflicts, however, the interest in the area remained relatively low, especially in the 
Anglo-American context.  One of the few works to focus on the region was Richard Blanke’s 
 
25 Wolfgang Schumann, Oberschlesien 1918/1919: von gemeinsamen Kampf deutscher und polnischer Arbeiter 
(Berlin: Rütten & Loening, 1961). 
 
26 Günther Doose, Die Separatische Bewegung in Oberschlesien nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg (1918-1922) 
(Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowtiz, 1987).  See also: Ralph Schattkowsky, “Separatism in the Eastern Provinces of the 
German Reich at the End of the First World War,” Journal of Contemporary History, 29 (1994): 305-324. 
 
27 Lawrence Schofer, The Formation of a Modern Labor Force: Upper Silesia, 1865-1914  (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1975), 1.  Also see: Laura Crago, “Nationalism, Religion, Citizenship and Work in the 
Development of the Polish Working Class and the Polish Trade Union Movement, 1815-1929: A Comparative 
Study of Russian Poland’s Textile Workers and Upper Silesia’s Miners and Metalworkers.”  (PhD diss., Yale 
University, 1993). 
 14 
1975 article, “Upper Silesia, 1921: The Case for Subjective Nationalism.”28  Here, he used the 
plebiscite to explore national subjectivity.  Historians, he argued, have come to define nationality 
only by “objective” qualities – language, race, religion and ancestry among them.  But in certain 
cases, nationality must be defined “subjectively” – that is, “nationality defined in terms of 
individual consciousness alone, usually formed by traditional loyalties to provinces or dynasties 
or other non-ethnic political units, which loyalties can be quite at odds with ‘objective’ ethnic 
conditions.”29  Upper Silesia’s plebiscite provides an excellent case study for objective versus 
subjective nationality, as a good proportion of Polish-speakers ultimately voted for Germany.  
Likewise, Harry K. Rosenthal looked to Upper Silesia in order to challenge the idea of national 
self-determination, arguing that the “assumption – that all human beings hold membership in 
national groups – can be challenged.  Upper Silesia can serve as an illustration.”30  Nearly thirty 
years before the field at large would seriously consider the concept of “national indifference,” 
Rosenthal asked, “Might it not be that the doctrine of national self-determination, rather than 
satisfying a real demand, has actually forced many people, as in the case of Upper Silesia, to 
acquire a nationality?”31 
Since the late 1990s, research on Upper Silesia has slowly but steadily gained 
momentum, especially in the Anglo-American context.  One of the first publications of this last 
wave is T. Hunt Tooley’s 1997 book National Identity and Weimar Germany: Upper Silesia and 
the Eastern Border, 1918-1922, which examines the plebiscite from the vantage point of the new 
 
28 Richard Blanke, “Upper Silesia, 1921: The Case for Subjective Nationality,” Canadian Review of Studies in 
Nationalism 2 (1975): 241-257. 
 
29 Blanke, “Upper Silesia, 1921,” 242. 
 
30 Harry K. Rosenthal, “National Self-Determination: The Example of Upper Silesia,” Journal of Contemporary 
History 7, no. 3/4 (July-Oct. 1972): 231. 
 
31 Rosenthal, “National Self-Determination,” 241. 
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Weimar government and argues that, while the plebiscite was used as a way to bolster support 
for Germany on its eastern border, it also resulted in a reshaping of the relationship between 
Prussia and Germany.32  Tomasz Kamusella has written extensively about Silesian nationalism, 
ethnicity and language since the early 2000s.33  Especially important for this dissertation are 
three recent publications.  Waldemar Grosch’s 2002 Deutsche und polnische Propaganda 
während der Volksabstimmung in Oberschlesien, 1919-1921 analyzes the German and Polish 
plebiscite propaganda, including fliers, leaflets and posters, although this examination is more 
quantitative than qualitative.34  James Bjork, in his 2008 book, Neither Germany nor Pole: 
Catholicism and Nation Indifference in a Central European Borderland, has argued that in the 
wake of the intense Germans and Polish national projects, Upper Silesians avoided choosing a 
national identity by embracing their (Catholic) religious identity.35  The Catholic Church, acting 
as a supra-national institution, played the leading role in the triumph of the religious over the 
national in Upper Silesia at least until the outbreak of the First World War.  Finally, and most 
recently, Brendan Karch’s 2018 Nation and Loyalty in a German-Polish Borderland examines 
national activists’ efforts, and failure, to turn Upper Silesians into loyal Germans or Poles over a 
 
32 Tooley, National Identity and Weimar Germany. 
 
33 For some of Kamusella’s works, see: Silesia and Central European Nationalisms: The Emergence of National and 
Ethnic Groups in Prussian Silesia and Austrian Silesia, 1848-1918 (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 
2006); The Szlonzoks and Their Language: Between Germany, Poland and Szlonzokian Nationalism (San 
Domenico: European University Institute, 2003); “The Szlonzokian Ethnolect in the Context of German and Polish 
Nationalisms,” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 4, no. 1 (2004): 19-39; “Upper Silesia 1870-1920: Between 
Region, Religion, Nation and Ethnicity,” East European Quarterly 38, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 443-462. 
 
34 Waldemar Grosch, Deutsche und polnische Propaganda während der Volksabstimmung in Oberschlesien, 1919-
1921 (Dortmund: Forschungsstelle Ostmitteleuropa, 2002). 
 
35 Bjork, Neither German nor Pole.  Guido Hitze also argues for the primacy of Catholicism in Upper Silesians’ 
identity.  Hitze, Carl Ulitzka (1873-1953), oder, Oberschlesien zwischen den Weltkriegen (Düsseldorf: Droste, 
2002). 
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hundred-year period.36  While still mainly concerned with a nationalist narrative, some Polish 
historians are now also examining Upper Silesians’ regional identity.  Marek Czapliński, in the 
2002 Historia Śląska, writes that there are “a considerable number of those for whom "Silesian-
ness" [“śląskość”] is the most important and who do not want to declare themselves either Polish 
or German."37 
This dissertation fits into this new historiographical tradition; it does not assume that 
Upper Silesians were “naturally” Germans or Poles, but rather examines the efforts made by 
various groups to define and shape a German or Polish identity.  However, both Bjork and Karch 
examine the region over several decades – Karch’s work covers over one hundred years, 
stretching from the middle of the nineteenth century until the middle of the twentieth – allowing 
for a greater discussion of changes over time.  My dissertation includes the First World War and 
the years prior, but is primarily focused on the immediate aftermath – the plebiscite period.  By 
zeroing on these few years, I am better able to examine the nuances of the period.  Tooley also 
limits his discussion to the plebiscite period, but his work only includes the German side.  By 
incorporating both the German and Polish aspects, I believe my work will produce a broader 
view of Upper Silesia.  Like Grosch, I examine the various arguments put forth in the plebiscite 
propaganda, especially the posters.  But while Grosch’s approach is quantitative – calculating the 
percentage of posters which fit in this category or that – I take a qualitative approach, examining 
how the images not only represent economic and/or national interests, but also how they define 
what it means to be a German or Pole in these new nations.  Above all, the plebiscite propaganda 
 
36 Brendan Karch, Nation and Loyalty in a German-Polish Borderland: Upper Silesia, 1848-1960 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2018). 
 
37 Marek Czapiński, “Dzieje Śląska od 1806 do 1945 roku,” in Historia Śląska, ed. Marek Czapliński, Eliżbieta 
Kaszuba, Gabriela Wąs and Rościsław Żerelik (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2002), 296. 
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is highly gendered, an aspect that is conspicuously absent across the historiography.  By 
incorporating gender into my analysis of the plebiscite period, and especially the propaganda, I 
add a category of analysis that is lacking in the Upper Silesian historiography. 
More broadly, this dissertation contributes to the literature of Eastern Europe during the 
First World War.  While the war on the Western Front has a long and rich historiography, the 
experience of the First World War is still relatively understudied.  The last two decades, 
however, have witnessed a growth in the field, and not just in works on the battlefields.  This 
new scholarship has examined the plight of refugees and displaced peoples, especially in the 
Russian Empire;38 the German encounters with and subsequent imaginings of the eastern 
borderlands;39 and the experiences of the Home Fronts and their changing relationship with the 
state.40  Perhaps most important for my own work, however, is the growing focus on the violence 
and fighting which continued until the early 1920s throughout Central and Eastern Europe. 
While the First World War officially ended with the Armistice of November 1918, and 
fighting did cease on the Western Front, Central and Eastern Europe continued to exist in a state 
of chaotic upheaval and violence until the 1920s.  Robert Gerwarth argues, “To view [11 
November 1918] as the end point of the Great War is thus only possible if we ignore what was 
happening in the East, where violence often continued unabated for several years.”41  Peter 
 
38 For examples, see: Peter Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia during World War I 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999); Gatrell and Nick Baron, eds., Homelands: War, Population and 
Statehood in Eastern Europe and Russia, 1918-1924 (London: Anthem Press, 2004). 
 
39 For examples, see: Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity and 
German Occupation in World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Annemarie H. Sammartino, 
The Impossible Border: Germany and the East, 1914-1922 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010). 
 
40 For examples, see: Belinda Davis, Home Fires Burning: Food, Politics and Everyday Life in World War I Berlin  
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Maureen Healy, Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg 
Empire: Total War and Everyday Life in World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Alexander 
Watson, Ring of Steel: Germany and Austria-Hungary in World War I (New York: Basic Books, 2014). 
41 Robert Gerwarth, “Foreword,” in World War I in Central and Eastern Europe: Politics, Conflicts and Military 
Experience, eds. Judith Devlin, Maria Falina and John Paul Newman (London: I.B. Tauris, 2018), ix. 
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Holquist has used the term “continuum of crisis” to describe the years between 1914 and 1921; 
while speaking mainly about Russia during this time, he does note that, “Throughout much of 
central and eastern Europe, the war wound down in an extended convulsion of revolutions and 
civil strife.”42  Likewise, Maria Bucur argues, “Declarations of war or the signing of an armistice 
or peace treaty no longer demarcate when the war started or when it ended.”43  Although here she 
is speaking directly to the experience of the Second World War in Romania, the sentiment holds 
true for the First World War in the larger Eastern European context.   
This new scholarship examines why violence was so endemic across the “shatter zones” 
of Central and Eastern Europe.  Violence was most concentrated in the multi-ethnic, multi-
lingual, multi-religious borderlands of the fallen empires, as well as in areas which perceived 
themselves to be among the “losers” of the war.44  While most of the focus is on Germany’s 
eastern border, the new nations of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Russian Civil War, 
historians have also included Ireland in this discussion, often comparing its civil war and 
revolution to Polish, and even specifically Upper Silesian, paramilitarism.45  Running parallel to 
this scholarship, but not yet connecting, is the work led by women and gender historians 
exploring how nations resettled after the First World War by re-establishing the gender order and 
 
42 Peter Holquist, Making War, Forging Revolution: Russia’s Continuum of Crisis, 1914-1921 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2002), 3. 
 
43 Maria Bucur, Heroes and Victims: Remembering War in Twentieth-Century Romania (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2009), xi. 
 
44 See: Julia Eichenberg and John Paul Newman, “Introduction: Aftershocks: Violence in Dissolving Empires after 
the First World War,” Contemporary European History 19, no. 3 (2010): 183-94; Robert Gerwarth and John Horne, 
“The Great War and Paramilitarism in Europe, 1917-23,” Contemporary European History 19, no. 3 (2010): 267-73. 
 
45 For Ireland, see: Anne Dolan, “The British Culture of Paramilitary Violence in the Irish War of Independence,” in 
War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence in Europe after the Great War, ed. Robert Gerwarth and John Horne (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012); for Ireland and Poland, see: Julia Eichenberg, “Soldiers to Civilians, Civilians to 
Soldiers: Poland and Ireland after the First World War,” in Ibid; for Ireland and Upper Silesia, see: T.K. Wilson, 
Frontiers of Violence: Conflict and Identity in Ulster and Upper Silesia, 1918-1922 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010). 
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reintegrating men into society.  While there is a sizable amount of literature on this for Western 
Europe,46 Central and Eastern European historians have yet to fully examine these questions; the 
main exception is Maureen Healy’s work on post-war Austria.47   
Thus, my own work fits into this growing field.  I argue that Upper Silesia’s “continuum 
of crisis” lasted until the summer of 1921, when the Third Uprising ended, at the earliest, and 
June 1922, when the region was officially divided, at the latest.  The plebiscite period is book-
ended by violence and upheaval, beginning with the German Revolution and ending with the 
Third Uprising.  However, I also argue that postwar Upper Silesians, in the face of continued 
violence, attempted to return, to paraphrase Margaret Anderson, to the “practice of 
democracy.”48  Not counting the plebiscite, Upper Silesians voted in three democratic elections 
during this period.  With the exception of the Third Uprising, violence was not used as a fait 
accompli for either Germans or Poles to take control of the region by force.  While neither side 
liked it, both agreed that the fate of Upper Silesia would be decided at the ballot box, not the 
battlefield. 
 
46 For women, see: Erika Kuhlman, Reconstructing Patriarchy after the Great War: Women, Gender and Postwar 
Reconciliation between Nations  (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,  2008); Susan Kingsley Kent, Making Peace: The 
Reconstruction of Gender in Interwar Britain (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Mary Louise Roberts, 
Civilization without Sexes: Reconstructing Gender in Postwar France, 1917-1927  (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1994).  For men and studies of masculinity, see: Joanna Burke, Dismembering the Male: Men’s Bodies, 
Britain and the Great War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Paul Lerner, Hysterical Men: War, 
Psychiatry and the Politics of Trauma in Germany, 1890-1930 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); John Horne, 
“Masculinity in Politics and War in the Age of Nation-States and the World Wars, 1850-1950,” in Masculinities in 
Politics and War: Gendering Modern History, ed. Stefan Dudink, Karen Hagemann and John Tosh (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2004); Glenda Sluga, “Masculinities, Nations and the New World Order: Peacemaking 
and Nationality in Britain, France and the United States after the First World War,” in Ibid. 
 
47 Healy, “Civilizing the Soldier in Postwar Austria,” in Gender and War in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe, ed. 
Nancy M. Wingfield and Maria Bucur (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 47-69. 
 
48 Margaret Lavinia Anderson, Practicing Democracy: Elections and Political Culture in Imperial Germany 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
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 Finally, this dissertation fits into broader historiographical trends regarding nation and 
nationalism.  For the national activists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
nation was a primordial, ancient entity; the nation’s people were always its people, even if they 
themselves had forgotten this.  It was the charge of the nationalists to “awaken” their co-
nationals from their “slumber.”  This potent narrative is present in the national historiographies 
produced decades later, as seen in the above discussion of Polish literature on Upper Silesia; 
especially in the 1960s and 1970s, but even continuing to today, the three Upper Silesian 
Uprisings were viewed as the moments when the Polish nation in the region “awoke,” declaring 
themselves definitively as Poles.   
The 1980s brought about a constructivist turn in the scholarship, led by Benedict 
Anderson and Ernest Gellner.  Anderson defined the nation as an “imagined political 
community,”49 while Gellner called nationalism “primarily a political principle, which holds that 
the political and the national unit should be congruent.”50  While a shared linguistic or cultural 
heritage might form the base of a group or community, the nation as such was only born when 
educated elites decided to make it so.  Gellner maintained, “It is nationalism which engenders 
nations, and not the other way round.”51  Miroslav Hroch argued that national development, at 
least in Central and Eastern Europe, began when educated social elites, not belonging to the 
ruling ethnic group, decided that their own language and culture was worthy of a nation of its 
 
49 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: 
Verso, 1983), 6. 
 
50 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalisms (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1. 
 
51 Gellner, Nations and Nationalisms, 55. 
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own, and then took it upon themselves to “awaken” the people.52  Above all, though, this 
interpretation of the nation placed it as a modern phenomenon, one only possible in an age of 
print, growing rates of literacy and industrialization.53 
What none of the above theories consider is the gendered aspect of nationalism.  Even 
after Joan Scott’s seminal 1986 article, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,”54 
the connections between gender and the nation were only explored in the early 1990s, when 
feminist scholars of the Third World began to study women’s participation in nationalist 
struggles in the imperial context.  Since then, gendered nationalism has erupted among scholars 
of gender and feminism.  Gender not only shapes conceptions of the nation, but nationalism also 
establishes constructions of gender identity.  As Mrinalini Sinha has argued, “The attachments to 
modern gender and national identities have developed together and reinforced each other.”55  
Anderson, Gellner and their peers defined the nation as a political entity, therefore relegating it 
the public – re: masculine – sphere.  In the 1990s, however, women and gender historians began 
to “rediscover” women as active participants in the nation-building projects, serving as both 
biological and cultural reproducers of the nation, as well as activists in national movements.56 
 
52 Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social 
Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985), Ch. 4. 
 
53 For literature, see above authors and: John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (New York: St. Martins Press, 
1982); Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality 
(Cambridge: MIT Press and Wiley, New York, 1953); Adrian Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, 
Religion and Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and 
Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Anthony J. 
Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nationalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). 
 
54 Joan Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” American Historical Review 91, no.5 (1986): 
1053-1075. 
 
55 Mrinalina Sinha, “Gender and Nation,” in Women’s History in a Global Perspective, vol. 1, ed. Bonnie Smith 
(Urbana: Illinois University Press, 2005), 231. 
 
56 Sinha, “Gender and Nation.” 
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Incorporating a gender perspective into studies of the nation and nationalism do not just 
return women to the narrative, however; it also reevaluates to role men played as men, and the 
contested constructions of masculinity.  By treating “men” as “the universal,” studies of 
nationalism have often overlooked the importance of masculinity for the imagination and 
construction of the nation and national identities.57  Nationalist discourses, then, often use gender 
images — constructions of femininity and masculinity, which were closely related and often 
complementary — to define who belongs to the nation and create a hierarchical gender order of 
the nation.58  
One of the most widespread gendered constructions is the image of the nation as a 
“peoples’ family.”59  Historians such as Ida Blom have noted that, in the image of the nation as a 
family, women are usually charged with keeping and passing on their nation’s history and 
culture.  The term “mother tongue” highlights this notion, as it was the mothers’ responsibility to 
teach her children their national language.60  Women were often constructed as the “reproducers” 
of the nation, not the “producers” — reproducers both of culture, as well as of future members 
(men) of the nation.61  Men, as fathers and sons, stand to protect and provide for this national 
family.  Thus, while women are used to symbolize the nation’s past, Anne McClintock argues 
 
57 Ibid, and Horne, “Masculinities in Politics and War.” 
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that men “represent the progressive agent of national modernity.”62  Only when all family 
members are employed at their own tasks and in their own spheres – that is, performing their 
presubscribed gender roles -- can the nation be considered strong. 
But even these gendered works on the nation were confined to the constructionist 
paradigm which, while denying that nations were “eternal,”63 still held them to be an eventuality; 
Gellner noted that “nationalism as such is fated to prevail, but not any one particular 
nationalism.”  Political legitimacy in the modern world revolved around the nation; therefore, all 
people, everywhere, would eventually be swept up and belong to a nation.  Nations did not exist 
before the modern age, but their existence now was in no way questioned.  Only in the last 
decade have historians of East Central Europe begun to examine in earnest issues of national 
ambivalence and indifference – of the possibility that people’s highest loyalty could be not to the 
nation, but to another facet of identity – for example, a region or religion.  In her 2010 article 
“Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis,” Tara Zahra 
argued, “Making indifference visible…enables historians to better understand the limits of 
nationalization and thereby challenges the nationalist narratives, categories and frameworks that 
have traditionally dominated the historiography of eastern Europe.”64  She specifically pointed to 
Upper Silesians as “perhaps the most famously indifferent population in twentieth century 
Europe…The story of Upper Silesia challenges the teleological assumption that nationalization 
 
62 Anne McClintock, “’No Longer in a Future Heaven’: Nationalism, Gender and Race,” in Becoming National: A 
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was irreversible.”65  The concept of national indifference opens historians “to consider the 
history of individuals who stood outside or on the margins” 66 of the national community. 
Much of the work on nation, nationalism and national activism in Eastern Europe has 
focused on the Habsburg Empire, particularly the Czech and Bohemian lands;67 Keely Stauter-
Halsted’s The Nation in the Village examines Polish nationalism in Austrian Galicia.68  
However, these works do not address how the First World War and its immediate aftermath 
affected nation-building and national activism in the region, focusing instead on the last half of 
the nineteenth century up to 1914.  In Guardians of the Nation, Pieter Judson argues that it was 
during the First World War that local nationalists finally triumphed over national indifference.69 
However, this examination appears only in the epilogue, and Judson himself admits that the 
historiography on the war is still rather weak.  Nor have such works fully explored the gendered 
dimension of nationalization and nation-building.  While war, nation and gender have been the 
subjects of increasing exploration in the Western European context,70 such studies on Eastern 
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Europe are still quite sparse.71  Bucur and Nancy Wingfield, in their Gender and War in 
Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe,  note that it is only recently that cultural and social facets, as 
opposed to tradition diplomatic and military concerns, have been explored, but “gender analysis 
has remained marginal in this new trend.”72  They argue that a major reason for this gap in the 
literature is the “overriding centrality of the tension between nationalism and trans-nationalism 
or internationalism….The concern of political elites with consolidating the national identity of 
the nascent states of eastern Europe crowded out most other issues raised by the experience of 
World War I.”73     
Thus, this work, following the examples of Bjork and Karch, examines national activism 
in an area known for its national indifference, but takes a gendered view of the nation and its 
representations.  While most Eastern European studies of nationalism focus on the former 
Habsburg Empire, my focus on another multi-ethnic region, situated in a different national 
context, provides another vantage point from which to study the area. 
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Sources and Organization 
The main source base for this study is primarily comprised of the wide variety of printed 
sources found in the Archiwum Państwowe w Katowicach (State Archive of Katowice; APK) and 
the Biblioteka Śląska (Library of Silesia).  These sources can be divided into three broad 
categories: newspapers published in the region; leaflets, pamphlets, brochures, posters, 
caricatures, and other materials produced as propaganda for the plebiscite; and the results of 
various national and local elections, language censuses and, of course, the plebiscite itself. 
I chose six newspapers – three German, three Polish – and followed them throughout the 
period from 1912 to 1922, as much as the holdings of the Biblioteka Śląska would allow.  The 
German newspapers I selected were the nationalist Kattowitzer Zeitung (published daily) and 
Oberschlesier (published monthly), and the left-wing Volkswille (published daily).  The Polish 
newspapers I examined were Górnoślązak (published daily), the Polish nationalist/Catholic 
Katolik (published Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays), and the left-wing Gazeta Robotnicza 
(also published Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays).  These newspapers not only tried to define 
in their articles what it meant to be German, Polish or Upper Silesian; they also informed their 
contemporaries about the activities of the two competing nationalist movements.  They provided 
information about events and associational life from different perspectives, because each 
publication had its own political bias, and they also provided analysis and interpretation of 
election and poll results.  The newspapers are especially important in the months immediately 
following the end of the First World War, as each espoused a different path for Upper Silesia to 
follow in this time of uncertainty.  In addition, I examine two satirical magazines produced as 
plebiscite propaganda: the Polish-language Kocynder and the German-language Pieron.  Both 
represent the nationalist extreme of the propaganda material. 
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My second group of sources includes the posters, brochures, flyers and such produced as 
plebiscite propaganda.  These items were found in the Biblioteka Śląska and in the APK.  I use 
these sources to analyze the competing constructions of what it meant to be German, Polish or 
Upper Silesian.  In them, the visual and textual elements are most closely related.  Because they 
value imagery over text, I would argue that the posters analyzed here largely provoke an 
immediate response.  Similar to the printed sources mentioned above, the images are both highly 
gendered and highly classed, and thus are a good source to examine how these and other 
“categories of difference” played out against the national. The leaflets and brochures place text 
in the primary position.  With more space in which to craft an argument, and include a myriad of 
statistics, these materials tend to produce a more considered response.  
Finally, I analyze the results of national and local elections, the language censuses and, 
especially, the plebiscite as a way to determine Upper Silesians’ reactions to the nationalistic 
rhetoric and propaganda.  Again, though, one must be careful not to examine these results from a 
purely nationalist vantage point.  For example, the language censuses are useful in that they 
illustrate how many “Germans” and “Poles” nationalists took to reside in Upper Silesia, but do 
not tell us how German or Polish these speakers actually felt or considered themselves to be.  
Lastly, I use the plebiscite as an indicator for how Upper Silesians reacted and responded to the 
plebiscite propaganda.  While complete knowledge of reception is impossible, these results of 
the plebiscite do tell us which state the Upper Silesians chose to live in, even if this did not 
correspond to their ethnic nation. 
This dissertation begins with an examination, as its title suggests, of “Upper Silesia 
Before the Crossroads.”  Upper Silesia’s politics, economy and demographics at the turn of the 
twentieth century are discussed, with special attention given to the Reichstag elections of 1903, 
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1907 and 1912.  It was during these years that Wojciech Korfanty’s Polish Party made its 
entrance on the political scene, and through these elections we can see how the Upper Silesian 
electorate swerved between the German and Polish national parties and the supranational 
Catholic Center and, to a lesser extent, the German Socialist Party.  In analyzing the newspapers, 
I examine the different representations of Upper Silesians, Germans and Poles before the war, 
and how these representations changed during the war.  I pay special attention to the change in 
the Polish press after 1916, when it started to become clear that the dream of an independent 
Poland would be fulfilled.  This part also discusses Upper Silesia’s experience during the First 
World War; while never a site of actual fighting, the region was an important site for wartime 
manufacturing, and is coal proved vital for the German war effort. 
 Part II, entitled “Down Which Road?,” examines the fifteen months between the end of 
the First World War and Inter-Allied Commission’s occupation of the region, during which time 
a myriad of choices for the future of Upper Silesia were possible – German, Polish, 
Independence, and several Socialist alternatives.  Upper Silesia stood in the middle between 
Germany, which was transitioning from Reich to Republic, and Poland, which was attempting to 
knit together three disparate parts to form one coherent nation-state.  It was a time of violence, 
with the German Revolution, strikes in the mines, and the First Upper Silesian Uprising in 
August 1919.  At the same time, however, most Upper Silesians attempted to leave the chaos of 
the war and its aftermath and reestablish democratic norms.  Upper Silesians would vote three 
times in 1919, each time free of violence and corruption.  This Part also examines the 
negotiations occurring far from Upper Silesia, as Roman Dmowski and Ignacy Paderewski 
attempted to convince the Allied Powers to give the region to Poland.  Due in large part to David 
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Lloyd George’s misgivings, the Treaty of Versailles instead stipulated that the future of the 
region would be determined by plebiscite.      
 The plebiscite campaign is the focus of Part III, entitled, “’Stay in Germany’ or ‘Become 
Polish’?”  After a brief discussion of the events of summer 1920 – the Polish-Soviet War’s Battle 
of Warsaw and the “Miracle on the Vistula,” the East Prussian plebiscites and the Second Upper 
Silesian Uprising – the part turns to the German and Polish plebiscite campaigns.  Both sides 
established Plebiscite Commissariats to oversee the propaganda.  I divide the propaganda into 
three groups.  First, I examine how the plebiscite was presented in the newspapers.  Even as the 
various papers worked towards the goal of securing the plebiscite for their nation, their own 
political agendas were still expressed in the articles, giving nuance to how each defined what it 
meant to be German or Polish.  The satirical magazines, Kocynder and Pieron, relied heavily on 
illustrations, cartoons, and at times crude or dark humor.  The most extreme definitions of 
Germans and Poles are found here.  Finally, I analyze the posters, leaflets and brochures 
produced for the campaign.  Throughout all these different media, I highlight the arguments put 
forth – national, ethnic, economic – and discuss how these gendered images informed and shaped 
what it meant to be a German, Pole or Upper Silesian.  
 Lastly, the plebiscite and its consequences will be discussed in the Part IV, entitled “To 
the Polls.”  Here, I examine detailed voting records from the plebiscite, which included all voting 
districts, from the large cities in the Industrial Triangle to the tiny villages in which less than fifty 
votes were cast.  When it appeared that Poland might lose the Industrial Triangle to Germany, 
Korfanty engineered the Third, and largest, Upper Silesian Uprising; fighting would last from 
May until July.  As the decision was made to divide the region, I again return to the papers and   
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magazines, examining how the division was perceived and presented.  As a final point, the 
Epilogue carries the Upper Silesian story into the mid-1920s, to determine what lasting effects, if 



















BEFORE THE CROSSROADS: 
UPPER SILESIA BEFORE AND DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
 To be Upper Silesian in the mid-nineteenth century meant predominantly one thing – to 
be Catholic.  The religion of the vast majority – 90 percent – of the population, Catholicism was 
the main identifier for most Upper Silesians.  Politically, the Catholic Center Party reigned 
supreme, dominating in the Reichstag elections of the 1880s and 1890s.  While inhabited by 
German- and Polish-speakers, ethnic and national differences were not emphasized, and many, if 
not most, Upper Silesians were at least functionally bilingual.  But as the nineteenth century gave 
way to the twentieth, national activists – both German and Polish – began to focus on Upper 
Silesia.   
 This part examines the two events which changed Upper Silesians’ perceptions and 
definitions of Germans and Poles in the region – the growing nationalist movements which 
appeared at the turn of the twentieth century, and the First World War, which brought with it the 
possibility of an independent Polish nation-state.  The first chapter explores the wave of Polish 
nationalists who appeared in the region after 1890.  The battle for Polish nationalism in Upper 
Silesia was waged between two groups: the Catholic moderates, led by Adam Napieralski and 
his newspaper empire, and the new radicals, headed by Wojciech Korfanty, a political firebrand 
who was only beginning to make his mark on Upper Silesia.  During the last three Reichstag 
elections before the outbreak of the First World War – 1903, 1907 and 1912 – the newly formed 
Polish Party, headed by Korfanty and later supported by Napieralski, challenged the political 
hegemony of the Catholic Center Party.  Looking especially at the 1912 election, Napieralski and 
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his Katolik camp issued their own specific definition of what it meant to be a Polish Upper 
Silesian, one which excluded not only German-speakers but also Polish-speakers who did not 
vote for the Polish national party. 
 The second chapter focuses on Upper Silesia’s experience in the First World War, as well 
as how the war caused Polish nationalists to question what it meant to be Polish.  For 
Napieralski, Polish nationalism’s main concern was securing linguistic and cultural rights for 
Poles in Upper Silesia, not independence.  By 1914, Poland had been off the map of Europe for 
over one hundred years.  The First World War, however, brought with it the possibility of an 
independent Polish state, and with it the questions of who would belong to that state.  This 
chapter examines the evolution of Napieralski’s wartime rhetoric, from conciliatory at its 
outbreak, his elation at the November 1916 announcement of the establishment of the Kingdom 
of Poland, and bitter resentment at the fact that this new Poland would not include Upper Silesia.  
The change in German nationalist rhetoric in the newspapers is also discussed, as the German 
press hardened its stance on Poles as the war drew to a close.  This part, then, serves to establish 
a baseline definition of how Germans and Poles in Upper Silesia viewed themselves and each 
other, in order to examine how these definitions and perceptions changed in the post-war 
plebiscite period. 
1. Upper Silesia Before the War 
Upper Silesia holds a unique place in German, Polish and Central European history.  It 
was religiously homogenous but culturally, ethnically and linguistically mixed.  Its Polish-
speaking residents were separated from their German neighbors by language and class, and from 
their Polish counterparts in Posen, to the north, by history.  Whereas Posen had been a part of the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and held fast to its Polish heritage, Upper Silesia had only 
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been a part of the medieval Piast kingdom.  In the nineteenth century Posen was agrarian where 
Upper Silesia was industrial; Germans in Posen were predominantly Protestant, while in Upper 
Silesia they shared the Catholic faith with Poles.  Posen was at the vanguard of Polish 
nationalism; Upper Silesians held to a religious or regional identity. 
 In the last decades before the First World War, however, Upper Silesia underwent a 
series of changes that would challenge these local identities, especially for those who were 
culturally and linguistically Polish.  A new brand of Polish nationalism, inspired by that in 
Posen, would sweep through the region, causing in-fighting between those who favored a 
moderate program of nationalization and those who advocated a more radical approach.  In the 
midst of this, the outbreak of the First World War occurred.  As the fighting wore on and Upper 
Silesians began to lose faith in the German government, Polish and German Upper Silesians 
would struggle to redefine themselves and each other. 
This chapter will serve as an introduction to the region – its politics and growing 
industrialization at the turn of the twentieth century and especially in the years leading up to the 
First World War.  It will also examine how Polish- and German-speaking Upper Silesians 
defined themselves and each other, and in what ways the rhetoric surrounding these definitions 
changed before and during the First World War.  As will be seen, expressions of Germanness 
and Polishness in the German press are comparatively light when compared to those produced by 
the Polish press.  This should not come as a surprise; Upper Silesia was, after all, a part of the 
German Reich, and its people were German citizens.  The German press did not view the Polish 
nationalist movement as a threat until the First World War, and German nationalist groups 
preferred to focus their efforts in Posen.  The task was harder for Polish activists, who had to 
persuade the Polish-speaking population – many of whom were bilingual and saw Germanization 
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as a means of social mobility – that their true national loyalties lay with a country that appeared 
on no maps.  Focusing on the publications of Adam Napieralski’s Katolik camp, which were 
among the most widely-read Polish-language newspapers in the region, it becomes clear that 
being a Pole meant something much more than simply speaking the Polish dialect at home.  True 
Poles were defined not only by their ethnicity, but just as importantly (if not more so) by their 
religion and politics.   
1.1: Upper Silesia: Its Place, People and Politics 
Upper Silesia lies at the crossroads of Germanic and Slavic Europe.  A part of the Polish 
kingdom in the Middle Ages, the entire region was later transferred to Bohemian and, in 1526, to 
Habsburg rule.  It remained a part of the Austrian Empire until Frederick the Great claimed the 
land during the Austrian Wars of Succession in 1742.  It was, therefore, not a part of the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth, which was partitioned by Prussia, Austria and Russia in the late 
eighteenth-century.  This history explains Upper Silesia’s unique place in East Central Europe.  
While it had been separated from Poland for seven centuries, and was a part of Prussia/Germany 
for less than two, both German and Polish nationalists claimed that the land was historically and 
nationally theirs. 
After the Wars of Liberation in 1813, Silesia became a province in its own right, split into 
the three districts (Regierungsbezirke) of Lower, Middle and Upper Silesia, the latter known also 
as the Oppeln Regency, after its main seat in the city of Oppeln/Opole.1  The division of Silesia 
into these three districts would have far reaching and unintended consequences.  While Lower 
and Middle Silesia were inhabited predominantly by German-speakers and Protestants, Upper 
Silesia was ethnically mixed with a large majority of Polish-speakers, especially in the 
 
1 Lower and Middle Silesia were centered around Leignitz/ Legnica and Breslau/Wrocław, respectively.  Breslau 
also served as the capital for the entire province of Silesia. 
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industrializing eastern counties (Kreise).2  While ethnically mixed, the district was religiously 
homogenous, with over 90 percent of Upper Silesians declaring Catholicism as their faith in 
1890.3  These differences served to highlight Upper Silesia as distinct from the rest of the 
province. 
 The defining geographical feature of the region was the Oder/Odra River and its plain.  
The Oder cut through the western-most counties of the district and served as a linguistic dividing 
line between German-speakers on the left bank and the ethnically mixed regions on the right.  To 
the south, the Beskids (a branch of the Carpathians) formed the border with Habsburg Moravia.  
The eastern border was not so much geological as it was political; by 1795, Upper Silesia 
bordered the Russian and Austrian-Habsburg holdings of partitioned Poland, as well as, farther 
to the north, the Posen area of Prussian Poland.  By and large, Upper Silesia in the early 1800s 
was an agricultural district, centered mainly on grains and potatoes.4  It was not over winter 
wheat and rye, however, that Germany and Poland would stake claims to the region.  In the mid-
 
2 Brendan Karch, “Nationalism on the Margins: Silesians between Germany and Poland, 1848-1945” (PhD diss., 
Yale University, 2010) 43.  Sarah Wambaugh divides the counties between three categories: Industrial (Beuthen, 
Beuthen City [Stadt], Königshütte, Kattowitz, Kattowitz Stadt, Hindenburg/Zabrze), Industrial-Agricultural 
(Gleiwitz Stadt, Tost-Gleiwitz/Toszek Gliwice, Rybnik, Pleß/Pszczyna, Tarnowitz/Tarnowski Góry), and 
Agricultural (Kreuzburg/Kluczbork, Namslau, Rosenberg/Oleśno, Oppeln, Oppeln Stadt, Gross-Strehlitz/Wielkie 
Strzelce, Lublinitz/Lubliniec, Kosel/Koźle, Neustadt/Prudnik, Ratibor/Racibórz, Ratibor Stadt, 
Leobschütz/Głupczyce). Sarah Wambaugh, Plebiscites since the First World War, with a Collection of Official 
Documents, v. 1-2 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1933), vol. I, 206.  Some of 
these districts were combined to form the twelve larger electoral districts, which were: Kreuzburg-Rosenberg, 
Oppeln, Gross Strehlitz-Kosel, Lublinitz-Tost-Gleiwitz, Beuthen-Tarnowitz, Kattowitz-Zabrze, Pleß-Rybnik, 
Ratibor, Neustadt, Leobschütz, Falkenberg-Grottkau and Neisse.  All but the last three were mixed-language 
districts; the others, located west of the Oder, were predominantly German-speaking. 
 
3 Eight percent declared themselves Protestants, while one percent of the district was Jewish.  Protestants and Jews 
were, for the most part, German-speaking, although a number Polish-speaking Protestants could be found in 
Kreuzberg county, located in the north-west corner of the district.  James Bjork, “Neither German nor Pole: 
Catholicism and National Ambivalence in Upper Silesia, 1890-1914” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1999), 28. 
 
4 Stanisław Michalkiewicz, ed.  Historia Śląska, Vol. III, part I (Wrocław: Polska Akademia Nauk, Institut Historii, 
1976), 89.  For more on Upper Silesian agriculture and its development, see: Michael R. Haines, “Agriculture and 
Development in Prussian Upper Silesia, 1846-1913,” The Journal of Economic History 42, no. 2 (June 1982): 355-
384. 
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nineteenth century, Upper Silesia truly distinguished itself not by what grew in its soil, but by 
what could be found beneath it. 
 The color black seemed to rule in Upper Silesia.  It was the color of the Center Party, 
whose predominance in the region will be described in more detail below, and it was the color of 
Upper Silesia’s economic driving force: coal.  Situated on one of Europe’s main coal fields5 – a 
field which ignored political boundaries and extended into Russian Poland and Austrian Galicia 
– over the course of the nineteenth century Upper Silesia came to be defined by its mining and 
rose to be one of the most important industrial centers in Germany.  Coal was king, but iron ore 
and zinc were also mined, and steel production and smelting operations also came to be 
important in the late nineteenth century.  While mining had been a part of the Upper Silesian 
economy since the late eighteenth century (the foundries in Gliwice were said to have cast the 
Prussian guns used against Napoleon in Leipzig in 1813),6 it was not until the latter half of the 
nineteenth century that Upper Silesian mining truly asserted itself as a major force.   
 From 1852 to 1885 Upper Silesian mining increased by 1000 percent.7  While coal 
production at mid-century was 1.7 million tons, by 1885 it had grown to 12.7 million tons; on the 
eve of the First World War, Upper Silesia was producing almost 44 million tons of coal 
annually.8  The region was second only to the Ruhr in German coal output, supplying 23 percent 
 
5 Robert Machray, The Problem of Upper Silesia (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1945), 32.  Machray 
locates the other main European coal fields in Great Britain; the Ruhr Valley, extending to northern France and the 
Benelux countries; and Donetz region, now in Ukraine. 
 
6 Norman J.G. Pounds, The Upper Silesian Industrial Region (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1958), 59. 
 
7 Laura Crago, “Nationalism, religion, citizenship and work in the development of the Polish working class and the 
Polish trade union movement, 1815-1929: a comparative study of Russian Poland’s textile workers and Upper 
Silesian miners and metalworkers” (PhD diss., Yale University, 1993), 61. 
 
8 Marek Czapliński, “Dzieje Śląska od 1806 do 1945 roku,” in Historia Śląska , ed. Marek Czapliński, Elżbieta 
Kaszuba, Gabriela Wąs and Rościsław Żerelik (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2002), 304; 
Lawrence Schofer, The Formation of a Modern Labor Force: Upper Silesia, 1865-1914 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1975), 10. Czapliński puts the 1913 total coal production at 49.3 million tons. 
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of Germany’s coal at the outbreak of the war.  Though not as important as coal, the mining of 
zinc and iron ore also significantly contributed to Upper Silesia’s economy.  Zinc production 
continued to increase up until 1914 and remained important for Germany, but it could not keep 
up with zinc production in other areas of Europe.  Iron ore production, meanwhile, peaked in 
1890 and steadily declined after the turn of the twentieth century as deposits were mined to 
completion.  Essential in the local manufacture of steel, after 1900 Upper Silesian plants began 
importing more and more iron ore from other European nations.9 
 From the beginning of the nineteenth century, and even before, the wealthy families of 
Silesia had held large stakes in mining, but their hold on the industry increased sharply in the 
1870s.  Taking advantage of the years of economic uncertainty which followed unification, noble 
families like Henckel von Donnersmarck began consolidating firms into large conglomerates.  At 
the turn of the twentieth century, fourteen of the twenty-two firms operating in Upper Silesia 
controlled over 92 percent of production.10  These Junker industrial magnates were universally 
German and predominantly Roman Catholic. 
 The workers, on the other hand, though also Catholic, were culturally and linguistically 
Polish – about 85 percent of the workforce were Polish-speakers.11  Despite comprising the 
overwhelming majority of workers, Polish-speakers were severely underrepresented in skilled 
and managerial positions.  Most took on the unskilled jobs of sorters, haulers and shovelers, 
while German-speakers held the semi-skilled and skilled, not to mention better paying, positions.  
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speakers two to one; only three of the 420 mining directors and administrators were Polish-
speakers.12   
 Recruited mainly from the surrounding countryside, these workers powered Upper 
Silesia’s industry, which, as discussed above, grew by leaps and bounds in the last half of the 
nineteenth century.  The workforce also quickly expanded at this time, none more significantly 
than those employed in coal mining.  In the span of just over 40 years, from 1870 to 1913, the 
number of coal miners grew by over a factor of five, from 23,000 to 123,000 miners.  By this 
time, the number of ironworkers had dropped from its 1885 peak of 3800 to 1000 workers, but 
zinc mining held steady, employing about 13,000 workers.13  As more workers and their families 
moved to the Industrial Triangle, the urban landscape of this region changed dramatically.  By 
1910, the four major industrial cities – Kattowitz, Gleiwitz, Beuthen and Königshütte/Królewska 
Huta – had populations of over 60,000, and 62 percent of the area’s residents lived in cities or 
towns of 25,000 or more.14  All told, industry employed almost half of those able to work in the 
region. 
 Despite these large numbers, however, firms frequently complained of work shortages 
after 1890.  Though large, the growth in the workforce could not keep pace with increased 
production.  Unlike in the Ruhr, where labor shortages were often due to a lack of skilled 
workers, in Upper Silesia the problem lay in the need for unskilled workers, a situation which 
labor historian Lawrence Schofer refers to as “something of a mystery.”15  One of the main 
reasons for the labor shortage appears to be internal migration away from Upper Silesia to other 
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areas of Germany and Prussia – the so-called Ostflucht, or Flight from the East.  In the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Upper Silesia had one of the highest birthrates in the 
Kaiserreich.16  However, it lost much of this natural population increase to emigration, as 
(mainly Polish-speaking) workers left Upper Silesia for the higher-paying mining jobs in the 
Ruhr.17  Some 75,000 immigrants came from other areas of Germany and Prussia, predominantly 
Saxony, starting in the late 1880s.  These German Protestants would change the face of some of 
the industrial cities,18 but because they held mainly administrative and managerial positions in 
the industrial firms and plants, they did not alleviate the shortage of unskilled labor.19 
 To fill the work shortages while simultaneously avoiding raising wages, firms looked to 
three groups: women, children and foreign workers.  On the eve of the First World War, women 
and children together accounted for ten percent of the Upper Silesian industrial workforce.  
Female employment reached its peak in 1889, when 12,000 women worked in industry;20 by 
1914 the number had fallen to about 10,000, or five percent of the overall workforce.  Though, 
after 1900, teenage boys over sixteen years of age were considered to be adult workers, the 
number of children working in mines did not experience a noticeable decline.  In 1912, they 
made up 4.3 percent of the workforce.  The majority of women and children worked in coal 
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mining, although a significant minority (between 30 and 40 percent for women, 40 percent for 
children) also labored in zinc smelting.21 
 The largest of the three groups, however, consisted of foreign workers, who themselves 
comprised ten percent of the workforce in 1914.  This was a new development in the region, 
however, as in the mid-1800s foreign labor made up a very small percentage of the total labor 
workforce.  When the German government expelled all alien Poles (those from Russian Poland 
and Austrian Galicia) in 1885, the industrial firms did not protest and only a total of 7000 Poles 
were forced to leave; because many workers had brought their families with them, the number of 
workers lost was well below this.  But as both industry and agriculture began to increase in the 
1890s, and more labor was needed to supplement the Upper Silesian workers, the government 
eased the ban on Polish labor.  Still, the number of foreign workers remained small, numbering 
between one and two thousand for most of the 1890s.  At the turn of the twentieth century, 
however, foreign employment exploded, peaking at 20,000 in 1909.22 
 Despite the large and growing number of workers, socialist parties and organizations 
found it hard to gain traction in the region.  Founded in the same year as the Józef Piłsudski-led 
main branch, the Polska Partia Socjalistyana Zaboru Pruskiego (Polish Socialist Party, Prussian 
division, or PPS zp) established its base in Berlin in 1893 and quickly aligned with and received 
financial support from the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (the Social Democratic 
Party of Germany, or SPD).  While the Social Democrats would make gains at the polls, 
especially in the elections of 1898 and 1912, overall the party and its organizations remained 
quite small; the flagship paper of the PPS zp, Gazeta Robotnicza (The Workers’ Gazette), only 
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had a subscription of about 1500 throughout the prewar period.23  The SPD and PPS zp 
fundamentally differed on the question of Polish nationalism and independence, which caused 
Polish-speaking workers to be wary of both organizations.  This was one of the main obstacles 
for the expansion of socialism in the region.  Another was that Upper Silesians did not need 
socialist working groups, as many already belonged to a workers’ union backed by the two most 
powerful institutions in the region – the Catholic Church and its political representative, the 
Center Party. 
The Center Party’s (Zentrumspartei)24 entrance into Upper Silesian politics could be 
described as inauspicious at best.  In the first Reichstag elections of 1871, the party founded to 
protect the interests of German Catholics won only one electoral district in an area that was 90 
percent Catholic.  This statistic meant, of course, that most of those who ran and won under one 
of the two conservative parties’ banners were also Catholics.  Only in the district of Pleß-Rybnik 
did the Center Party prevail, a victory that would be a sign of things to come in Upper Silesia.  
Father Eduard Müller, a poor German priest from Berlin, defeated none other than Victor Moritz 
Karl, the duke of Ratibor, a large estate holder, and the chosen candidate of the Prince of Pleß.25  
Three years later, however, the Center would win eight of the twelve electoral districts, and from 
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1884 to 1903 would claim eleven.26  The Party never received less than 60 percent of Upper 
Silesia’s vote total in Reichstag elections, and on three occasions earned 80 percent of all votes 
cast: 1881, 1884 and 1893.27  Prior to the Center Party’s dominance, the representatives of the 
region were predominantly large landowners, but by 1893 all Center party representatives were 
commoners, including members of the clergy.28 
The supremacy of the Center Party in the region was due in large part to the Kulturkampf, 
during which Chancellor Otto von Bismarck aimed to use the power of the state to lessen the 
influence of the Catholic Church.  The result in Upper Silesia, as in other predominantly Catholic 
areas of Germany, was for voters to heed the cry of their parish priests and rush to support the 
Center Party, the political defenders of the faith.  Unlike in Bavaria or the Rhineland, however, 
in Upper Silesia there was also a nationality issue to be dealt with, as a number of the measures 
were also forms of Polish persecution.  It appears, however, that Upper Silesians placed religious 
matters over linguistic or national ones, as illustrated in an 1873 list that placed the rights of the 
church and the maintaining of confessional schools above defense of the Polish language.29  
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Parents and priests alike, it seemed, were more concerned that their children receive the “right” 
sort of religious instruction than with the language in which it was taught.30 
It was only in the 1880s, after the fires of the Kulturkampf had been mostly extinguished, 
that the language question came to the fore, and would serve as a sticking point between the 
clerical and lay leaders of the Catholic/Center milieu.  The clergy had survived the Kulturkampf 
with their authority intact, but their numbers severely depleted.  In an effort to rebuild church 
infrastructure, priests were less willing to fight against language laws.  This was especially true 
after Georg Kopp became Prince-Bishop of Breslau in 1887.  Always eager to accommodate the 
wishes of Berlin, Kopp worked to repair the relationship between the church and the state while 
at the same time subtly promoting the German language in Upper Silesian churches and religious 
instruction.  At first these measures struck a wrong chord with the clergy in Upper Silesia, many 
of whom were born in the region and had worked hard to learn the Polish language to better 
reach out to their parishioners.  Soon, however, what historian James Bjork termed “church 
patriotism” turned most of the Upper Silesian clergy to Kopp’s side, as they determined “the 
autonomy of the institutional church…was worth a Kulturkampf; the defense of ‘Polishness’ was 
not.”31 
In the last decade of the 1800s, the banner of Polish nationalism was carried by Adam 
Napieralski and his Katolik camp.  As editor of the largest paper in the Upper Silesian industrial 
region, Napieralski wielded vast political power; to be backed by Katolik in the 1890s virtually 
assured success at the polls.  Napieralski aimed to transform the Center Party from within, 
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slowly adding Polish nationalist interests and concerns into the party’s platform.  This caused 
tension between him and the Catholic Church, which worried that Napieralski’s changes would 
eventually put nation over faith.  Meanwhile, as the nineteenth century gave way to the 
twentieth, a new generation of Upper Silesian Poles came to find Napieralski’s moderate 
approach to be too slow.  Inspired by Roman Dmowski’s new Narodowa Demokracja (National 
Democratic) party, these men challenged the Center’s supremacy in the region.  Led by 
Wojciech Korfanty, they formed the Polish Party, unabashedly and unambiguously placing 
Polish nationalism front and center for the first time in Upper Silesia’s politics. 
Founded in 1868 by Karol Miarka, Katolik had cemented its reputation during the 
Kulturkampf as the Polish newspaper of the Upper Silesian industrial region,32 during which time 
Miarka focused mainly on publishing articles on religious themes, favoring them especially over 
those of the national.33  Once the fighting was over, however, Miarka and others in the Katolik 
camp turned their attention to the Polish cause, which many viewed to be inextricably linked to 
their Catholicism.  They distrusted the Germanizing policies allowed under Kopp and 
emphasized Polish national culture and language.  While they continued to expand their efforts 
throughout the 1880s, the Katolik activists did not have much political influence in the Center 
Party, which at the time was still run by the large German estate holders, most of whom knew 
little to no Polish.  It was not until 1889 and the arrival of Adam Napieralski on the Upper 
Silesian scene that the Katolik camp truly became a leading force in the region. 
Born in the fall of 1861 in Kluczewo, about 45 miles south-west of Posen, to a family of 
lower nobility, Napieralski was part of what would become known as the “Posen Triumvirate” – 
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three young editors who moved from Posen to Upper Silesia in the late 1880s and quickly 
became the leaders of the Polish national movement through their work with the Center Party.34  
While Bronisław Koraszewski (editor of Gazeta Opolska, The Oppeln Gazette) and Jan 
Maćkowski (editor of Nowiny Raciborskie, The Ratibor News) certainly impacted not only the 
Upper Silesian press but also its politics, it was Napieralski who truly established himself as a 
leader in the region. 
Katolik was already among the most successful papers in the region, with a subscription 
of 7,000 when Napieralski became editor.  Within three years they had nearly doubled, to 
13,000; by 1902, subscriptions numbered 22,000, making it, by far, the largest newspaper in the 
region.35  Continuing the work of his predecessor, Father Stanisław Radziejewski, Napieralski 
inserted an even stronger Polish nationalist tone into the paper.  As with others in the Katolik 
camp, he was also a devout Catholic; balancing these two institutions – the nation and the church 
– would be what gave Katolik its unique position in Upper Silesia.  Napieralski believed a 
national movement had to come from the people of the lower classes, the workers and the 
peasants; it could not be imposed upon them by middle-class activists.  Cultivating a sense of 
Polish nationalism in Upper Silesians meant first addressing their daily needs and demands, and 
this would take time.  In addition, the link between Polish nationalism and the Catholic Church 
had to be emphasized.  To this end, Katolik supported not only the clergy but the clergy’s politics 
– the Center Party. 
Napieralski and the rest of the Katolik camp would get the chance to prove the strength of 
their influence in the 1893 Reichstag elections.  After 1890, Reichstag elections were to be held 
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every five years.  Midway through this election cycle, Chancellor Leo von Caprivi introduced a 
new seven-year army bill, which would drastically increase military appropriations and the size 
of the standing army.  The new bill brought the Center to an impasse.  Since Bismarck’s 
dismissal from office three years earlier it had reached a sort of détente with the new Caprivi 
government as a number of Kulturkampf laws had been repealed; voting against the bill could 
jeopardize this new relationship.  At the same time, many Center party delegates had campaigned 
on a platform of lower taxes and military spending, and voting for the bill would anger their 
constituents.  Leaders of the party decided to support Caprivi, but the rank and file rebelled and 
voted against the army bill.  In light of the bill’s failure to pass, Caprivi did what chancellors in 
Imperial Germany were wont to do – he dissolved the Reichstag.36   
Most of the Center’s 106 representatives could return home and run again under the 
banner of having held to party policy with regards to taxes and military expansion.  Eleven could 
not, and of these seven were from Upper Silesia.  Landed magnates all, these local leaders now 
found themselves at odds with their constituents and, even worse, facing serious opposition from 
within their own party.  Sensing that the time was right, Napieralski and the Katolik camp 
launched an electoral attack, running their own, middle-class candidates against the wealthy 
(German) establishment.  Similar intra-party strife occurred in other areas of Catholic Germany, 
but in Upper Silesia there was also a nationality issue.  Katolik-backed candidates not only 
opposed the army bill, but also supported Polish language and labor rights.  For the most part, the 
local clergy supported the new candidates, as they were also against military expansion, but they 
did so warily.  While Napieralski and Katolik argued that Polishness and Catholicism existed 
side-by-side, and were in fact intertwined, parish priests worried that these new delegates would 
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reverse the Center Party’s platform, placing nationality over faith.  This tension between the 
clergy and the Katolik press would remain through the early 1900s, as Napieralski and his camp 
came to dominate Upper Silesian Center Party politics. 
The Center, however, could not hold forever. Napieralski’s long-term plan of slowly 
transforming the Center into a Polish Catholic party from within was advancing too slowly for 
the younger generation which now appeared on the political scene.  Influenced by the National 
Democrats and under the leadership of a young Upper Silesian named Wojciech Korfanty, these 
new national activists advocated for an immediate and decisive split from the Center and the 
formation of a new Polish Party in Upper Silesia.   
Founded in 1897 by Roman Dmowski, Jan Ludwig Popławski and Zygmunt Balicki, 
Narodowa Demokracja (National Democracy), or the Endeks (taken from their Polish 
abbreviation, ND), was a reaction to both the revolutionary and Positivist strands of Polish 
nationalism in the nineteenth century.  The failed revolutions, especially that of the January 
Uprising of 1863, had led only to a further denial of Polish rights under the Russian government, 
while the Positivist movement, which had advocated the creation of a Polish linguistic and 
cultural nation through scientific work, was viewed by the National Democrats as paralyzing the 
nation.  Instead, they advocated a return to “politics,” by which they meant a new form of 
agitation and organization – their politics was a call to action.37  The leaders of this new 
movement would not be the szlachta (Polish aristocracy), which had been behind the disasters of 
the previous century.  In Dmowski’s view, the new heart of Poland belonged to the small 
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farmers, workers and townspeople.38  The National Democrats’ Poland was a closed nation; the 
minorities which resided inside the borders of the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth – 
Belarussians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians – would be subject to Polonization.  Anti-Semitism was a 
key tenet of Dmowski’s National Democracy, as was a strong anti-German stance, which helped 
the movement flourish in Posen. 
This new version of Polish nationalism proved very attractive to young Polish-speakers in 
Upper Silesia.  The region, lacking a szlachta class and not a part of the old Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth, had not fit the older conception of the Polish nation.  Dmowski’s Endeks, 
however, challenged these notions and called for a reevaluation of what it meant to be Polish.  
The result was the first true Polish national movement in the region, led by university students 
who could claim to be Upper Silesian born and bred.   
It was in this context that Wojciech Korfanty entered the political stage.  Korfanty was 
born in the spring of 1873 in Sadzawka, the fifth child of a coal-miner and his wife.39  Although 
the family spoke Polish in the home, it was in school that he discovered his love for Polish 
literature and history.  Polish was not taught at the Kattowitz Gymnasium, but Korfanty and 
other students, feeling slighted by their German teachers’ low opinions of Polish culture, met to 
read and translate the great works of Polish Romanticism outside of class.40  In August 1895, a 
few months before he was set to take his final exams, Korfanty was expelled from the 
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Gymnasium for “Polish agitation.”41  For the next three years he traveled around Silesia and 
Prussia, even working in the mines for a summer.  He considered joining the Polish Socialist 
Party while in Berlin, but disliked their internationalist outlook; besides, the Socialists were a 
fairly organized group by the late 1890s, and there was little chance for a young Korfanty to 
quickly move into the leadership position he so desired.  He found such an opportunity in 1898, 
when he arrived in Breslau.  There he was among the first to join Zet (Związek Młodzieży 
Polskiej, or Union of Polish Youth), a newly formed organization that stood as the vanguard for 
the National Democratic Party in the region.42   
Korfanty soon found himself as the head of this new Polish nationalist movement that 
forged a third way between the Center and the Socialists.  In 1902 he took over the newspaper 
Górnoślązak (The Upper Silesian) in Posen, but quickly moved his base of publication to 
Kattowitz.  Within a year the paper was one of the most widely read dailies in the Industrial 
Triangle.43  Under his leadership the Endeks, operating under the name of the Koło Polskie 
(literally Polish Circle, but here translated as Polish Party), launched a strong program of Polish 
nationalism, with their goal of unseating as many Center Party representatives as possible in the 
1903 election. 
Alongside these new forms of Polish nationalism, in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries nationalist rhetoric and divisiveness also appeared in the form of new 
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German organizations, such as the Pan-German League and the Navy League.44  In Prussian 
Poland, the Ostmarkverein (the Eastern Marches Association) was the most powerful and active.  
Reacting against the new Caprivi government’s concessions to Poles in the east, and still upset 
about Bismarck’s undignified dismissal from the government, three Posen activists formed the 
Verein zur Förderung des Deutschtums in den Ostmarken (the Association for the Advancement 
of the German Nationality in the Eastern Marches) in 1894.45  Ferdinand Hansemann, the 
youngest of the three at 33 years of age, was the son of a Berlin financer and was himself new to 
politics, although he considered himself an amateur publicist.  Herman Kennemann, on the eve 
of his eightieth birthday at the Association’s founding, was the largest landowner in the Prussian 
east, overseeing an estate comprised of over 200 square kilometers of land.  Finally, Major 
Heinrich Tiedemann also held a sizable estate about 15 miles southwest of the city of Posen.  He 
would become the driving force of the Association, holding the office of president from the first 
meeting until his death in 1922.46  In its manifesto, the Ostmarkverein claimed its purpose to be 
“the strengthening and marshaling of the German nationality in the Polonized Eastern Marches 
of the Empire, by encouraging and fortifying German patriotic feeling as well as by augmenting 
the German population and strengthening it economically.”47  Based on the initials of these three 
men, the Association was also known as H-K-T, or Hakata in Polish.  A derogatory term to the 
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Poles, who would use it during the Plebiscite period especially to refer to any German, the 
Association came to use this abbreviation as well. 
At its founding the Association consisted mainly of other large, agrarian estate-holders, 
although membership was granted to any German who paid the annual fee of one Mark; in the 
future, however, teachers, clergymen, doctors, lawyers and government employees would come 
to swell its ranks.48  But in its early years it remained quite small, with 2800 members in Posen, 
out of a population of almost 700,000 German-speakers.  By the end of 1895 this branch would 
claim 3500 members, and in 1896 membership for the entire Eastern Marches (which included 
Posen, West Prussia and Silesia) numbered 6,132;49 in four years the number of members 
jumped to 20,000, over half of whom resided in Posen or West Prussia – that is, the Polish 
territory partitioned to Prussia at the end of the eighteenth century.50  It was here that the 
Association devoted most of its efforts. 
Despite the fact that nearly one-third of Prussia’s Polish-speakers lived in Upper Silesia, 
the Ostmarkverein all but ignored the region for its first several years.  Branches first appeared in 
1895 and 1896, but it was not until 1903 that the Silesian Regional Committee was formed in 
Breslau.  Even then, many of the Society’s programs failed to reach Upper Silesia.  The reason 
for this was that the Ostmarkverein did not perceive Polish-speaking Upper Silesians as a 
credible threat to Germandom in the two areas the Association most focused its efforts: land and 
language.  While members of the Polish szlachta ruled much of the large landholdings in Posen, 
in Upper Silesia it was German nobles who controlled the landed estates.  As for language, 
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German was already used in schools, with Polish allowed only as the language of religious 
instruction.  Many Upper Silesians were bilingual.  Finally, the Ostmarkverein and other German 
nationalists did not consider Upper Silesians to speak true Polish (Hochpolnisch), but rather a 
crude dialect, known as the derogatory Wasserpolnisch.  Only on the eve of the First World War 
did the Ostmarkverein truly penetrate the region, with large branches opening in the industrial 
cities, headed in part by factory personnel.51 
 At the turn of the twentieth century, Upper Silesia was a region on the cusp of great 
change.  The Kulturkampf had served to radicalize some towards more nationalistic politics, 
although the majority of the people still held fast to the politics of the supranational Catholic 
Center.  German nationalism was advanced through both official state policy and the work of 
groups such as the Ostmarkverein – although they did not give Upper Silesia much heed until the 
early 1900s.  Polish nationalism was the purview of Napieralski and his Katolik camp.  But as 
Korfanty advanced Dmowski’s National Democracy into the region, the vanguard of Polish 
nationalism began to change.  Over the course of three pre-war elections – 1903, 1907 and 1912 
– Napieralski and Korfanty would battle not only for votes, but for the right to define Polish 
nationalism in Upper Silesia. 
1.2: The Elections of 1903, 1907 and 1912 
The 1903 Reichstag election was the introduction of Korfanty’s Polish Party into Upper 
Silesian politics, and while it might not have quite lived up to expectations – the party was 
projected to win three Reichstag seats but walked away with only one – it still managed to make 
its mark on the region.  In four of the twelve voting districts the party finished in second place 
and forced a run-off in two – including Pleß-Rybnik, where Jan Kowalczyk actually finished in 
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first during the initial election.52  He won a plurality in the initial voting but fell about 1000 votes 
shy of capturing the district outright.  In the subsequent run-off, his opponent, Center candidate 
Josef Faltin, won almost all the four thousand votes which had previously gone towards the 
German nationalist candidate and ultimately carried the election by a margin of almost 1200 
votes.53  The Polish banner, then, was carried solely by Korfanty’s victory in Kattowitz-Zabrze.  
And a narrow victory it was.  The Center candidate, Paul Letocha, had earned 44 percent of the 
vote, compared to Korfanty’s 26 percent; he narrowly beat out Socialist candidate Franciszek 
Morawski, who earned 22 percent, for second place.  In the runoff election, Korfanty reached an 
agreement with Morawski and arranged for the latter’s’ supporters to back him.  In the end, 
Korfanty won by a margin of 1.25 percent, earning 23,550 votes to Letocha’s 22,875.54  While 
Polish nationalists from Upper Silesia had served in the Reichstag in the past, they always did so 
under the auspices of the Center Party.  Here was something new – a Polish nationalist serving as 
the representative of the new Polish Party.55 
Feelings of both German and Polish nationalism would play an even larger role in the 
next election.  Like the election of 1893, in 1907 voters returned prematurely to the polls after 
the dissolution of the Reichstag the previous December.  Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow had 
put forth a new colonial policy, which included more troops in Southwest Africa and more funds 
to support them.  The nationalist parties – led by the Conservatives, National Liberals and Free 
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Conservatives – fully backed the proposal, while the Social Democrats, among others, refused to 
pass it.  The swing bloc was again the Center Party, and when they voted against the bill Bülow 
immediately dissolved the Reichstag, signing and dating the order he had prepared days earlier.56  
With only about six weeks between the dissolution and new elections, the campaigns were 
hastily prepared as the nationalist parties hammered home a message of national pride and 
security.  Across Germany these nationalist parties received a spike at the polls, and the same 
held true in Upper Silesia, where not only did the Polish Party make huge electoral inroads, but 
the German nationalist parties also had their greatest returns in almost thirty years. 
Whereas in the past the Conservative, Free Conservative and National Liberal Parties had 
competed against each other for votes, in 1907 they coordinated and cooperated across party 
lines; only one German nationalist candidate ran in each of the nine mixed-language districts.  
Meanwhile, the Center Party experienced splits along ethnic lines.  Not only was it losing voters 
to the Polish Party, there was also an internal party division between German and Polish Center 
candidates.  In Neustadt three Center candidates (two German and one Polish) ran against each 
other, while in two others a specifically pro-German Center candidate ran with no pro-Polish 
Center opposition, although in Beuthen-Tarnowitz the Polish Party candidate (and victor) was 
none other than former Center stalwart Napieralski.57  Shortly after the 1903 election, 
Napieralski had shifted his Katolik camp away from the Center – which still refrained from 
advancing a Polish national agenda – and towards Korfanty’s Polish Party.  According to 
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historian Brendan Karch, “By 1906, Napieralski and Korfanty created a Polish front of radical 
and more moderate political voices united in opposition to the Catholic Center Party.”58 
The 1907 election brought the Center its worst returns since 1874, as it lost an additional 
four seats to the Polish party; in Pleß-Rybnik, for example, the Polish candidate crushed that of 
the Center’s by a margin of more than six to one.59  In Oppeln, the Polish Party candidate was 
Paweł Brandys, a pro-Polish priest who held fast with the Center’s primary objective, defending 
the Catholic faith.  However, Brandys also argued that the Center was a “German Party” that 
“does not protect our nationality or our language.”60  Brandys beat his (German) Center 
opponent handedly, earning 4.5 times as many votes.61  Even more telling of the Center’s 
downfall, in four of the five districts that the Polish Party carried, the party in second place was 
not the Center, but rather a German national party.62  Returning again to Oppeln, the Free 
Conservative candidate received almost twice as many votes as his Center counterpart, who, 
again, was running on a pro-German platform; the National Liberal candidate in Kattowitz-
Zabrze defeated his Center opponent, a Polish priest, by almost this same margin – although this 
hardly mattered, as Korfanty again won this district with 65 percent of the vote.63  While the 
German nationalist parties failed to win any districts, with the exception of longtime 
Conservative stronghold Kreuzburg-Rosenberg, their overall electorate rose exponentially, 
catapulting them to the position of second strongest in the region.  The Polish Party also 
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witnessed a huge upswing in its number of votes, growing by a factor of 2.5 to become the 
largest party in the district.  While it could still claim six of the twelve seats, the Center lost 52 
percent of its voters; once the undisputed leading party of the region, had been relegated to third 
place, with 23 percent of the vote.  The Social Democrats experienced a loss of almost the same 
magnitude, claiming a scant seven percent of the electorate.64  Because of the circumstances in 
which the election was called, there was a heightened sense of nationalism, especially German 
nationalism, in the truncated campaign cycle.  Still, in the election of 1907, seventy percent of 
voting Upper Silesians supported a national party, up from a mere 27 percent in the previous 
election.  Based on these results, it would seem that Upper Silesia was following the early 
twentieth century path of nationalization. 
Appearances, however, can be deceiving, and in the years following 1907 the Center 
would make back some of its lost ground.  Instead of further dividing into national camps, voters 
backtracked, turning once again to non-national parties, especially the Center.  This was largely 
due to the so-called Bülow Bloc, the alliance of National Liberal and Conservative Parties 
arrayed against Catholics and Socialists in a mini-retread of the Kulturkampf.  After the passing 
of anti-Polish legislation in 1908 – including restricting the use of Polish language in public 
meetings – the Polish Party and Center looked again to one another for support.  Nothing brings 
two groups together like a common enemy.  In the 1908 Landtag elections, the two parties ran on 
a coalition ticket, as the Center backed Polish nationalists in three districts.65 
As a part of this alliance, Napieralski and his Katolik camp returned again to their more 
moderate national rhetoric, much to the chagrin of Korfanty.  As quickly as the two men had 
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come together, they fell apart.  Denigrated as a radical nationalist and socialist by those in the 
Katolik camp, Korfanty was forced out of Upper Silesian politics.  He sold Górnoślązak to 
Napieralski and spent his political exile in Berlin.  It would not be until the very end of the First 
World War that he would return to the Upper Silesian political scene, but when he did, as will be 
seen, it was in great triumph.  
In the lead-up to the 1912 election, however, Napieralski found it difficult to balance a 
moderate, Center-style nationalism with the wishes of the Polish working-class electorate.  In a 
bid to keep them from voting Socialist, which was, albeit slowly, on the rise in the region, he 
again turned his back against the Center Party.  Much as he had done in 1907, Napieralski put the 
full weight of his media empire behind the Polish Party.66  In the 1912 election cycle and in the 
remaining years before the outbreak of the First World War, the Katolik press both defined what 
it meant to be a good Pole and identified those elements which endangered it.  Not surprisingly, 
one of the main enemies of Polishness were German nationalists, who in the papers were almost 
always referred to as HKT-ists.  Poles were warned not to fall prey to Germans and their 
promises of social mobility.  But being a true Pole was about more than ethnicity.  Katolik 
papers’ definition of Polishness included both a religious and political component: Poles were 
Catholic and voted for the Polish Party. 
One of the main threats to this definition of Polishness was Socialism.  In this, Katolik 
followed the trend, found in parties across the political spectrum, of viewing socialism and 
socialist parties as a threat, as an “internationalist” organization whose loyalties lay outside the 
nation.  On the eve of the January 1912 Reichstag elections the Katolik press ran a series of 
articles condemning the Socialist party.  There was no distinction made between the PPS and 
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SPD.  This firestorm of vitriol is in large part explained by the election, which in Katowice-
Zabrze saw Polish Party candidate Wojciech Sosiński, a union leader, pitted against the (Polish) 
Socialist Józef Biniszkiewicz (the Center Party candidate, who was pro-German, was never 
mentioned).  It makes sense that the rhetoric used to describe and distinguish Socialists from 
“good” Catholic Poles would be heightened.  Still, these articles cannot be dismissed as mere 
electoral propaganda, as they also provide insight into how the Katolik camp was defining their 
own notions of Polishness. 
 Sosiński beat Biniszkiewicz in the initial election on 12 January, earning about 3,000 
more votes but still well shy of winning the majority of the district; in fact, Sosiński won only 30 
percent of the vote, less than half the 65 percent Korfanty had won to carry the district five years 
prior.67  The run-off election was scheduled for 22 January, giving the Katolik press ten days to 
convince their readership to vote for Sosiński.  They attacked from two fronts, criticizing 
Biniszkiewicz’s (and Socialists’ in general) lack of religion and strong ties to Germandom.  
“Now Biniszkiewicz and his comrades cry that they don’t fight religion, that religion is a private 
thing,”68 declared an article in Górnoślązak.  “But outside elections the most open Socialists are 
revealed to be against religion.”69  To prove this, the article cited not only Biniszkiewicz’s 
current publication (“Anyone who reads Gazeta Robotnicza finds in each issue slurs against the 
Catholic Church”),70 but also a paper for which he worked several years earlier.  A 1906 edition 
of Naprzód (Forwards), Górnoślązak reported, ran the following epitaph: “God is a clay idol, 
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which you can easily smash with a hammer.”71  The next year, the same paper ran a small poem.  
“We don’t fear anything in life;/ Freedom, brothers, that is our God./ So let’s live it up.”72  
Though he might deny it in an election year, Biniszkiewicz and his fellow Socialists held God in 
disdain at the best, and at worst did not even believe in His existence.  Such a man, such a party, 
could not be trusted to truly represent the interests of the good, Catholic Poles of Upper Silesia. 
 Intertwined with their lack of faith was the fact that, according to the Katolik press, 
Socialists were inextricably tied to the German camp.  This was all part of the “Culture of 
Socialism,”73 as a Katolik article put it.  Describing a Socialist meeting from the week before (to 
which “their” Sosiński had been “intentionally invited,”74), Katolik reported that a one point, 
“The ‘comrades’ in the hall shouted, ‘Out with the Poles!’”75  The quote was printed in German, 
and “there were a lot of Germans and Jews”76 in attendance, an interesting claim, given that Jews 
accounted for only one percent of Upper Silesians.   Later that week, Katolik laid out exactly 
what they viewed was at stake in the upcoming run-off.  Everyone in the district must vote for 
“his brother and compatriot” Sosiński.77  “It would be a disgrace and a shame for our people,” 
the article argued, “should a Socialist win in Katowice-Zabrze, in cahoots with the Jews, a 


















doubtful that any self-respecting member of the HKT would ever call himself, or even associate 
with, a Socialist, in the Katolik worldview these terms are one in the same and infinitely 
interchangeable.  We see here, as well, the conflating of Jewry with Socialism and Germandom – 
the same three groups Dmowski’s National Democrats so often railed against, illustrating the 
party’s strength and influence in the region.  Socialism is associated with Germandom, which is 
itself synonymous with the HKT.  All three of these elements – Socialists, Jews, Germans – are 
“Others” in Upper Silesia, interlopers who are not truly of the region, and therefore cannot 
represent the interests of the “real” (Polish) Upper Silesians.   
 In contrast to these pagan, German Socialists, true Poles were both staunch in their love 
of nation and devoutly Catholic, and have been so for a millennium.  Claimed Katolik, “For a 
thousand years have the Holy Faith blossomed and the Polish people lived here, and now the 
Catholic and Polish people would elect a Socialist as their representative?  No, it cannot be!”79  It 
is important to note that here Catholic and Polish are adjectives describing the people who have 
resided in Upper Silesia for centuries.  Later in the article, however, all “katolicy Polacy” were 
called upon to march to the polls and vote.  This construction makes little sense in English.  
Translating it as ‘Catholic Poles’ makes the first word, Catholic, an adjective, and would imply 
that there are other, non-Catholic Poles.  In the Katolik worldview, this is impossible.  All Poles 
are Catholics; these identities are inseparable.  In Polish, both “katolicy” and “Polacy” are given 
equal weight; that is, neither modifies the other.  The man is a ‘Pole-Catholic,’ as awkward as 





of the Holy Faith and our Polish nationality,” that proper Upper Silesian Poles will vote for 
Sosiński, “our brother, a good Catholic and a good Pole, a son of the people.”80 
 Sosiński won his run-off with Biniszkiewicz, capturing almost 60 percent of the vote.  In 
other districts, however, the Polish candidate did not fare as well.  Instead of building on their 
1907 gains, the Polish Party lost ground, with one district, Lublinitz-Tost-Gleiwitz, falling back 
into the Center’s camp.  Still, in Gross Strehlitz-Kosel, the Center’s long term incumbent, Father 
Josef Glowatzki, defeated his Polish challenger, Father Józef Wajda, by less than four hundred 
votes; meanwhile, in the staunchly Conservative district of Kreuzburg-Rosenberg, the Polish 
candidate, Father Paweł Kutschka, managed to force a run-off with Ludwig Meyer.  In the run-
off, the first in several election cycles, the Conservative candidate won with 58 percent of the 
vote.81   
Despite these close races, the Katolik camp viewed these loses as a “Betrayal of the 
Social Democrats,”82 as a Górnoślązak article declared a few days after the results had been 
tallied.  “Social Democrats in this year’s election have fought all along the line against the Polish 
candidate and directly or indirectly supported the Centrists, HKT-ists, Conservatives and 
Liberals.”83  Socialists, the article claimed, sent out secret signals, telling members to stay at 
home and not vote in the run-off elections, thereby insuring a Polish defeat.  In its closing it 
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HKT.”84  Those who supported Socialist candidates also supported those backed by the HKT; 
they were not true Poles, who always voted for their national compatriots. 
 Examining the election results of the three districts shows this claim to be completely 
unfounded.  Kreuzburg-Rosenberg was a Conservative stronghold; a Conservative candidate had 
won this district since 1884, usually out-right.  The very fact that Kutschka, the Polish candidate, 
forced a run-off with Meyer proves that the Polish Party was starting to make in-roads in the 
district.  Still, Meyer won by over 2,600 votes, almost doubling the margin by which he had 
defeated Kutschka in the first election.  The Socialist Party earned a paltry 344 votes, or two 
percent of the total vote.  Clearly they were not the swing block in this election.  That distinction 
most likely went to those roughly 2,500 voters who initially voted for the National Liberal 
candidate and now threw their support behind the other pro-German option.  In Gross Strehlitz-
Kosel, the Polish candidate lost to the Center incumbent, but by a much smaller margin of votes 
as compared to the previous election, indicating that the district might have turned Polish in the 
next election, had there been one.  It seems unlikely that the nearly 1,250 Socialist voters 
abstained in the run-off, as the total number of voters here rose by over 2,000 from first vote to 
run-off.  Finally, in Lublinitz-Tost-Gleiwitz, Polish incumbent Father Theodor Jankowski lost to 
Center candidate Augustin Warlo by just under 800 votes.  The Katolik camp has the strongest 
argument here that Socialist abstention caused them to lose the vote, as the number of voters 
dropped by 1,551 votes between the initial election and the run-off.  Still, even if every 
abstention were a Socialist voter, that still would not account for the 2,200 who initially cast 
ballots for the party.  Again, as in Kreuzburg-Rosenberg, it seems that Warlo was pushed over 




candidate.85  Taken together, the 1912 elections represent a region still very much in flux.  While 
55 percent of the electorate cast votes for a nationalist party, 45 percent did not. 
 The Katolik camp continued to express its distrust and disgust with the Left even after the 
1912 elections, using the Socialists as convenient scapegoats.  Shortly after the 22 January run-
offs, for example, Katolik ran an “exposé” on the Party, questioning one of the central tenets of 
Socialism.  “Are the Socialists a workers’ Party?”86 the paper asked, before proceeding to 
examine the employment records of members of the Social Democratic Party and concluding 
that “there is not a single worker” and “the main part of the red members are made up of party 
clerks.”87  Even months later, the newspaper ran an article entitled, “The Socialists want to 
capture Upper Silesia.”88  Here Socialism is explicitly tied to Germandom; there are only the 
“German Social Democrats,” with no mention made to the Polish branch of the Socialist Party.  
“It is well-known that the German Social Democrats spare no effort or cost to win for themselves 
the Polish people; to cram them into the framework of the German party…German Social 
Democracy is the real daughter of German society…They call it in a Berlin tune, the most 
unsympathetic, the most conceited and the most brutal part of Prussian-ism.”89  For the Katolik 
camp, German Socialism was even more dangerous to true Poles than the initiatives of the HKT.  
At least they were unabashedly pro-German.  The Socialists, on the other hand, claimed to be 
representing the best interests of the Polish workers.  Once caught, the party then attempts to 
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strip away all their Polish characteristics, transforming them into good Germans who would 
renounce their Polish and Catholic heritage. 
 For Napieralski and Katolik, then, the true danger to Polishness – and the political power 
of the Polish Party – came from the Socialists.  Korfanty’s radical nationalism had spoken to and 
inspired the Polish working class.  With him gone, the moderate camp feared these workers 
would turn to Socialism.  In the 1912 election, there was little risk that Poles or Polish-speakers 
would vote for a German nationalist party; there was great concern, however, that they would 
turn to Socialism.  For this reason, Katolik fixated on denigrating the Socialist Party, tying it to 
Germandom and setting it up as an enemy of Polishness.  
 Threats to Polishness did not just occur during an election cycle, however.  German 
temptations were all around, especially in the Industrial Triangle.  As discussed above, Polish-
speakers rarely held middle management positions in the mines and factories; these jobs were 
reserved for German-speakers.  Germanization, then, came to be seen as a means of social and 
economic advancement.  The Katolik camp worked hard to discourage Polish parents from 
allowing their children to be Germanized, often running a small ad encouraging parents to “teach 
[their] children to read and write in Polish.”90  An article published in early 1914 lamented the 
sad state of the Lithuanians, who were becoming increasingly Germanized and forgetting their 
Slavic roots.  This tragic fate should serve as a warning for Upper Silesians.  “Among us, 
unfortunately, are countrymen who, like the Lithuanians, don’t care for the Fatherland’s 
language, for Polish nationality.  They don’t teach their children to read Polish and rewrite their 
 




offspring as Germans…We will be alert, so that the treasure of the Fatherland’s language won’t 
be lost by our own negligence.”91 
 It was not just inattentive and neglectful parents who worried Katolik; even well-meaning 
parents could lose their children, especially their sons, to German temptations.  In an extended 
article published in the spring of 1914, Górnoślązak warned parents not to allow their sons to 
join the German army.92  The life of an NCO might seem to set one on the path of social 
mobility, but it was fraught with danger.  Was a “well-decorated uniform” worth losing one’s 
son to the Germans?  After serving in the German Army, he would return home much changed: 
“He writes home in German – maybe even having completely forgotten the Polish 
language…He’s entered into different relationships, into a different world, completely different 
from the one from which he came.”93  The article ends with a plea for parents to “educate [their] 
sons as decent people, as good Poles…Honor will not be won by Germanization or being an 
NCO…but rather by persistent, honest work…a respectable life, a true Catholic and Pole.”94  
Again, the dual identity of being both a Pole and Catholic are stressed; these two elements are 
inseparable. 
 While the article frequently addressed “parents,” it was really the mother who bore the 
brunt of the blame for her son becoming a Germanized NCO and turning his back on his Polish 
heritage.  Whereas the father “might resist a little” at the idea of sending his son to NCO school, 
“the mother wheedles the father.”95  She thinks nothing of the consequences; she considers only 
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her own vanity.  “‘How all the village will look at him, when he goes to church with her?’ she’ll 
say or think.  ‘And such an office and such an income he will have – ho ho – no one would rival 
him.’”96  There are also the son’s – and by extension, her – future prospects to consider.  Women 
cannot resist a man in uniform, and being an NCO may help her son snag a rich wife – “And it’s 
understood that the parents get something from this happiness.”97  The mother thinks nothing of 
the national or religious implications of having her son enter the world of a German NCO.  She 
only cares how her own standing in the community will rise to have a son in uniform.  This 
message is echoed in a Katolik article which appeared a month later.  Here again mothers were 
accused of turning away from their Polish roots: “The Silesian woman [has] stopped being the 
dispenser of spiritual treasures…[and] feels drawn to the “fine” German [things].”  No longer 
does she educate her children in the “customs of Old Poland, the piety and virtue of Old 
Poland.”98  What does it matter that he will no longer be a “true Catholic and Pole,” so long as he 
captures a rich wife and shares his wealth with the family? 
 Mothers are often held as the conveyors and protectors of nationalism and religion; it is at 
their mothers’ apron strings that children learn their first language and are introduced to their 
faith.  Women, then, had a special responsibility for teaching their children that fathers did not 
share; it was mothers who were praised when their children followed the path of true Polishness, 
and mothers who were blamed when these children fell to the temptations of Germandom.  The 
day after the article warning of the perils of life as NCO, Górnoślązak published another 
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were corrupting good Catholic, Polish women, enticing them with “coffee hours, feasts and 
fun.”99  These gatherings brought together both Catholics and Protestants, and indeed erased all 
distinction between the two faiths.  The article complained, “Our Polish women feel, 
unfortunately, overjoyed, when they drink coffee at a table with a ‘fine Protestant lady.’”100  
Even though the majority of German-speakers in Upper Silesia were also Catholic, in the Katolik 
press Germans were coded strictly as Protestants; Polish women were not just admiring a “fine 
Protestant lady,” but a German one.  It was not just the mixing of religious faiths that worried 
Górnoślązak.  The true motives of these “fine ladies” were to Germanize Polish women and 
mothers, and by extension their children.  Polish mothers soon begin to “neglect religious 
education,” instead teaching their children (to whom they have given “non-Catholic names”) to 
be Prussian.101  These children grow up to “despise their [Polish] background, scorn their 
parents, forget about Catholic teachings and morals, corrupt themselves and follow the German 
stream to moral rot.”102   
 Here again is the notion that Catholicism is tied to Polishness.  The loss of these children 
to Germanization is not only “sad for the Polish nation,” but “not least sad for the Catholic 
Church.”  And it was the duty of the mother to teach her children to be both.  She was the 
protector of both Polish nationhood and the Catholic faith.  It was her job to ensure the next 
generation of Polish Upper Silesians met all Katolik requirements – that they be Catholic (unlike 
the Protestant Germans and pagan Socialists), that they vote Polish (as opposed to Center, 
Socialist or, unthinkably, for one of the German nationalist parties), and that they honor and 
 








respect their Polish heritage.  As will be seen, similar rhetoric was used in the plebiscite to target 
women, who were always assumed to be mothers or potential mothers.  Plebiscite propaganda 
argued that mothers had a moral responsibility to vote for Poland on behalf of her child, to secure 
both his future and the future of the Polish nation. 
On the eve of the First World War, Napieralski’s Katolik camp issued its specific 
definition of Polishness.  It was not enough to simply speak Polish; a “good” Pole was defined 
by his religion as well as his politics.  To be a Pole was to be Catholic – ignoring the Catholic 
German-speakers of the region.  To be a Pole was to vote for the Polish Party – thereby 
excluding any workers who might have identified more strongly with their class than nation.  
Defense of Polishness began at home, where children learned to speak Polish at their mothers’ 
apron strings.  Napieralski was not advocating for independence; Polish Upper Silesians still 
belonged to the German state.  But with the outbreak of the First World War, and especially its 
end, the dream of a Polish nation-state became a reality, leaving Upper Silesian Poles to question 
their place within its undetermined borders. 
2. Upper Silesia at War 
The First World War would reshape every aspect of Europe – politically, socially, 
culturally – but its impact would be especially felt on the flat plains of Central Europe.  Peace 
between the three eastern empires had ensured Poland remained erased off the map of Europe for 
over one hundred years.  Now, those empires were at war with one another.  Suddenly, Polish 
nationalism no longer simply meant supporting a cultural nation; it meant the establishment of a 
new Polish state – or, at the very least, the reunification of Polish lands under one flag. The war 
also opened new possibilities for other nationalities and ethnicities in the region – including an 
industrial territory situated at the border of the three empires: Upper Silesia. 
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 There has already been much ink spilt on the First World War, and for this reason an in-
depth discussion of the war itself will not appear here.103  The focus will remain on those 
elements that directly affected Upper Silesia – the experience of Upper Silesians in the military; 
the breakdown of the Home Front; and especially, the 5 November 1916 announcement by 
Germany and Austria-Hungary proclaiming the establishment of a new Kingdom of Poland.  
Although nominally independent, this new Poland was nothing more than a puppet state, to 
which Germany held the strings.  It was a constitutional monarchy without a king, a state without 
any determined borders; it was merely another country in Germany’s vast Mitteleuropa.104  Still, 
as a symbol this new Poland held much power, especially for those Poles living outside it, in 
Austrian Galicia, Prussian Poland, and Upper Silesia.  Upper Silesians took great interest in what 
a future Poland might look like, and this affected their own impressions of life under German 
rule.  As will be discussed in more detail below, there was a shift in how the Katolik camp 
discussed Polish life in Germany after 1916, as Napieralski shifted from a conciliatory to more 
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nationally strident tone.  Likewise, the German press, which had largely avoided any discussion 
of Polishness or Polish Upper Silesians, took on a harsher tone towards the end of the war, as the 
German Army began to falter and a truly independent Poland – not a German puppet state – 
became a reality. 
2.1: Upper Silesia During the First World War 
In many important ways, the experience of Upper Silesia during the First World War was 
no different than that of the rest of Germany. In the heady days of August, tens of thousands of 
Upper Silesians mobilized to the front; Laura Crago estimates that over 70 percent of the mining 
and metalworking work force volunteered in the first weeks after the declaration of war, and 
historian Bernard Link notes that up to 25 percent of the industrial region served in the 
military.105  Cries for the Kaiser rang out in the streets and military songs were sung.  There was, 
as one historian has noted, “an atmosphere of Prussian patriotism,” as cheering crowds followed 
men mobilized to the Fronts to the train station.106  Early Russian advances into bordering 
Galicia united both German- and Polish-speaking Upper Silesians as they braced for a Russian 
invasion that never came.  After the great spring offensives of 1915, during which Paul von 
Hindenburg drove the Russian army back over their own border, imperial war headquarters were 
established in the palace of the Prince of Pleß.  That same year, the industrial village of Zabrze 
was renamed Hindenburg.107 
Support for the war and the German military was not unanimous, however, especially 
among Polish activists in the region.  A few dozen prospective agitators were preemptively 
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arrested and imprisoned for a short time at the war’s outbreak.  Among the arrested were several 
prominent Polish-language editors and publishers.  Napieralski escaped imprisonment, however, 
due to his cooperation with the Germans, and he alone was allowed to continue publication of his 
papers during the war’s initial phase, making his the only Polish-language newspapers allowed to 
print, although he, too, was still subject to censorship.108 
 The policy of conciliation, spearheaded by Napieralski and other Catholic-Centrists, 
would continue throughout most of the war.  Cooperation with Germany was not done out of any 
sort of state or national loyalty, but rather pragmatically, as Napieralski and others believed 
victory by the Central Powers was the best way to advance their national cause.  Upper Silesia, 
as discussed above, had not been a part of pre-partitioned Poland, and so did not, at the start of 
the war, call for the return of an independent Poland.  Napieralski himself hoped that Congress 
Poland would be incorporated into the German fold as an autonomous region, while Upper 
Silesians, in turn, would be given more linguistic and cultural freedom.109 
 Polish-speaking Upper Silesians fell in the middle ground between ethnic Germans and 
ethnic Poles, coming from other areas of Prussian Poland, who served in the military.  As 
historian Alexander Watson notes, “[Poles] underwent the same training as ethnic German 
troops, were placed under a similar disciplinary regime, shared the danger and hardship of the 
battle zone and were assimilated into frontline primary groups.”110  They did not, however, share 
the “patriotic allegiances of their German comrades.”  But here Watson is mainly referring to 
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those Poles from Prussian Poland, especially Posen, which was a hotbed of Polish nationalism 
prior to World War I.  Dmowski’s National Democracy, which held that a Russian victory would 
be the best outcome for Polish nationalism, was especially strong there, and so many of the two 
million Poles fighting from Posen felt themselves to be working at a cross-purpose.  Polish 
soldiers did desert, although, as historian Edward Mendel states, it was, and still is, impossible to 
determine just how many soldiers did flee.111  
 But whereas Poles from Posen and West Prussia were looked at with suspicion by their 
German superiors, Polish-speaking Upper Silesians were often praised for their bravery and 
loyalty.  When, in April 1915, the VI Army Corps, in which Silesians served, was placed under 
scrutiny for desertion, an inquiry by both civilian and military officials found these concerns to 
unfounded; Friederich Wilhelm Loebell, the Prussian Minister of the Interior, declared that 
Upper Silesian Poles were not under suspicion of desertion and were performing 
“impeccably.”112  Since many Upper Silesians were bilingual, they did not suffer the same 
linguistic difficulties as their Polish counterparts from other areas of Prussian Poland.  In 
November 1915, the German Army decreed that new Polish recruits would not be sent to their 
Army Corps, but scattered across units from the west, in hopes of both assimilating them into 
German culture and minimizing group desertions.  Upper Silesians, as a reward for their loyal 
service, were exempt from this by April 1916, and thus allowed to remain in their home 
Corps.113 
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 On the fronts, Upper Silesians appear, by all accounts, to have fought admirably, with 
about 56,000 Upper Silesians killed during the war.114  The Silesian VI Army Corps suffered 18 
percent casualties in France in the opening weeks of the war.115  It was only as the war lagged on 
for longer than expected, combined with the failure of the German government to keep the Home 
Front from breaking down, that Upper Silesians, of both ethnicities, began to question their 
loyalty to the cause. 
 At home, Upper Silesia put its industrial might to work and was one of the major 
contributors to the war industry, providing everything from ammunitions to underwear.  A large 
explosives factory was opened in Beuthen, and chemical plants stopped producing fertilizer and 
began making bombs.  Upper Silesia was one of the largest suppliers of arms, ammunitions and 
grenades for the Germany army; arms production in the region had increased thirteen times its 
pre-war levels by 1915.116  The region’s factories also produced uniforms and other articles of 
clothing for the troops, and was an innovator in the production of nitrogen-based fertilizers, 
which were needed to increase crop yields.117  
 This transition from peace to wartime manufacturing was not smooth, however, as almost 
overnight the composition of the Upper Silesian workforce changed radically.  Adult men were 
conscripted into the army, leaving behind an untrained workforce, much to the chagrin of the 
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industrialists.  By the end of 1914, 25 percent of the experienced workers had been drafted, 
compared to the five to six percent of workers drafted from the Saar and Ruhr.118  To fill this 
void, women entered the industrial workforce in larger numbers than ever before in Upper 
Silesia.  On the eve of the war, in 1913, women had comprised 4.5 percent of the coal-mining 
workforce; by 1918 this percentage had almost tripled, to 12.3 percent.119  At the Giesche zinc 
works in 1915, women comprised 25 percent of the total workforce.120  As these increases were 
still not enough to keep up with production, Poles from Austrian Galicia were also used, 
although they made up only 15 percent of the workforce.  This is because, in the spring of 1915, 
Upper Silesia could tap into a much large pool of workers: Russian prisoners of war.  Already in 
October 1914 65,000 POWs were working in the mines and factories; this number would later 
rise to 100,000 POWs.  Mostly Russians and Serbs, these men provided twenty percent of the 
coal-mining workforce.121  By 1917 they comprised 60 percent of the total industrial workforce 
in Upper Silesia, and by war’s end only 22 percent of workers had pre-war ties to the region.122 
 Only a small percentage of workers were unionized before the war, and this percentage 
dropped as the trained workforce left for the front.  The mines operated in relative peace for the 
first half of the war.  As the fighting continued much longer than ever anticipated and living 
conditions at home worsened, though, workers became increasingly agitated.  With the passing 
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of the Auxiliary Service Law in December 1916, union organizers began entering the mines and 
factories looking to recruit new members.  Over the next year union membership soared; the 
Metalworkers’ Union, for example, grew from 226 to 5153 members.123  Newly organized, the 
workers went on strike.  Throughout the summer of 1917 the region was engulfed by strike after 
strike.  By mid-summer coal production had fallen by half a million tons.124  The strikes 
continued into the fall in conjunction with food riots, led mostly by women.  Workers struck 
sporadically through the winter and spring of 1918, but in summer the striking workers caused 
such a disruption in production that the mines were militarized.  The presence of armed forces in 
the mines did little to dissuade the miners, who continued to hold smaller-scale strikes until the 
war’s end, even at the discouragement of the unions.  
 Within months of the war’s outbreak Upper Silesia was already experiencing supply 
problems.  By December 1914 the shortage of foodstuffs and other materials was severe enough 
to warrant a ration-card system, by which each person was allocated 1.2 kg of bread a week.  
Called “war bread,” it was made mainly from oat flakes and potato flour.  By the next year, all 
food products, cleaning supplies and clothing were distributed by way of ration cards.  
Regulations on milk and dairy gave preference to children under the age of 12 and nursing 
mothers, who were allocated one liter of milk per day.125  Farmers were prohibited to use grain 
for fodder and in early 1915 pigs were killed en masse, to both counteract the meat shortage and 
free up grain and feed for human consumption.  “Ersatz” products soon became the norm; Jakub 
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Grudniewski notes, “Tea was replaced with dried fruit, leather shoes with wooden clogs…When 
no yarn was available, human hair was used.”126  Unsurprisingly, a black market soon flourished 
in the region.127  Trade on the Black Market only increased as the war waged on and even 
rationed goods could not be found in the shops.  Conditions worsened still in late 1916, as Upper 
Silesia could not escape the “Turnip Winter” that caused mass suffering throughout Germany.  
Potatoes, which people depended on as their main source of food, were scarce; rations were cut 
to 1/4kg per person.  In conjunction with the wildcat strikes, women took to the streets to protest 
the ration system, which was clearly failing.128  By the fall of 1917 women had formed a network 
of informal councils, which organized shopping efforts so women could both work and procure 
food.  These councils soon expanded to include day-care centers, orphanages and basic primary 
education.129  The region was saved from utter disaster by the signing of the Treaty of Brest-
Litovsk in early 1918, after which foodstuffs could be imported from newly-acquired Ukraine.   
 While never the site of any actual fighting, Upper Silesia was nonetheless greatly affected 
by the First World War.  Like the rest of Germany, it sent young (and, as the war went on, not so 
young) men to the fronts; women filled the vacant spots in the mines and war industries; and the 
region experienced deprivation and starvation as the food supply became more and more scarce.  
In addition to these common wartime experiences, Upper Silesians, especially those who 
identified strongly as Poles, looked with great interest at the evolving German policy towards 
establishing a new Polish state.  Even if Upper Silesia was not to be a part of Poland, its 
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reconstitution would nevertheless have an impact on their lives – as did the other changes 
brought about by the end of the First World War.  While the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II and 
subsequent Armistice ended both the German Reich and the First World War, chaos and 
confusion still remained, especially in Central Europe.  As Germany and Poland sought to 
reestablish themselves in November 1918, Upper Silesia readied itself for an uncertain future. 
2.2: The First World War in the Polish and German Press 
Throughout the war, the Polish camp was divided between those who supported 
Napieralski and the Katolik camp’s policy of cooperation with Germans, and those who 
advocated a more strident approach.  Both sides viewed the war as an opportunity to promote 
and advance the Polish cause.  Napieralski limited his goals to an independent Poland, which 
would exist under Germany’s protection and include the territory of Congress Poland – not 
Posen and not Upper Silesia.  Others wished to see Upper Silesia incorporated into a new Polish 
state.  While Napieralski’s Katolik camp never went this far, a subtle change in tone and message 
can be seen in his papers as the war progressed – from one of conciliation and unity during the 
first phase of the war, to excitement and then bitter realization after the November 1916 
declaration of the Kingdom of Poland. 
It is impossible to fully discuss or analyze any publication during the war without 
considering censorship.  The publication of military information was banned; because of the 
region’s proximity to the front, there was a real concern that newspapers could easily fall into 
enemies’ hands.130  More than that, though, papers had to scrubbed of any hint of disloyalty to 
the German state or cause.  The same went for the politicians representing the region; while the 
Polish Party representatives in the Reichstag opposed the war, they, like their Social Democratic 
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colleagues, voted unanimously for war credits to avoid suspicion.  Unable to fully douse their 
anti-German sentiments, many National Democrats in Posen and Upper Silesia either emigrated 
out of the region or joined the Koło Międzypartyjne (Interparty Circle), a clandestine group 
which coordinated communication between local Polish leaders.131 
Napieralski and other Catholic-Centrists, however, took a position of conciliation towards 
the German war effort.  Within a month of the war’s outset, Napieralski had reached a mutually 
beneficial agreement with the German authorities – in exchange for publishing pieces supporting 
the German war effort and cooperating with censors, Napieralski’s papers would be distributed 
in the newly-conquered territory in Congress Poland; he would also receive breaking war news.  
The German authorities viewed pro-German messaging in the Polish-language press as a vital 
component for winning Polish support for the war effort.  Meanwhile, the arrangement allowed 
Napieralski to extend his publishing empire into occupied territory.132 
It might be easy to assume Napieralski’s conciliatory agreement was simply to turn a 
profit during the war.  It appears, however, that he truly did believe the best way to promote the 
Polish cause was through cooperation with Germany and Austria-Hungary.  Napieralski judged 
the Central Powers most likely to not only win the war, but also support an independent Polish 
state.  In a September 1915 article, he appealed to his fellow Poles to support the German and 
Austrian war effort: “[F]or fundamental and opportunistic reasons, putting Poles on the side of 
the Central States is necessary for the good and future of our nation.”133  Early support for the 
war effort would gain the Central Power’s trust, and give Polish nationalists “ultimately, a 
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serious voice” in the shaping of a new Polish entity.  Napieralski concluded, “In this way, in our 
opinion, we will best protect the national good of Poland and all Poles.”134  Thus, it was not so 
much censorship that blunted Napieralski’s pen, but rather the belief that currying German favor 
during the war would promote the best possible outcome for Poland after.  Again, it must be 
stressed that Napieralski and others in his camp were not advocating for a completely 
independent Poland, nor did they think Upper Silesia would become a part of this new Poland, 
in-keeping with pre-war expectations.  The best-case scenario for their region would be greater 
linguistic and cultural autonomy. 
 A few weeks after the outbreak of the war, Katolik ran an article stressing conciliation 
and cooperation with Germany.  “Germany today, just like Poland, takes up the Polish cause,” it 
announced.135  This war would be fought “mainly on the lands of ancient Poland,” and each side 
had made plans and promises for what would happen to this territory after the war.  Focusing 
mainly on the German and Austrian war efforts, it noted, “Everything that happens is in hope 
that an Austrian and German victory will bring freedom to the Poles, who until now have 
belonged to the Russian state.”136  This phrase “belonged to the Russian state” should be 
highlighted.  Katolik is discussing the future only of those Poles living in Congress Poland.  It 
does not include the Poles of Prussia or Galicia; these people, after all, are citizens and subjects 
of Germany and Austria-Hungary, respectively, and would remain so even after the war.  Still, 
the tone of the article is striking in its neutrality.  No longer were the Germans scheming H-K-T 








Silesia and beyond, were fighting for the same purpose.  Interestingly, the article ended with the 
assertion that an independent Poland “would be a bulwark against pan-Slavism and would 
constitute a great guarantee for European peace.”137  Here, Katolik seemed to be removing 
Poland and Poles from the Slavic world, even though they are, indeed, Slavs.  Most likely, this 
condemnation of pan-Slavism stemmed from Russia’s involvement in the Balkans on behalf of 
Serbia, as this was one of the leading reasons for Russia’s mobilization to war.   
 In the same issue, Katolik ran an article discussing the plight of Polish Upper Silesians.  
As is to be expected, the article praised their behavior.  “The Polish people of Silesia have 
behaved completely calmly and dutifully towards the [German] state.  Everyone recognizes 
this.”138  Interestingly, the remainder of the article detailed the arrest and release of “several” 
Polish Upper Silesians, yet the tone, again, remains strikingly neutral.  There is no ire that these 
men were arrested preemptively and without cause.  Instead, the article simply reported that the 
men feel no ill will towards their [German] captors, as well they should not; as the [German] 
officer at the jail declared, there is no reason to take the arrest badly, since in a time of war 
everything must be sharply examined and taken as a warning.  As further proof of the jailors’ 
benevolence, this statement was even translated into Polish, so that those without a solid 
command of German could also understand.  
 Perhaps more so than the previous article, this one represents Napieralski’s conciliatory 
tone.  It is easy to support the German side when it is promising a dream that is contingent on an 
uncertain future; it is not so simple to brush over the unwarranted arrests of one’s neighbors.  
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himself was not arrested, due to his agreement of cooperation with German authorities.  Had the 
article been more strongly worded, Napieralski would probably have joined his colleagues in jail.  
Instead, he remained free and continued to publish, even as others’ newspapers were shut down. 
 The tone in the Polish-language papers shifted from neutral to joyous after the November 
1916 declaration from the Central Powers of the establishment of an independent Kingdom of 
Poland.  Germany and Austria-Hungary hoped the announcement would drum up support among 
their own Poles, as well as encourage them and their compatriots in Russian Congress Poland to 
volunteer in the Central Powers’ armed forces.  Upper Silesia was not to be a part of this 
independent Poland.  Still, the papers greeted this news with much fanfare, running numerous 
articles about the announcement and the future of Poland for more than a week after the 
proclamation. “Poland rises,” proclaimed one such article, entitled “Towards a Free Poland.”139  
“Generations of people were waiting for her with eagerness and longing and, before her return, 
sadly laid down in the grave.  We happily watch her with vivid eyes and welcome her…We open 
our hearts to Poland and cry, ‘Welcome, our beloved, welcome, living homeland!’”140  The 
article mentions its “joyous heart,” and that is the best way to describe the tone of the article: 
joyous.  The article also makes clear that the future of Poland is linked to the future of the 
Central Powers.  It is only with their victory that an independent Poland will arise. 
 Before the First World War, independent Poland was a dream.  But with Germany’s 
November 1916 declaration, the idea of a Polish state suddenly became real.  Poland was no 
longer an amorphous idea, but an actual state that would need concrete boundaries.  The Katolik 
press welcomed back it “Homeland” – but where, exactly would that Homeland be?  Who would 
 




be allowed to join it?  After a little over a week of soaring elation, the newspapers began to 
question Germany’s true motives and intentions.  Appearing in Górnoślązak on 16 November 
(eleven days after the proclamation), “New Situation for Poles in Prussia” began by bluntly 
stating, “The autonomy of the Kingdom of Poland was announced, but we Poles in Prussia don’t 
belong to this.  This, which in the souls of thoughtful Poles in Prussia stuck as an ideal, to which 
their hope and effort clung to, has come true, but not for us.  We must look this truth in the 
eyes.”141  This new Poland would mean “the development of new relationships for Poles, for us 
and for the Prussian state, to which we remain citizens.”142  This last sentence pointed out what 
the previous articles had, almost willfully, ignored: Upper Silesians, and their Posen brethren, 
were Prussian citizens.  They belonged to the German state.  What good was an independent 
Poland, what use were the rights granted to its people, if nothing were to change in Prussia?  
Here, Górnoślązak seemed to be placing Upper Silesian Poles in a very interesting position, 
between the Poles of Poland proper and the Prussian/German state.  Linguistically, religiously 
and culturally, they belong to the former; legally, they are a part of the latter.  
 The question of Poland’s borders and Upper Silesia’s place in them was further 
complicated by the work of Dmowski.  Since the outbreak of the war, he and his National 
Democrats had sided with Russia, believing it to be the best bet for Polish linguistic and religious 
autonomy.  By 1916, however, it was clear the war was not likely to end with a Russian victory, 
and Dmowski and his cohort regrouped in Lausanne, Switzerland, before settling in Paris in the 
fall of 1917; here, they established the Polish National Committee, which would be the officially 
recognized Polish body during the post-war treaty negotiations.  Having lost faith in Russia, 
 




Dmowski now placed his hopes of an independent Poland with the western Allied states.  Great 
Britain and France, however, were not willing to discuss the Polish question, for fear of upsetting 
their Russian ally; Russia had declared Poland an internal, domestic matter.  Meanwhile, famed 
pianist Ignacy Jan Paderewski arrived in the United States in fall 1915, hoping to convince 
President Woodrow Wilson to support the cause of Polish independence.  As the United States 
were not an official ally in the war, Paderewski hoped Wilson would be more willing to push 
Russia towards granting Polish independence.143 
1917 brought two important changes that would ultimately prove vitally important for the 
question of Polish independence.  The first was the Russian Revolution, which brought the anti-
war Bolsheviks to power, and their sudden exit from the war.  With Russia no longer an ally, or 
even a combatant, Britain and France now had the freedom to discuss Poland’s future.  That 
same year, the U.S. entered the war, and in January 1918 Wilson delivered his Fourteen Points 
speech to Congress.  In it, he laid out the United States’ major war aims.  Point 13 called for an 
independent Polish state, “which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish 
populations.”  Again, this raised the issue of Poland’s future borders.  For the first time, 
however, these borders would not be confined to the old Congress Poland; Austrian Galicia, 
Prussian Posen and Upper Silesia were now opened as possible territories to belong to the new 
Poland.  Dmowski himself claimed these areas, as well as a corridor to the Baltic Sea, in his 
meeting with Wilson on 8 October 1918.144   
 In what would prove to be the last year of the war, Napieralski’s press abandoned its 
conciliatory tone and returned to its old, pre-war standbys: religion and language.  In the spring 
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of 1918, Górnoślązak published a piece about “Religious Instruction in Upper Silesia,” in which 
the paper once again called upon the Upper Silesian clergy, who “love and cherish the German 
language,” to conduct religious instruction in Polish.145  “In Upper Silesia seventy percent of the 
people speak Polish.  The child learns it from his mothers’ prayers in Polish, he goes to church 
and there listens to a Polish sermon.”146  In order to be truly immersed in the Catholic faith, a 
child needed to receive religious instruction in the language he best understood.  To instruct him 
in German before he has attended school, and thus does not completely understand the language, 
stunts his religious growth.  Here, again, the importance of the mother is stressed.  The Pole (a 
young boy) learns his prayers from his mother; she is his first religious instructor.  
 The Katolik press did not redefine Polishness during the war; Polish Upper Silesians were 
still Catholic, still supported the Polish national cause.  But, at the beginning of the war at least, 
it was stressed that they were also citizens of Germany; Napieralski himself argued this in his 
1915 appeal, stating Poles had the “formal obligation arising from state citizenship”147 to support 
the German war effort.  In this time of upheaval, ethnic differences had to be put aside so that a 
unified Germany could defeat its Russian foe.  Berlin paid for this loyalty, in part, by promising 
the establishment of a future Polish state – a promise it seemed to keep with the 1916 declaration 
of the new Kingdom of Poland.  But this new Poland only served to highlight for Poles the 
slights committed against them, the cultural and religious grievances that had been swept away 
in the name of wartime solidarity.  Dmowski’ campaign for an independent Poland and Wilson’s 
Fourteen Points made possible what Upper Silesian Polish nationalists had never truly 
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considered – the chance to truly becoming a part of a Polish nation-state.  Before, Upper 
Silesians might ethnically identify as Polish, but they accepted that they were German citizens – 
after all, there was no Poland to which they could belong.  But as the war ended and the new 
Poland secured its place in Central Europe, Upper Silesians suddenly had another option, on 
which, unbeknownst to them at the time, they would soon be asked to decide. 
The German-language press differed from its Polish counterpart in several important 
ways.  First, there was no equivalent to Napieralski; the publishing landscape was much more 
diffuse, with no one editor or press group dominating the region.  Second, the German-language 
press was much less concerned with defining Germans and Poles.  This is not a surprise.  Upper 
Silesians were all German citizens, and, especially in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, laws regarding language and education usually favored German-speakers.  Whereas 
Polish activists constantly felt that their backs were against a wall, fighting for linguistic and 
cultural rights, German nationalists did not perceive Polish-speakers to be too great of a threat.  
This is in part evidenced by the lack of a strong Eastern Marches Association presence in the 
region until right before the outbreak of the First World War.  Instead of a full-throated attack on 
Germandom, as appeared in the Katolik press, publications like the daily Kattowitzer Zeitung148 
and the monthly Oberschlesien149 were much subtler in their slights against Polish-speakers 
before the war.  This continued during the first phase of the war as well, as the papers basically 
ignored their Polish-speaking neighbors and addressed their German audience.  It was only as the 
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war reached its end, and a new Polish state had been founded, that the papers began to pay 
attention to and deride Polish-speaking Upper Silesians as foreign and “others.” 
German nationalist sentiment was unlikely to appear in articles deriding the Polish Party.  
Instead, the attitude can be found threaded through pieces in a much subtler way.  Take, for 
example, the joke that appeared in the May 1914 edition of Oberschlesien, under the heading, 
“Upper Silesian Humor:”150   
“At the inspection assembly, the command is called. 
Lieutenant: All men with an ‘O,’ report! 
Onderka! ‘Here!’ Owczarczyk! ‘Here!’ etc. 
‘Is there anyone here with an ‘O’ who wasn’t called?’ 
‘I wasn’t, Sir!’ 
‘What’s your name?’ 
 ‘Klepitko!’”151 
 
 The three men who respond – Onderka, Owczarczyk and Klepitko – all have Polish or 
Slavic last names.  Presumably, the lieutenant is German, as he is the one in a position of 
leadership and power.  Regardless, the punch line of the joke is that Polish Upper Silesians 
would not understand the simple instructions of a roll call.  Klepitko is so simple-minded that he 
believes he should be included with the other “O” men, as his name also contains the letter.  The 
joke does not argue that Upper Silesians should only speak German, or that Polish nationalists 
are insidiously causing agitation in the region.  Instead, it pokes fun at Polish Upper Silesians’ 
intellect.  Much like the American “How many [insert ethnicity/gender/occupation] does it take 
to screw in a light bulb?”, this joke is based on one group’s assumption that another is 
intellectually inferior to them. 
 
150 “Oberschlesien Humor,” Oberschlesien, May 1914. 
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 It is interesting that Oberschlesien could publish the above joke, and yet, not even two 
years earlier, publish an article that highlighted the unity of Upper Silesians.  Appearing in the 
November 1912 edition, the article, entitled, “Local History and Local Cultivation in Upper 
Silesia: Opinions and Suggestions,”152 examines the cultural history of Upper Silesia.  It is 
written in first person plural; the author frequently uses “we,” “us,” and “our,” connecting to and 
including the reader.  For example, he writes, “The Silesian periodicals and newspapers bring 
more and more accounts of our area.”153  The uniqueness of Upper Silesia is also emphasized; 
the region “has its own poets, writers and artists.”154  Still, this Upper Silesia could be essentially 
German; assumedly only Germans would read Oberschlesien, and so they would be the ones to 
whom the writer is speaking.  It is the closing lines of the article that make this piece truly stand 
out: “I speak German, and you speak Polish; but we were born in the same land, and are 
therefore brothers.  Our fight comes to an end!”155  This is one of the very few expressions of an 
Upper Silesian identity that is not tied to either Germanness or Polishness.  That is, while other 
articles might call on “Upper Silesians,” they are really directing their message at either German- 
or Polish-speakers; the “other” is not included in the term “Upper Silesian.”  Yet here, in the 
German national Oberschlesien, appeared an article that highlighted Upper Silesian-ness and 
separated it from any language.  It did not matter if one spoke German or Polish; one was an 
Upper Silesian by virtue of being born in the region.  That is, language was not taken to be the 
deciding factor in determining one’s ethnicity.  This position, as will be discussed below, would 
be completely reversed in an article appearing near the end of the war. 
 








 When the war began the German-language press, like its Polish-language counterpart, 
stressed the unity and resolve of the people, specifically the German people.  The tone in these 
articles ran the gamut from resigned acceptance of the war to full-scale jingoism.  In its August 
1914 edition, Oberschlesien noted, “Germany did not want this war.  Our Kaiser is endeavoring 
to preserve peace.”156  The war would “demand an immense sacrifice, a sacrifice of goods and 
blood.”157  But even though Germany did not ask for this war, her “sons, brothers and 
fathers…will be absolute in their duty,” as will those left behind in Upper Silesia, where, in spite 
of all the hardships to come, “the mood is superb, the enthusiasm tremendous.”  Days after the 
declaration of war, the Kattowitzer Zeitung issued an “Appeal to Germany’s Men, Women and 
Young!,”158 in which “hard-working and industrious German people”159 were encouraged to 
stand together during the war. 
 The more bombastic rhetoric was reserved for the poems issued by both publications 
within a month of the start of the war.  Again, German unity in the face of war is stressed.  
Oberschlesien’s “Faith” opened with, “From East to West, from North to South/ All of Germany 
surges in flames!...We blaze and thunder together/ We hold each other hand in hand/ and shout: 
Kaiser and Fatherland!”160  All Germans, be they from Bavaria, the Rhineland or Upper Silesia, 
are united in the war effort; they all “blaze” for Germany.  In “To the Germans,” the Kattowitzer 
Zeitung also encouraged Germany to rise up and take hold of its victorious destiny: “O German 
Eagle, once more wave/ yourself over the European Empires!/ Your roaring wings resound, ring 
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out/ And go to the sun and sing and sing/ A storm song with no equal.”161  In a time of war, 
religious and national differences are swept aside, if not forgiven then, for the time being, at least 
ignored.  While addressed “To the Germans,” the theme of this and the above poem was unity.  
The poem was not excluding national minorities, but rather bringing them into the German fold.  
In the face of war, everyone was German.  
 Interest in Congress Poland appeared in 1915, when the Central Powers first established 
control over Congress Poland and set up governments in Warsaw and Lublin.  The Kattowitzer 
Zeitung ran short articles in January and February 1915 regarding the German management of 
the region and German and international relief efforts being taken on behalf of the Russian 
Poles.162  The information in these articles was reported in a clear-cut and detached manner.  
More interesting is the March 1915 account of “The Hardship in Poland!”163  Here one finds 
what appears to be genuine sympathy for the residents of Congress Poland.  “Hardly a land 
suffers so under the turmoil of war as Russian Poland,”164 the article claimed, and the “inevitable 
destruction of home, farm and land” has meant disaster for millions, especially those living in the 
cities, exposing them to hunger and disease.  However, it is not only out of the goodness of their 
hearts that Germans must help their new Polish charges.  Diseases can spread quickly, and 
epidemics do not care what language one speaks.  Not only are the borderlands in danger, but 
more importantly so are “our brave troops fighting there, who are in constant contact with the 
 
161 “An die Deutschen!,” Kattowitzer Zeitung, 5 Aug. 1914. 
 
162 “Die deutsche Verwaltung in Russisch-Polen,” Kattowitzer Zeitung, 8 January 1915; “Hilfsaktion für die 
Bevölkerung im besetzten Polen,” Kattowitzer Zeitung, 9 February 1915. 
 




population.”165  It is not just a matter of “humanity,” but “an obligation of self-preservation,”166 
the article reported, that should compel Germans to aid the Russian Poles.  Even charity and aid 
must be viewed through the lens of what is best for the German nation.  The Poles of Russia are 
depicted as destitute, although through no fault of their own, and this is not reflected back onto 
Polish-speaking Upper Silesians; that is, the article’s main goal is to justify German aid to the 
region, not disparage Poles.   
 As the war dragged on, however, some anti-Polish articles began to appear in the papers, 
although these were still relatively rare.  Most likely spurred by the rise in Polish nationalist 
rhetoric as the war drew to a close and the rebirth of Poland seemed imminent, articles in the 
German-language press began to present Polish-speaking Upper Silesians as foreign elements.  
In 1912, as discussed above, Oberschlesien had produced an article that stressed one’s birthplace 
over language as determining ethnicity: “I speak German, and you speak Polish; but we were 
born in the same land, and are therefore brothers.”167  In January 1918, no such sentiment could 
be found in the pages of Oberschlesien.  Entitled “The Power and Impotence of Language” and 
written by Prof. Dr. Paul Knötel, the editor himself, the lengthy article advocated for German’s 
supremacy over Polish.168  The article began by stating, “The power and impotence of a thing 
can be seen especially in comparison with others of its kind.  This also applies to languages.  We 
recognize their power or powerlessness especially where there are other languages, such as in a 
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discussion on the Roman Empire and the power of the Latin language.  Of Upper Silesia, Knötel 
argued that German immigration law, with regards to Slavic-speakers, “broke down the barriers” 
between Germans and Slavs and led the latter, “imperceptibly and without external coercion, to 
the adoption of the German master language [Herrensprache].”170  Slavic languages, particularly 
Polish, should not be allowed, as their use weakened the German language.  Knötel pointed to 
Austria-Hungary and Switzerland as places where multilingualism had forced the German 
language to go on the defensive.  Such a thing could not be allowed to happen in Germany.  He 
concluded, “Language strengthens the will, and in the future it will hopefully strengthen and 
make powerful the German will, for the salvation of our people [Volk].”171  Language is the key.  
No longer can Upper Silesians be allowed to speak anything but German, least this cause the 
downfall of the German nation.  Upper Silesians who do not speak in the same tongue are no 
longer brothers. 
 In the German-language press, then, Polish-speaking Upper Silesians were only seen as a 
threat to the German nation as the war reached its end and an independent Poland became a 
reality.  Before the war and in its early stages, these Poles were largely ignored, and Germanness 
was largely defined by one’s loyalty to the Fatherland.  In the war’s opening months, German 
unity was placed above all else, and non-German elements, such as Upper Silesia’s large number 
of Polish-speakers, were ignored.  Besides, most understood and spoke German, albeit to varying 
degrees, and all the inhabitants of Upper Silesia were German citizens.  Only as the First World 






language press begin to view Upper Silesia’s Polish-speakers as a foreign threat to the integrity 
of the German nation. 
On the eleventh day of the eleventh month of 1918, the First World War ended, and 
Europe found itself in a very different world than it had been in only four years earlier.  This was 
especially true for Central Europe.  Some Polish nationalists had hoped that a Russian victory 
would ensure new measures of autonomy for Congress Poland.  But in 1918, Russia was 
embroiled in the Bolshevik revolution, whose red menace threatened to sweep across the 
continent.  Others had held out hope that Germany would keep its promise of an independent 
Kingdom of Poland.  But in November 1918 Germany, too, was mired in revolution, and the 
imperial government that had issued this claim no longer existed.  
 In the middle stood Upper Silesia.  The Armistice ended the war, but not its many 
questions.  What would this new Germany look like?  Would Poland arise again?  And if so, 
where did Upper Silesia belong?  With Germany, with Poland – or perhaps on its own?  Upper 
Silesians suddenly found themselves at a crossroads, down which lay many options for their 
future – a future that, on the eleventh of November 1918, was anything but clear. 
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PART TWO: 
“DOWN WHICH ROAD?”: 
THE MYRIAD PATHS FOR UPPER SILESIA IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF 
THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
When the guns fell silent on the eleventh day of the eleventh month, 1918, Europe, and 
the world, found itself much transformed.  Four years of horrific fighting had left land and lives 
destroyed.  An entire generation of young men – almost ten million – had disappeared, and an 
additional six million civilians could also be counted as casualties of the war.  Put another way, 
an average of 1306 German citizens died each day during the course of the war.  France and 
Great Britain had considerably less losses, although their own daily losses were still a staggering 
881 and 582, respectively.1  But while all was, for the most part, finally quiet on the Western 
Front, in the east the fighting did not stop with the declaration of the Armistice.  As three 
empires fell, new nation-states scrambled to fill the void left behind, often with violent results.  
Revolutions, uprisings and civil wars would continue to occur in the lands of East Central 
Europe for the next several years.2  In the wake of the war, the multiple national and social 
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questions raised during the fighting were left largely unanswered, and even the peace settlement 
that followed failed to enact concrete solutions.  In the midst of all this uncertainty and upheaval, 
the people of East Central Europe found themselves at various crossroads. 
This was especially true for the residents of Upper Silesia.  Historians such as Peter 
Holquist have called the immediate post-war years a continuum of crisis.  He notes, “Throughout 
much of central and eastern Europe, the war wound down in an extended convulsion of 
revolutions and civil strife…Rather than viewing these civil wars […] as distinct episodes in 
their own right, we might instead think of them […] as a ‘continuation and transformation’ of the 
world war.”3  Upper Silesia’s continuum of crisis lasted at least until October 1921, when the 
League of Nations gave its recommendation for the region’s partition, and at latest mid-1922, 
when the partition was enacted.  In those years the region witnessed an upswell of violence – 
three bloody revolutions, a series of strikes, both organized and wildcat, in the mines, unrest over 
food shortages, and a general rise in “banditry.”  According to historian T.K. Wilson, “Between 
11 November 1918 and 30 June 1922 there were an estimated 2,824 violent fatalities in Upper 
Silesia” and “12.39 violent deaths per 10,000” residents.4   
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And yet, in the wake of this violence, the people of Upper Silesia attempted to return to 
the prewar electoral order, even as the political, social and national orders were all being debated 
and remade.  Within a year of the German Revolution and declaration of the Armistice, Upper 
Silesians were asked to participate in three elections that, aside from some nationalists’ 
grumblings, were democratic, open and free.  The first of these – electing representatives to the 
German National Assembly, to be held in Weimar – took place a mere ten weeks following the 
downfall of the Reich and the end of the war.  In that time political parties – and their 
newspapers – mobilized their voters, urging them to vote for their party or, in the case of the 
Polish parties and press, to boycott the election wholesale.  To use historian Margaret 
Anderson’s term, Upper Silesians very quickly returned to “practicing democracy.”5  The year 
following the end of the war, then, was a crucial one for the region.  Upper Silesians attempted to 
make order from chaos.  Through their participation, and abstention, in the elections they made 
their own will known – even if they were not always successful. 
The situation Upper Silesians found themselves in during 1919 is best expressed by the 
title of the 14 January 1919 Gazeta Robotnicza article, entitled “Down which Road?”6.  Although 
specifically about the new Polish republic, the question raised in the article’s headline was one 
that confronted Upper Silesians of all national and political stripes.  As 1918 came to a close, 
new roads suddenly appeared, and Upper Silesians now faced various options for their future.  
German and Polish nationalists attempted to steer Upper Silesia towards one of these two new 
nation-states, which both laid claim to the region.  Socialists hoped to make real gains in the 
region and found themselves again trying to navigate national (in the case of the SPD) and 
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religious (for PPS) political minefields.  And some Upper Silesians, buoyed by the actions of 
their new neighbor to the south, decided to advocate for autonomy, if not outright independence.  
This part will examine the myriad paths now open for Upper Silesians, as well as how the 
decision for their future was ultimately taken away from them.   
The first chapter explores the situation in Germany and Poland at the end of the First 
World War, and how the changes played out in and affected Upper Silesia.  Two days before the 
Armistice, the Kaiserreich collapsed and the new German Republic, governed at first by a 
coalition of Majority and Independent Socialists, emerged.  On the day of the Armistice, Józef 
Piłsudski marched into Warsaw and claimed control over a newly reborn Poland.  Both these 
events are important in understanding the climate of Upper Silesia and the position in which it 
now found itself throughout 1919.  It will end with an analysis of the 19 January elections to the 
National Assembly, in which some Upper Silesians voted for the new Republic and others used a 
boycott to demonstrate their loyalty to Poland.   
The second chapter explores how, in the midst of this national and social upheaval, the 
three main options advocated their individual agendas and laid out their own visions of Upper 
Silesia’s future.  Socialism, in various forms, was sweeping across East Central Europe, and was 
a major tenet of both Weimar Germany and Poland.  But German and Polish Socialists, 
represented in Upper Silesia by the SPD and PPS, respectively, did not view each other as 
comrades; especially on the Polish side, there was a substantial dose of mistrust and 
apprehension towards the other.  Upper Silesians also had national options. Immediately after the 
war the region was still a part of Germany; this was indisputable.  However, very soon after the 
war’s end, speculation (or the fantasy) that Upper Silesia could join the new Poland appeared in 
the press.  The question of where the area belonged “historically” was raised, with both German 
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and Polish advocates searching the distant (sometimes mythical) past to argue for Upper Silesia’s 
place in either nation.  Finally, the third path led to an autonomous or independent Upper Silesia, 
although what exactly this meant (a fully independent nation, an autonomous region in either 
Poland or Germany) was debated even among the promoters of an “Upper Silesia for Upper 
Silesians.”   
 In the last chapter, the decision of Upper Silesia’s immediate future is determined – but 
not by the Upper Silesians.  Instead, hundreds of miles away in Paris, the leaders of the 
Victorious Powers decided the fate of a territory most had never seen.  After examining the 
Versailles Treaty and its declaration of a plebiscite to be held in the near future, the chapter 
returns to Upper Silesia.  As summer turned to fall, we find two of the clearest examples of 
Upper Silesia’s balancing act between violence and order.  In August, in part as a reaction to a 
new wave of strikes, the First Silesian Uprising shook the region and highlighted just how fragile 
any peace there was.  Less than three months later, on the first anniversary of the declaration of 
the German Republic, Upper Silesians – both Germans and Poles – returned to the polls for a 
third time.  Both sides viewed the municipal elections as a pre-plebiscite for the region, and the 
Polish party experienced unparalleled success here.  Yet once again, the region’s attempt to 
assert its own authority over its future was taken away, as the arrival of the Inter-Allied 
Commission and its troops in early 1920 took control of the region until the plebiscite, over a 
year later. 
1. Revolution and Rebirth: Germany, Poland and Upper Silesia After the First World War 
The second week of November, 1918, was a momentous one for Central Europe.  On 9 
November, Kaiser Wilhelm II was forced to abdicated the throne and the German Republic 
declared.  Two days later, on the day of the Armistice on the Western Front, Józef  Piłsudski 
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made his triumphant return to Warsaw, and Poland once again regained its independence.  Few 
things, however, are as simple as that.  In the weeks that followed, both these new states would 
experience intense birthing pains as revolutionary leaders debated and fought over the future of 
these new nation-states.  In Germany, infighting between the SPD and the Independent Socialists 
(Unabhängige Sozialistische Partei Deutschlands, or USPD)7 reached a fever pitch by 
December, as they argued over just how far to take the German Revolution.  Meanwhile, 
Piłsudski had to navigate between forces on the Left, who wanted a full social revolution, and 
those on the right, particularly the National Democrats (ND, or Endeks), who refused to 
acknowledge Piłsudski’s authority and had the ear of the Victorious Powers in the west.  Both 
republics also struggled with the issue of borders – where to place them, and how to keep them 
secure.  This was especially true for Poland, which was trying to stitch together a nation-state 
from parts of three disparate empires. In American President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen 
Points, the thirteenth called for a Poland “which should include the territories inhabited by 
indisputably Polish populations.”8  Just what constituted “indisputably Polish populations” and 
where they could be found would be determined at the upcoming peace conference.  Until then, 
Piłsudski’s and Dmowski’s supporters would compete to make the newly reborn Polish state into 
their own vision.  Posen/Poznania9 proved especially troublesome for both Germany and Poland.  
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9 While the region did not officially become a part of Poland until the Versailles Treaty, from this point forward it 
will be referred to by its Polish name – Poznania – instead of the German Posen. 
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Still a part of the German state, Poles there staged an uprising in late December, demanding to 
join the Polish Republic; the region, however, was an Endek stronghold, and as such did not 
support Piłsudski or his nascent government in Warsaw.   
All these events affected the situation in Upper Silesia in late 1918 and early 1919.  The 
Poznania-led Naczelna Rada Ludowa (Supreme People’s Council, or NRL), established a 
subcommittee in the region, intent on advancing the Polish national cause and bringing Upper 
Silesia into newly-reconstituted Poland.  Decisions made in Berlin, about the revolution in 
general and the situation in Upper Silesia specifically, had an even greater impact on the region.  
Nowhere was this more evident than in the 19 January election for the German National 
Assembly.  For Germans, but especially Socialists, the election was a chance to break with the 
old political order and chart a new course in the region.  Pro-Polish forces, meanwhile, hoped to 
use their boycott to prove to the Victorious Powers that Upper Silesia belonged to Poland.  This 
chapter, then, will examine the initial weeks of the German and Polish revolutions and explore 
their impact on Upper Silesia, culminating in the election to the German National Assembly. 
By early fall 1918 it was clear to almost everyone that Germany was on the verge of 
losing the Western Front.  Despite its crushing victories in the East, capped by the Treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk in March 1918, and the initial success of its spring initiatives in the Somme, the 
Western Entente powers, now joined by American armed forces, had driven the German Army to 
the brink.  On 28 September Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff were forced to admit to 
the Kaiser that the war was lost and left it to the civilian government, practically paralyzed 
during the war, to negotiate the armistice.  As Ludendorff retorted, “They can make the peace 
that has to be made.”10  But seeking an armistice would not prove easy.  As U.S. Secretary of 
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State Robert Lansing made clear, nothing less than a complete restructuring of the German 
Empire would suffice.  Throughout October, the Reichstag, under the leadership of Prince Max 
von Baden, passed a number of constitutional reforms that would have transformed Germany 
into a parliamentary monarchy had they been enacted.  Then, on 26 October, Berlin received 
Wilson’s third note, which stated negotiations would only continue if Germany laid down her 
arms and those responsible for the conduct of the war were removed from power.  This was too 
much.  While Ludendorff resigned in anger a few days later, Hindenburg and other like-minded 
military commanders remained.  In an attempt to stop armistice negotiations, as well as, most 
likely, end the war in a blaze of glory, Navy Admiral Reinhardt Scheer ordered his fleet to attack 
the British Royal Navy.  Realizing they were about to embark on a suicide mission, the sailors 
mutinied, first in Wilhelmshaven on 28 October, then in Kiel on 4 November.11 
From here the revolution, inspired by the Bolshevik Revolution a year earlier, spread 
throughout Germany.  Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils took control in a majority of cities, for 
the most part in a bloodless manner.  The SPD called for the abdication of Wilhelm II, something 
the USPD had been advocating for throughout October.  Both von Baden and Friedrich Ebert, 
the leader of the SPD, intended to establish a regency council in the Kaiser’s wake; neither man 
was a republican.  But it was already too late.  On 9 November workers took to the streets in a 
general strike, amid reports that Karl Liebknecht, one of the founders of the far-left Spartacists, 
was about to declare Germany a socialist state.  Hoping to preempt Liebknecht, von Baden 
 
11 For more on the start of the German Revolution and the founding of the Weimar Republic, see the classic works 
by Eberhard Kolb, The Weimar Republic, trans. P.S. Falla (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988); Hans Mommsen, The 
Rise and Fall of the Weimar Republic, trans. Elborg Forster and Larry Eugene Jones (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 
1989); Detlev K. Peukert, The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity, trans. Richard Deveson (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1987).  See also: Richard Bessel, Germany After the First World War (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993); Erich Eyck, A History of the Weimar Republic, trans. Harlan P. Hanson and Robert G.L. 
Waite (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962); Dietrich Orlow, Weimar Prussia, 1918-1925: The unlikely 
rock of democracy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986); Eric D. Weitz, Weimar Germany: Promise 
and Tragedy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). 
 104 
announced Wilhelm’s abdication, even though the Kaiser had not yet replied to the request from 
his headquarters in Spa.  This was followed by SPD leader Phillip Scheidemann’s speech from 
the balcony of the Reichstag, during which he exclaimed, “That old and rotten thing, the 
monarchy, has collapsed.  Long live the new!  Long live the German republic!”12 
 What followed was nearly ten weeks of turmoil and chaos.  Von Baden resigned and, 
without Reichstag approval, simply handed the chancellorship to Ebert.  Ebert then formed the 
Council of People’s Representatives (Rat der Volksbeauftragten), designed to guide Germany 
through its transition into a republic and comprised equally of Majority (Ebert, Scheidemann and 
Otto Landsberg, a native Upper Silesian born in Rybnik) and Independent Socialists (Hugo 
Haase, the USPD Party Chair, Wilhelm Dittmann and Emil Barth).  He also negotiated with 
Wilhelm Groener, who had replaced Ludendorff as quartermaster general of the Supreme 
Commander, to secure the military’s loyalty.  In exchange for their support, Ebert assured the 
officers that he would check the new government from drifting too far to the left and devolving 
into a Bolshevik-style of revolution.13  In the first days of the revolution, then, one can already 
find the major fissures between the two Socialist parties.  For the Majority Socialists, the 
revolution was already done; it had been completed by the October constitutional reforms.  The 
USPD, however, viewed the revolution as just beginning and hoped to push Germany even 
farther to the left, establishing a Soviet Germany similar to Bolshevik Russia. 
As Germany underwent its revolution, Poland began to rise from the ashes.  In September 
1917 the Central Powers had granted some semblance of autonomy to a Regency Council.  The 
council controlled only Congress Poland; Austrian Galicia and Prussian Poland were not 
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included in the Central Powers’ post-war Polish plans.  As the war came to its end in the West 
and a truly independent Poland became a foregone conclusion, however, various factions began 
to maneuver themselves into positions of power.  As the Austro-Hungarian Empire dissolved, 
Wincenty Witos and Ignancy Daszyński, members of the Austrian Reichsrat (Parliament), 
formed the Polish Liquidation Committee (Polska Komisja Likwidacyjna, or PKL) in Krakow on 
28 October, in an attempt to fill the void left by Vienna and govern Galicia.14  Then, on 6-7 
November 1918, just days before the Armistice, left-wing and Socialist supporters, again led by 
Daszyński, declared a People’s Republic in Lublin.  The People’s Republic stood in direct 
opposition to the Regency Council, still under German control.  Two days later, as discussed 
above, revolution broke out in Germany.  In the wake of this, the new German government 
released Piłsudski, who had been imprisoned in Magdeburg since mid-1917, on 10 November.  
He immediately took the train to Warsaw.15   
Piłsudski, as historian Norman Davies states, was “the one man whose reputation was big 
enough to save the situation.”16  As a military commander, he was able to negotiate with the 
German Command troops who were still technically in charge in Warsaw.  As Davies wryly puts 
it, “He proposed the German Command that they should simply lay down their arms and take the 
first train out, before civil commotion erupted.  The Germans readily agreed.”17  With his pre-
war Socialist bona fides, Piłsudski could exert his influence over Daszyński and the other leaders 
of the People’s Republic.  He would support some of their policies, but would not allow Poland 
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to become a Soviet Republic, a la Russia.  As he told Daszyński, “We travelled a long way 
together in the socialist team; I got out at the stop called “independence.”18  For Piłsudski, 
socialism was always a means to Polish independence; that being achieved, he was not about the 
jeopardize the new Polish state by continuing down a socialist/soviet revolutionary path.  To 
underscore this break, Piłsudski did not accept his power from the People’s Republic, but rather 
from the more conservative Regency Council.19  Within a week, Piłsudski was both the Polish 
Head of State and Commander in Chief.  Together with the socialist Jędrzej Moraczewski, whom 
he named Prime Minister, he passed a number of reforms aimed at securing the support of the 
workers and peasants.20 
 A continent and an ocean away, however, Dmowski and the National Democrats had 
been hard at work shoring up Entente and American support for an independent Poland under the 
leadership of the Polish National Committee (Komitet Narodowy Polski, KNP).  More than a 
year before the end of the war, Ignacy Paderewski, the famed pianist living in the United States, 
had met with Wilson to convince the latter of the need for an independent Poland under the 
leadership of the National Democrats.  In September 1918, Paderewski and Dmowski presented 
their envisioned borders of the new Poland to Wilson, arguing in particular for Polish control 
over Danzig and Poznania, as well as Upper Silesia.21  When the war ended, it was not 
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Piłsudski’s leftist government in Warsaw, but rather the exiled National Democrats of the KNP 
in Paris whom Wilson and the other Entente leaders recognized as the legitimate representatives 
of the new Poland. 
 It was to Dmowski that most of the political leaders in Prussian Poland, particularly 
Poznania, also looked for leadership.  Belonging primarily to the ND or other moderate parties, 
politicians in the region had more in common with the members of the KNP than they did with 
the Socialist government in Warsaw; in fact, they refused to even recognize Piłsudski’s 
government.22  Poznania posed a further problem for the new Polish state – it was not yet an 
incorporated territory, despite the declarations and actions of the Polish representatives in the 
German Reichstag.  On 15 October, almost a full month before the Armistice, the Polish 
delegates declared themselves citizens of a Polish state that did not yet exist.  The person chosen 
to deliver this speech was none other than Wojciech Korfanty, the former leader of the Upper 
Silesian Polish Party, brought back from his political exile by a special election some four 
months earlier.23   
Three days after the Armistice, the Poles in Poznania formed the Supreme People’s 
Council (Naczelna Rada Ludowa, NRL), which was to serve as a sort of provisional government 
for the region.  Technically, the area was still a part of Germany, although the NRL did not 
acknowledge this.  Korfanty, as one of the representatives of Silesia, traveled to Posen, where he 
took his seat as one of the NRL’s three commissars, highlighting the importance of both Upper 
Silesia and Korfanty’s firebrand reputation to the Polish national cause.  In one of its first 
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messages to Upper Silesia, the NRL urged Polish soldiers to “return, after years of hardships and 
drudgery, to your native land” and work towards “the creation of a New Poland.”24  The appeal 
simultaneously called for the establishment of a new political order while reinstating the 
traditional gender one.  The men were told to “join the organizations and societies that you 
belonged to before the war,”25 to return to their old lives as much as was possible.  The returning 
men were again expected to take up their place as the head and protector of their families.  In 
their return journey, men should “not stop on the way back, just aim for your family’s side.”26  
Despite just returning from years at war, the NRL asked these men to “get into the people’s 
guards, which we’ll start in the counties, so that your families and property can be saved.”27  All 
this was in the service of their families, but also the “New Poland.”  As will be seen in the 
plebiscite propaganda, men’s role as protectors of their family was often translated as protectors 
of the nation.  A Silesian branch of the NRL was founded in Beuthen by mid-December; it was 
headed by Józef Rymer, an activist for the Polish Trade Union.28  
While all this was occurring across the border in Poland, or across the ocean in the 
United States, the German Revolution continued to play out on the ground in Upper Silesia.  As 
in the rest of the Reich, Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils had also been established.  Unlike other 
Councils in Germany, however, in Upper Silesia the USPD played a relatively minor role, 
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controlling only the smelting center of Hindenburg/Zabrze.29  Pro-proletarian and pro-Polish 
supporters of the Majority Socialists comprised the main members of the Councils established in 
other industrial counties, while in the major cities, such as Oppeln, Gleiwitz, Kattowitz and 
Tarnowitz, the SPD was joined by members of the Center and Democratic parties and included 
trade unionists, teachers, bureaucrats, lawyers and others from the middle classes; as historian 
Wolfgang Schumann has noted, “only a few” Council members from these cities were “workers 
or ordinary soldiers.”30  These Councils promoted peace and gradual, less radical, change.   
The old Reich governmental leaders were also promoting peace and order in the early 
days of the Revolution.  On 14 November, the President of the Oppeln Regency 
(Regierungspräsident), Johannes von Miquel, issued a public declaration urging the people of 
Upper Silesia to “all do your duty.  Keep calm and in order!”31  Directed at “workers, employers, 
civil servants, business people, farmers, soldiers,” the declaration addressed what would quickly 
become the most pressing matters for the new German state – keeping the miners on the job, and 
protecting the border.  On the latter point, von Miquel urged soldiers, “Be aware that you are 
needed to maintain order and protect the Border. Do your duty and follow the instructions of 
your superiors. By establishing the Soldiers' Councils, your interests are protected in every 
respect.”  Likewise, officers were to continue with their duties “regardless of [their] private 
position on the political upheaval.”  In this, von Miquel stated, “Your patriotism will help you.”  
But it was to the workers (Arbeiter und Arbeiterinnen) that von Miquel devoted most of his 
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appeal.  “Complete the tasks required of you,” he implored.  “Do your work!  The new Reich 
government [Die neue Reichregierung]32 has enacted laws that will bring about a substantial 
improvement in your situation in a short time.”  In other words – Do not, under any 
circumstances, go on strike.  “Do not let yourself be tempted to work stoppage.”33  Do not let 
“unauthorized persons mislead you into anything that might harm the interests of the general 
public and the Fatherland.”34  It was imperative to the new Germany that the mining and 
distribution of Upper Silesian coal remain undisturbed and uninterrupted.   
Von Miquel’s warnings were not heeded.  When it became clear to the predominantly 
Polish-speaking workers in the industrial region that their working and living conditions were 
not going to quickly improve, wildcat strikes again engulfed the region.  The movement began 
on 14 November in Antioninehütte, where workers demanded significant wage increases in order 
to keep up with the inflated price of food and other essentials.35  In response, representatives of 
the German trade unions, the Polish ZZP and the Berg- und Hüttenmännische Verein (Upper 
Silesian Coal and Metal Employers’ Association) met in Kattowitz.  On 18 November, the three 
groups announced the Kattowitz Agreements, which were to reorder labor in the region.  
Workers were to receive a pay raise, and an eight-hour day was to be imposed.  However, the 
pay increase was still not sufficient to cover the rising cost of food, and the eight-hour day did 
not include the time it took the workers to enter and exit the mine.  Both of these concessions 
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were non-negotiable for the workers.  As a result, on 21 November thousands of miners went on 
strike.  Within two days, 24 pits and more than 30,000 miners were on strike.36 
 The wave of strikes deeply troubled Berlin.  On 21 November the Council of People’s 
Representatives devoted much of their meeting to solving the Upper Silesian problem.  The 
debate revolved mainly around the decision to send troops to secure the region, and if so, where 
to find such troops.  Haase argued sending armed forces would not only turn Polish labor leaders 
against Berlin, but would also tarnish Germany’s image in the upcoming peace negotiations; 
besides, there were no troops to send.  August Müller, State Secretary of the Reich Economic 
Office, disagreed, arguing, “There is nothing more important than securing the Upper Silesian 
coal region, otherwise there is no gas and no electricity in Berlin.”37  Later in the meeting, he 
declared, “If we lose the Upper Silesian coal, then Germany will fall apart completely.”38  Reich 
State Secretary of Labor Gustav Bauer proclaimed, “At all cost, we must send troops to the 
east.”39   
 Finally, it was decided that Haase would travel to Gleiwitz the next day to sort out the 
matter on the ground.  On 22 November Haase met with representatives of the Workers’ 
Councils and industry in Gleiwitz, as well as representatives of the Berg- und Hüttenmännische 
Verein in Kattowitz.  Once again, securing the eastern border was a top priority.  In both 
meetings, the Upper Silesian representatives stressed that the current Grenzschutz was 
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“insufficient” and in need of “disciplined troops.”40  In the Kattowitz meeting, the “consensus 
view” was that the strikes were spontaneous and wild, although there did appear to be some 
communication between the mines, and were not supported by the union leaders, who had 
negotiated the Kattowitz Agreements.41  This sentiment was in fact echoed in a Górnoślązak 
article printed the same day as the meetings.  Citing the concessions made in the Kattowitz 
Agreements, the paper argued, “The Upper Silesian worker won through the organization”42 – 
that is, through the negotiations of the ZZP.  The organization would continue to “look after the 
workers’ every need, and they will make more and more improvements for them,”43 but the 
strikers had to trust the Union to speak for them. 
 The meetings must have given Haase some measure of reassurance, however; he 
telegraphed Dittman that “things in Upper Silesia are much more favorable than was to be 
expected,”44 and when he returned on 23 November he reported having calmed the situation by 
promising Council support to the workers’ claims, thereby postponing the need to send troops to 
the region.45  Yet still the strike continued.  In some places the miners had the support of their 
local Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council; in Kochlowitz, for example, members of the Soldiers’ 
council occupied the mine so as to prevent anyone from entering.46  However, because the 
strikers did not have the backing of the unions, they could not put forth a cohesive and consistent 
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list of demands.  This eventually allowed the owners to negotiate with their own mines 
individually.  On 28 November there were 20 mines on strike; by 30 November, it was down to 
11 pits and 8000 workers.  By 2 December all mines were operational once again.47  
 Up until now, the SPD and USPD in Berlin had held a tenuous alliance.  Again, for the 
former, the revolution was complete, while the latter wished to push for a social revolution in the 
Bolshevik model.  In December, these differences proved to be untenable and led to the 
splintering of both the German Revolution and the German Left.  On 29 November, the Council 
of Peoples’ Representatives proclaimed elections to a constituent assembly be held, in which all 
German citizens, men and women, would be allowed to vote; the date for the elections was set a 
few weeks later, at the National Congress of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils, for 19 January 
1919.  For the left-wing of the USPD, which had opposed the calling of a national assembly 
since the Revolution began, this decision was just one more way in which the Majority Socialists 
and right-wing USPD members were hijacking the Revolution.  On 29 December, under pressure 
from those on the left, the three USPD members of the Council withdrew.  Two days later, 
extreme leftists in the party, including the Spartakusbund, broke off from the USPD to form the 
German Communist Party (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, KPD).   
 The extreme left now attempted to wrestle back control of the Revolution from the 
Majority SPD.  On 5 January, partially in response to the dismissal of Berlin Chief of Police 
Emil Eichhorn, workers took to the streets in protest to Ebert’s “counter-revolutionary” 
government.  The leaders of the Spartakusbund, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxembourg, 
prepared to challenge the SPD government.  Their plans proved premature.  As historian 
Eberhard Kolb stated, the Spartacist Uprising was “without a strategic plan, was hopelessly 
 
47 Schumann, 110. 
 114 
mismanaged and to some extent half-hearted.”48  The government sent in the Friekorps to put 
down the revolt, and on 15 January Liebknecht and Luxembourg were captured and executed.   
 As the USPD was splintering in Berlin, so it was in Upper Silesia.  Leftists formed the 
Communist Party of Upper Silesia in late December and quickly joined it to the KPD.49  Strikes 
began again in December, and after the violence of the Spartacist Uprising Berlin was no longer 
willing to hold back the troops.  Defense Minister Gustav Noske, who had been in charge of the 
Freikorps that quelled the uprising in Berlin, now issued a call for volunteers to become part of 
the Grenzschutz (Border Security).  Echoing this call – and providing substantial financial 
backing – was the Berg- und Hüttenmännischer Verein.  Gustav Williger, one of the 
Association’s leaders, issued a call for volunteers on 6 January, proclaiming, “Great danger 
threatens our Upper Silesian homeland!  Upper Silesia urgently needs protection against the 
Polish enemy, who threatened it from the outside and in…If we don’t want to meet the same fate 
that Posen has suffered, haste is urgently needed.”50  The Grenzschutz needed men “for whom 
the protection of Upper Silesia against Polish domination is a matter of heart.”51  Appealing to 
their sense of masculinity, Williger argued these men would be saving “their wives and children, 
parents, brothers and sisters from the hardships, poverty and misery”52 that would befall the 
region if it fell into Polish hands.  By late January, Noske reported he had 22,000 men at the 
government’s disposal.53  At the same time, Otto Hörsing, the SPD’s regional party secretary, 
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was promoted to State Commissar for the Regierungsbezirk Oppeln, effectively dismissing the 
imperial leaders.54   
 This concern for the border was compounded in late December by the events in 
neighboring Poznania.  The initial Armistice agreement had called for German forces to retreat 
back to territory held before August 1914, allowing German troops to remain in Poznania, whose 
fate would be determined at the upcoming Peace Conference.  The NRL, though disappointed 
with this decision, nevertheless urged peace among Poles in the region and placed all their faith 
in Dmowski and his KNP in Paris to secure to land for Poland.  For the younger generation, 
however, waiting for a decision hundreds of miles away, and made by men who had never 
visited the region, was too much to ask.  On 27 December, Paderewski stopped in Posen on his 
way from London to Warsaw.  Inspired by his patriotic speech, young Poles spontaneously took 
up arms against the German troops stationed in the city.  When Warsaw could not send troops to 
aid in the insurrection, Polish volunteer units formed and held off German troops arriving from 
other areas of the Prussian east.  Fighting continued until mid-February, when the renewal of the 
Armistice at Trier redrew the lines of demarcation, placing Poznania outside German influence 
but keeping Upper Silesia within its boundaries.55  Hoping to avoid another Posen in Upper 
Silesia, a coalition of Grenzschutz and Freikorps units attempted to keep the peace; within a few 
months they numbered between 70-80,000 strong, while the Polish response, the Polish Military 
Organization of Upper Silesia (Polska Organizacja Wojskowa Górnego Śląska), soon counted 
about 12,000 members.56 
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 With Poznania in a state of war and the Victorious Powers intent on negotiating only with 
Dmowski’s KNP in Paris, Piłsudski now tried to broker a compromise between his left-wing 
factions and the Endeks.  He removed Moraczewski from power and named Paderewski Prime 
Minister on 18 January 1919; Paderewski also held the position of Foreign Minister and shortly 
thereafter returned to Paris to represent Poland in the peace talks.  A week later, on 26 January, 
Poland held its first elections for the Sejm (Parliament).  The result was a parliament split almost 
evenly between the Endeks, the Center and the Left.  In February, the Sejm passed what became 
known as the “small” constitution, and by the end of the month the new Polish Republic was 
officially recognized by the Entente powers.57  
 Despite this semblance of political security, in reality the situation in Poland was still 
chaotic as Piłsudski, Paderewski and others attempted to forge a new nation out of three 
disparate pieces.  Industry was at a stand-still; multiple currencies were in circulation; those who 
had survived the war found themselves homeless, wandering the countryside and spreading 
disease.58  Compounding the internal strife, Poland found itself engaged in several conflicts 
along its borders.  In addition to the insurrection in Poznania, fighting had been occurring in 
Eastern Galicia since the beginning of November, when the Ukrainian National Council took 
control of Lwów and subsequently proclaimed the area part of the West Ukrainian People’s 
Republic.  Polish forces recaptured the city at the end of the month, although fighting continued 
until January 1919.59  But the question of Poland’s eastern border would soon provide the young 
nation an even greater challenge.  In mid-February Poland and the Soviet Union blundered into 
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war.60  The fighting would continue until 1921 and included the famed “Miracle on the Vistula,” 
during which Piłsudski and his troops stopped the advancing Soviet forces at the gates of 
Warsaw.  As will be discussed in the next part, German propaganda used the Polish-Soviet War 
to highlight Poland’s uncertainty and instability during the plebiscite period. 
Meanwhile, in the wake of strikes, inter-party strife and violent uprisings, Germany was 
preparing for the elections to the National Assembly, set to be held on 19 January; elections to 
the Prussian Landtag were scheduled for the following week, on 26 January.  The voting age was 
lowered from 25 to 20 years of age, and, for the first time, women were also granted the right to 
vote.    The election was meant to mark the end of the chaos of revolution and a return to order.  
In Upper Silesia, the election was both an affirmation and a rejection of the new German 
Republic. 
Before discussing the election in Upper Silesia, it is important to know its results on the 
national stage.  National voter turnout was 83 percent, with the SPD carrying 38 percent of the 
electorate – enough to be the largest party, but not nearly enough to be the majority party, even if 
combined with the 7.5 percent won by the USPD.  The Center and the newly-formed German 
Democratic Party (Deutsche Demokratische Partei, DDP) won 20 and 18.5 percent, respectively, 
making them the second and third largest parties represented in the Assembly; the successors of 
the old conservative nationalist parties, the German National People’s Party (Deutschnational 
Volkspartei, DNVP) and the German People’s Party (Deutsche Volkspartei, DVP), combined for 
a meager 15 percent.61 
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The vast majority of voting Upper Silesians – over 80 percent – also voted for either the 
Catholic Center (which had renamed itself the Catholic People’s Party [Katholische Volkspartei, 
KVP])62 or SPD, although in different proportions than the national scale.  But the key word here 
is voting.  Only 59 percent of eligible Upper Silesians participated in the election.63  The main 
reason for this low turnout was the Polish boycott of the election, called for by the NRL in 
Poznania.  In a confidential meeting on 13 December, the NRL passed a unanimous declaration 
"that the Polish population of the Prussian partition would not participate in the elections to the 
German constitution.”64  Again, it must be pointed out that while Poznania had been a part of the 
Prussian partition in the late eighteenth century, Upper Silesia was not.  Still, the resolution, 
when it was made public about two weeks later, included Upper Silesia.  County election 
committees were ordered to “completely abstain from all electoral activities” and to hold 
meetings, in order to educate the Polish populace about why they should boycott the election.65  
The Polska Powiatowa Rada Ludowa (Polish County People’s Council) in Pleß reported back to 
the NRL on 5 January that they were ready to “begin agitation for abstaining from the German 
constitutional elections.”66 
The day before the election Katolik urged Poles to stay home, claiming, “[W]e want to 
belong to Poland and we will choose our representatives then.”67  In another article printed the 
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same day, the paper responded to a meeting, run by Catholic priests and Center Party leaders, 
designed to convince Polish Upper Silesians to vote Catholic in the election.  One priest argued, 
“Even if the Poles had a grudge against German Catholics from earlier times, today it is their 
Christian duty to rush to the rescue when the neighbor's house is burning.”68  To which the paper 
asked why this was always presented as a one-way street, with Poles expected to help the 
Germans in their hour of need, but no one admonishing the Germans for anti-Polish policies and 
actions.  It was akin to “blow[ing] one’s fist through someone’s eyes… and then call[ing]: and 
now help me, because others want to beat me.”  One the eve of the elections to the Prussian 
Landtag, from which the NRL also called on Poles to abstain, Katolik examined the morality of 
the boycott, asking, “Is it a sin to not vote?”  The answer, according to the article, was an 
unequivocal “No.”  While the NRL had not listed its motives for the boycott in its declaration, 
they are clearly examined here.  Participating in the election “would give the Germans a 
dangerous weapon”69 to use against the Poles.  Germans could hold up Polish electoral 
participation at the Peace Conference as a sign that they wished to remain in Germany.  A high 
voter turnout in Upper Silesia would not only give legitimacy to the vote for the National 
Assembly, but would also legitimize Germany’s claim that Upper Silesia should remain a part of 
Germany.  While “Poles do not want to harm German Catholics,”70 their participation in the 
election would be detrimental to what should be, in Katolik’s eyes, the primary goal of all Polish 
Upper Silesians – joining themselves and the region to Poland. 
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 In the end, the Center and the SPD emerged as the dominant parties, winning 48 and 33 
percent of the vote in the Oppeln Regency; the USPD, DDP and DNVP split the remaining 
electorate.71  But the more important aspect of the election is who did not vote, and where.  
Upper Silesia’s 59 percent of voter turnout was 25 percentage points less than the national 
turnout.72  The discrepancy in participation is close to the percentage of those who voted for the 
Polish Party in the 1912 election (35 percent), indicating that the boycott was more or less 
successful.  Proof of this can be found by looking at the results of individual counties and cities.  
For example, in Pleß and Rybnik, two Polish strongholds, voter turnout was a dismal 22 and 26 
percent, respectively, while several counties, including Kreuzburg, which had consistently voted 
for German conservatives before the war, had voter turnout on par or better than the national 
average.73  Also striking is the divide between city and county.  Kattowitz, the city, had a turnout 
of 73 percent, while Kattowitz county registered a participation rate of 42 percent.74  This trend 
of higher voter turnout in the large cities and lower in the surrounding counties held true for most 
of the industrial region, and was a sign of things to come.  As will be seen in the plebiscite, the 
cities tended to vote to stay in Germany, while the counties largely went for Poland.   
Convincing a quarter of likely Polish voters to abstain from participating in a German 
election is no mean feat.  Still, almost 60 percent of Upper Silesians did vote – even though, 
according to the 1910 language census, this same percentage of the population was Polish.  Even 
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assuming that the entire 40 percent of eligible voters who did not cast a ballot were Polish, at 
least 20 percent of Polish Upper Silesians did decide to participate.  As will be seen, 60 percent 
of Upper Silesians would also vote to stay with Germany in the 1921 plebiscite, indicating that a 
substantial part of the Upper Silesian community might consider themselves to be linguistically, 
culturally or even ethnically Polish, but preferred to remain German citizens.   
“Poles! The war is coming to an end.  The old world is dying, a new one is born.”75  So 
proclaimed Górnoślązak on 17 November 1918.  Indeed, it was a new world, one in which 
empires fell and new nation-states arose.  As the revolutionary period came to an end in late 
winter 1919, it was not yet clear what the future held for Upper Silesia.  While a considerable 
percentage of Polish Upper Silesians had boycotted the German Constituent election, indicating 
that they, given the chance, might prefer to become a part of the new Polish state, the number of 
Poles supporting the boycott was less than those who had voted for a Polish candidate in the last 
election, from 35 percent to 25 percent.  A substantial portion of the Polish-speaking population 
still chose to vote in the German election.  While the Catholic Center still reigned in Upper 
Silesia, it was the SPD that made the most gains, suggesting that the party, which never really 
had a strong foothold in the region, had finally acquired some traction.  Meanwhile, the borders 
of the new Poland – and, by extension, the borders of Germany – were being debated in Paris, 
where Dmowski and Paderewski were working tirelessly to convince the Allied Powers there 
that Poznania, Pomerania and especially Upper Silesia were historically and ethnically Polish.  
Over the next twelve months, Upper Silesians would wrestle with the options for their future 
brought forth by this new world. 
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2. The Different Roads: Options for and Reactions to the Future of Upper Silesia 
 In the year after the end of the First World War, Upper Silesians found themselves faced 
with a myriad of options for their future.  With the SPD leading the November Revolution and 
establishment of a new German state, and Piłsudski and his PPS leading the way in Poland, 
socialism finally appeared to be viable in the region – although Upper Silesians would have to 
pick between two competing national branches.  While the ultimate decision about the region’s 
fate would be made at the Versailles Peace Conference, nationalists worked to convince their 
supporters that Upper Silesia was undeniably German or Polish.  For some, neither one of these 
new states were satisfying, and instead argued that Upper Silesia should be independent.  As 
1918 turned to 1919, Upper Silesians of all national and political stripes would have to decide 
down which road they wished to see their region go. 
2.1: The Socialist Alternative(s)  
 “The Social Democrats, alone of all the parties, energetically fought the pernicious 
system of rule that led us into the abyss.  The Social Democrats were the sharpest opponents to 
the war and sought to prevent it by all means.”76  These were the opening remarks of an article 
appearing in Volkswille, an organ for the SPD, in early January 1919.  Two weeks later, the 
Gazeta Robotnicza piece, “Down which Road?”, referenced at the beginning of this Part, would 
also extol the virtues of socialism.  “We, as a party, as an organized working class, chose the 
hardest of the many possible roads, but at the same time the one which gives the greatest chance 
to undo all the issues standing before the Polish working class, as well as the entire nation.”77  
Both present the socialists as the only party which can lead the people to prosperity and safety.  
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“Because who actually could fulfill this role of national leader?”78 asks Gazeta Robotnicza.  For 
both it and Volkswille, the answer is clear: the socialists. 
 The newspapers, however, were not referencing the same socialism.  There was not a 
unified socialist movement in Upper Silesia; instead, the parties of the left were fractured along 
national and, especially after December 1918, political lines.  While the socialist movement writ 
large is international in its outlook, for the SPD and PPS in Upper Silesia, socialism was colored 
and influenced by national considerations.  The German SPD, unlike the Spartacists, was looking 
to build social democracy in Germany and in the German context only.  They advocated for a 
political, rather than social, revolution, and believed they had achieved that through the 
November Revolution.  Likewise, the Polish PPS believed socialism, as opposed to the 
conservative Edneks, was the best path forward for Poland.  Echoing Piłsudski, the PPS got off 
the socialist train at independence.   
Socialism had never been strong in the region.  Polish Upper Silesian workers were 
suspicious of the SPD, believing it to only represent German interests, and likewise distrusted the 
PPS for their previously close connection to the SPD.  More importantly, these industrial 
workers were almost uniformly Catholic, and thus chose to cast their votes for the Center and 
place their trust in the ZZP, which was viewed as more patriotically Polish.  The SPD was also 
small, for similar reasons; again, most German Upper Silesians also voted Center, and those 
Germans who did work in the industrial sector typically held management jobs; they toiled in the 
office, not in the mine shafts.  Historian Petra Blachetta-Madajczyk places the number of 
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 While Upper Silesia’s future remained unknown, it was difficult for either the SPD or 
PPS to build a strong, functioning organization on the ground.  However, by 1921 the SPD had 
grown to 8000 members, while the PPS positively exploded, boasting 40,000 members.80  As 
was discussed above, the SPD made large gains in the 1919 election, winning a third of the votes 
cast in the boycotted election.  This was more than double the 15 percent of total votes the 
socialist parties received in 1912.  There are several possibilities for this upsurge.  One is that, 
after over four years of war, Upper Silesians were looking to break with the old, conservative, 
Prussian system of government.  The SPD, as leaders of the revolution, offered just that.  On the 
Polish side, the workers who had gone on strike in November and December had done so in 
protest to the Kattowitz Agreement, which had been negotiated in part by the ZZP.  This could 
have caused some of their faith in the Union to falter, making the PPS appear more attractive.  
While Catholicism and the Center still reigned supreme in Upper Silesia, socialism at last 
appeared to be a viable option for the region.  The question facing Upper Silesians in early 1919 
was not only whether they wanted the socialist alternative, but what kind of socialism.   
 In early 1919, the SPD and, to a lesser extent, the PPS aimed at recruiting new supporters 
to the socialist cause.  This was especially true of the SPD, which was focused on the 19 January 
election of the National Assembly, the results of which were discussed above.  Volkswille 
(People’s Will) quickly became, as Blachetta-Madajczyk notes, the “mouthpiece of the SPD in 
Upper Silesia.”81  First published in 1916 under the leadership of Otto Braun, Volkswille would 
not truly make its mark on the region until 12 December 1918, when Karl Okonsky began 
serving as editor.  The daily was published in Kattowitz and soon reached a circulation of 
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70,000; its high-water mark would come in early 1921, with 250,000 subscriptions.82  Gazeta 
Robotnicza, the organ of the PPS, had a longer history, but its impact on the region, it can be 
argued, was less than that of its German counterpart.  Founded in 1891 in Berlin, the newspaper 
moved its center of publication to Kattowitz in 1900.83  Initially the paper had been subsidized 
by the SPD, although circulation of the paper was so low that, by 1912, these funds had become 
quite limited.84  This coincided with increased tension between the SPD and PPS, which resulted 
in the PPS fully separating itself from the SPD and turning more towards Polish nationalism.  
This change is evident in Gazeta Robotnicza, which after 1913 was decidedly pro-Polish in its 
outlook.  Circulation increased throughout the plebiscite period, peaking in 1921 with upwards 
of 40,000 subscriptions.85   
 With little over a month between Okonsky assuming editorial responsibilities and the 
election to the National Assembly, Volkswille inundated its readers with articles aimed at 
convincing them to vote for the SPD.  The SPD leadership during the November Revolution, 
while well-intentioned and comparatively benign, had been an undemocratic seizure of power.  
The Constituent elections, then, would be a return to the normal process of democracy.  In order 
to truly shape Germany’s future, the SPD would need a strong showing in the Constituent 
election.  Upper Silesians needed to be convinced that the SPD best represented their interests, in 
order to mobilize support around the party.  Referenced above, the 5 January article “Why I vote 
Social Democratic” listed the many virtues of the SPD.  “Social Democracy represents the 
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interests of all working men;” this included those who toiled not only with their hands, but also 
with their minds – not just “workers in a strict sense, [but] employees, clerks, craftsmen, farmers, 
traders, etc.”86  Freedom of thought and expression, as well as equal educational opportunities, 
are among the promises Social Democracy makes.  “Therefore I vote Social Democratic,” the 
article concluded, “because Socialism means happiness, prosperity, satisfaction, higher morality, 
and personal freedom for all.”87  In another short blurb, printed two days later, the paper asked its 
readers “In which party do you belong?” and warned them not to be fooled by the “new” parties 
which will appear on the ballot; these are, after all, simply the same old Reich parties, 
masquerading under new names.88  The DVP “was mainly the previous National Liberal Party;” 
the KVP “was previously the Center.”  “You belong in the Social Democratic Party (the only one 
that didn’t need to change its previous name).  In this party men and women together belong.”89 
   The reference to the inclusion of both men and women in the party is no doubt an 
obvious appeal to the new constituency of female voters.  The National Assembly was the first 
election in which women could also participate, and the Socialist press worked hard to capture 
their vote.90  Pre-war, the SPD was the only party which had advocated for women’s suffrage, 
and in the 1919 election argued that therefore the other parties were undeserving of their votes.  
Women owed their right to vote to the social democrats, and they were expected return this favor 
by voting for the party in the election.  In the days leading up to the election, a number of articles 
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geared directly at women appeared in Volkswille.  On 8 January, the paper explicitly linked 
women’s rights with the other social rights gained in the revolution.  The Socialist rebellion had 
defeated the “Junker economy” and “military monarchy”; “That they never rise again must be 
the work of women and mothers.”91  Women, according to the piece, owed their right to vote 
exclusively to the SPD.  The article claimed, “Their first act was the awarding of political 
suffrage to women.”92  Because the SPD helped women, women must now help the SPD, mainly 
by becoming disciples of the party.  “[Female] Comrades!” the article ended.  “Recognize where 
your place is, clarify for all women, that they don’t unknowingly help the enemies of freedom 
and lead them to us in the Social Democratic Party!  Women, on!”93  Another declared, “Use 
your right to vote, you women, which Social Democracy has made for you through revolution.”94 
 Quid pro quo was not the only appeal Socialists made to women.  This last article, 
entitled “To the Mothers!”, invoked the losses German women had experienced during the war.  
“Hark, you widows and mothers in mourning!  Shake off your dark veil and brighten your face to 
life!”95  Yes, their husbands and sons had died during the war, but the time for sorrow was over.  
The monarchy that had begun and waged the terrible war had been “swept away.  Now the young 
Republic needs the shepherding power of mothers and women.”96  The horrors experienced 
during the war would never again occur in a social democratic republic – but to ensure this 
future, the party needed the support of the wives and mothers who had already sacrificed so 
 












much.  Indeed, the very fate of the party in the election depended on women and their votes.  
Another article argued, “That the Social Democratic Party should receive the majority in the 
National Assembly is in the hands of the women, and it is in their interest… Women, working 
women!  The election comes to you.”97  This piece again ended with a call to action for working 
women, emphasizing their importance to the new Germany: “Women are to help in the 
construction of the socialist Republic.  Fulfill your duties, you working women, and help design 
the future of the people.”98  Women are not only necessary for the establishment and success of 
the new German Republic; they have an almost sacred duty to support the SPD, both to repay the 
party for securing their right to vote, and also because, as mothers and wives, it was the best way 
to ensure the horrors of the war would not be repeated. 
 While it, too, participated in the boycott and was therefore not immediately preparing for 
an election, the PPS also attempted to draw Upper Silesians to the socialist cause.  The PPS 
looked forward to the day Upper Silesia would be a part of Poland, and thus able to take part in 
Polish elections.  Building a strong base now would enable the party to make a good showing in 
future Polish elections, whenever that may be.  The biggest hurdle the party faced was 
reconciling Socialism with the vast majority of Polish Upper Silesians’ Catholic faith.  This had 
been the main division in the pre-war years, as newspapers like Katolik had claimed it impossible 
for one to be both Catholic and Socialist.  Now, though, it seemed there might be room for a 
détente between the two camps.  On 18 January, Gazeta Robotnicza printed the open letter sent 
from Father Euzebiusz Stateczny to the paper’s longtime editor, Józef Biniszkiewicz.  
Stateczny’s letter places Catholicism above Socialism and argued that the former is inextricably 
 




tied to Polish nationalism.  Still, he encouraged Catholics and Socialists to work together towards 
a new Poland.  “Polish Socialism,” he wrote, “cannot be disconnected from our Polish 
nationality and Catholic faith.”  He imagined a Poland in which “Poles live and work beside 
Germans and Jews, Socialists beside Catholics… Poland is Catholic, but it is not only Catholic, 
but also tolerant.”99  There is room in the new Poland, according to Stateczny, for both Catholics 
and Socialists, although his emphasis on the ties between Catholicism and Polish nationalism, 
and the subtle equivalence of Germans and Jews to Socialists suggests that he views Socialism as 
a foreign element – one which can be tolerated and even welcomed in Poland, but never truly 
considered Polish.  It is interesting, then, that his last line in the letter stated, “Let us be brothers 
of one mother!”100  The letter was reprinted unabridged, with Biniszkiewicz offering only a short 
post-script: “The above letter by a living Catholic priest shows clearly that a good Catholic can 
be a Socialist.”101  This, of course, was not quite what Stateczny was arguing; it was, however, 
the message Biniszkiewicz wanted and needed.  In order to draw more Polish Upper Silesians to 
the PPS, they must be assured that their Catholicism would not be threatened.  A letter of 
endorsement from a member of the Catholic clergy would, presumably, go a long way in 
accomplishing this goal. 
 The PPS urged Socialists and Catholics to come together in order to further the Polish 
national cause, which was given precedence.  Reaching across national lines to their fellow 
German Socialists, however, was out of the question; it seems nationalism trumped class politics 
for the PPS.  Articles in Gazeta Robotnicza and in the non-Socialist press present German 
 






Socialism as anti-Polish, or allied with the far-left Bolshevik and Spartacus movements.  
“Bolshevism and Poland” claimed that it is “in Bolshevik Russia’s interest to form a close 
alliance with Revolutionary Germany, to help the Spartacus [Movement] gain power.”102  
Górnoślązak, in “The Polish Socialist Party in Upper Silesia,” urged Polish Upper Silesians to 
leave the PPS, which was tainted by its former connection with the SPD, and join the ZZP 
instead.103 
 German Socialists, in contrast, were much more willing, at least in the press, to stress the 
connection between the SPD and the PPS.  In “Poles and German Socialism,” Volkswille quoted 
the Polish newspaper Dziennik Bydgoski, whose article claimed Germans aimed to keep Poles “at 
bay,” and that the SPD “may not dream of ever gaining broad masses of Polish workers for their 
ideas.”104  Not true, asserted Volkswille.  “The ideas of German Socialist workers are no different 
than those of the Polish Socialists could be, if they want to be regarded as true disciples of 
Socialism.”105  It should not matter the nationality, because Socialism is international in its 
outlook.  By placing the nation above class, Polish Socialists were not acting as “true disciples.”  
In fact, the article even offered a glancing blow against the PPS, noting, “The strong inclination 
of Polish comrades to national goals has obscured this fact.”106  Now that a new Polish state will 
be formed, though, hopefully they will drop these nationalist goals and “German and Polish 
workers will again unite in Socialism.”  
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 This difference in national acceptance is not surprising.  It was the German SPD which 
needed the Poles, not the other way around.  That is, the SPD needed to stress that German and 
Polish Socialism were united, in order to persuade Upper Silesian Poles to join the SPD.  Though 
perhaps culturally or ethnically Polish, these workers were still citizens of Germany, and thus 
could be used to bolster the strength of the SPD, sieving off votes from the Catholic Center, not 
to mention serve as proof that Upper Silesia wished to remain German.  Of course, they had to 
do this while still appealing to the German-speakers who already supported them.  As the above 
article illustrates, the way around this potential problem was the present the Poles’ faith in the 
PPS as misplaced and naïve.  The SPD would show them the right way to be socialist – 
something the Germans in the party already knew.  The PPS, however, could win more support 
by pointing to the SPD as an opponent, if not an out-right enemy.  Especially with a new Polish 
state established, Polish Socialists were looking to close ranks and nurture a strong Socialist 
movement that served the specifically Polish national cause. 
The Socialist movement in Upper Silesia, then, was split along national lines, with the 
SPD and the PPS each looking to expand their base and influence in the region.  Especially in the 
opening weeks of 1919, the SPD was concerned primarily with winning votes for the election to 
the National Assembly.  Both the SPD and the PPS had to contend with the strength of the 
Catholic Center, or the KVP, as it was now known.  For the SPD, this was a political contest, 
while the PPS strove to prove Poles could be good Catholics and good Socialists; these identities 
were no longer exclusive.  With the dominance of the SPD on the German national scale, and the 
rapid growth of both the SPD and PPS in Upper Silesia, a Socialist path was a definite alternative 
for Upper Silesians.   
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2.2: The National Choice 
While the Socialists looked towards the future, those in the German and Polish nationalist 
camps focused on the past – ironic, given that the old German Reich no longer existed, and the 
new Polish republic was still being born.  Both sides turned to the past, often wading deep into 
history, in order to justify Upper Silesia staying with Germany or being incorporated into Poland.  
Arguments about future economic prospects, which would play a large role in the plebiscite, 
were not cited in the newspaper articles which appeared in late 1918 and early 1919.  Instead, 
both the German and Polish national press seemed to take it as a given that Upper Silesia 
belonged to their respective national camps.  The Peace Conference in Versailles, where the 
actual decision regarding Upper Silesia’s future was to be made, was rarely mentioned. 
 Already in its December 1918 edition, when both the new German and Polish 
governments were still being established, the monthly magazine Oberschlesien asked whether 
Upper Silesia was Polish or German: “This is the question: Should Upper Silesia remain with the 
German Reich or become incorporated into the new Polish state?”107  The question, of course, 
was facetious; the answer, made painstakingly obvious in the seven-page article, was that Upper 
Silesia clearly belonged with Germany.   
 The article dove deep into the region’s history, attempting to discern whether the original 
inhabitants of the area were German or Polish.  Poles claim their ancestors were the first settlers, 
and thus “this gives them the right to demand the Polish Earth of Upper Silesia for themselves.”  
The article immediately refuted this idea: “Let’s look closer at this point.  Were Poles really the 
first residents of our land?  History knows otherwise.”  This history stretched back to the “fourth 
or fifth century,” as both the “meager notes of Greco-Roman writers” and “numerous grave 
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sites” supported the claim that the first inhabitants were, indeed, “Germans, originally Lugii, 
later Vandals.”  While these were “probably [a] plain, simple people,” they were “no crude 
barbarians, as they earlier wanted to make us believe.”  The “they” to whom the article refers are 
likely Polish nationalists, trying to down-play the importance of civility of these early Germans. 
 From here, the article lays out the history of the region, admitting that while Poles did 
live in Upper Silesia in the Middle Ages, after Frederick the Great annexed the region, “a new 
immigration of Germans began” who were responsible for the great cultural and industrial 
accomplishments of the area.  Now, citing the Wilsonian principle of national self-determination, 
“the Poles today require the annexation of Upper Silesia to the Polish kingdom.  Do they have a 
right to do so?  The history says no.”  In what will be a repeated sentiment throughout the 
plebiscite period, the article claimed, “What Upper Silesia is today, it owes, as we have seen, to 
Germandom, and it alone.”   
 Only in its closing lines did the article refer to the new Polish state, calling it “unstable” 
and declaring Upper Silesia should not be “plunged into this chaos” in which “countless victims 
[would] be sacrificed.”  This was a reference to the violence still occurring in Poland’s eastern 
borderlands.  After a centuries-spanning history lesson, the article returned to its initial question: 
“And the question, which we put forth at the beginning of this essay: Upper Silesia, Polish or 
German? Can only be answered: German!”   
 Several months later, the magazine would again return to using ancient history to support 
Germany’s claim to the land, this time in an article written by Gustaf Kossinna, one of 
Germany’s premier archaeology professors.108  In “The German Eastern Marches, an ancient 
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homeland of the Germans,”109 which Oberschlesien printed in its March 1919 edition, Kossinna 
argued the Eastern Marches, which he lists as including “West Prussia, Posen [and] Silesia” had 
Germans as “ancient occupants.”  These lands were not conquered by “militarism and 
imperialism;” Kossinna called these “lying slogans.”  Instead, ancient Germandom won them 
“only by virtue of its purely peaceful operation, its purely culture-bringing creativity.”  This 
“cultural creativity” would have a lasting impact on the region, one which could not be swept 
away even after “500 years of Slavic rule,” which Kossinna dismissed as only “an episode” in 
the region’s history.   
 What is most interesting about Kossinna’s article is that it introduced two important 
arguments that would be used by the German side during the plebiscite period.  The first, which 
was echoed in “Upper Silesia, Polish or German?”,  is the importance of German culture in the 
region.  As will be discussed below, the German representatives at Versailles would make this 
argument when presented with the first draft of the peace treaty, claiming that all of Upper 
Silesia’s “cultural and industrial accomplishments,” to again quote from the Oberschlesien 
article, were German in nature.  Without the ancient Germans, Upper Silesia would be a rural 
backwater, not a thriving industrial center. 
 Second, Kossinna was also adamant that these lands were taken through a peaceful 
spread of culture, not “militarism and imperialism.”  In the immediate post-war period and 
especially during the plebiscite period, the new Weimar Republic would work hard to distance 
itself from these two terms, often directly associated with the old, warmongering Kaiserreich and 
Prussianism.  Instead, plebiscite propaganda would depict the new Germany as a social republic, 
at peace with itself and the world.  Polish propaganda, however, would continue to brand 
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Germany with the sins of “militarism and imperialism;” Germans in cartoons and other 
illustrations were often identified by their military dress. 
 The Polish nationalist camp, spearheaded by Katolik, also used history and the 
subsequent cultural contributions of Silesia’s inhabitants to prove that the land was naturally 
Polish.  In early January, the newspaper took on Germany’s historical claims directly, in “Did 
Silesia Belong to Germany for 600 Years?”  “No one,” the article began, “who knows the history 
of Silesia will, with conscientious conviction, claim that Silesia has belonged to Germany for six 
hundred years.”110  That Germans claim otherwise, either in newspapers or at rallies, proves that 
“either they don’t know Silesian history, or they don’t write or speak the truth.”  The article 
proceeded to give a history of the region in the Middle Ages, particularly the fourteenth century, 
when Silesia was ruled by Polish princes.  To claim otherwise, the article concluded, has been 
done “in order to deceive the people.”  A follow-up appeared in Katolik sixteen days later, on 18 
January.  Almost double the length of the original article, this one offered a more in-depth 
history of the region in the 1300s, including a detailed discussion of Kazimierz the Great.  While 
some German papers might claim that Silesia was no longer Polish after 1163, Katolik argued 
that, while true that Silesia had its own princes, it still belonged to Poland.  In fact, the article 
argued, even after the region had become a part of the Bohemian kingdom, “even the Czech 
kings sometimes called it Polish.”111 
 The titles of these articles are a bit deceiving, and likely were selected because of the 
controversy they would cause.  In reading the articles, it becomes clear that “the German 
newspapers and rallies” – exact quotes are never included – were not so much claiming that 
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Silesia had belonged to the German Reich for over six hundred years, but rather that the territory 
had not been a part of the Polish kingdom since the Middle Ages.  Silesia had been passed first 
from the Bohemians to the Habsburgs, with Frederick the Great claiming it in 1742.  “On Polish 
Silesia,” published 1 March, finally seemed to recognize this, tacitly admitting that Silesia was 
not always a part of Poland.  “But even if,” it proclaimed, “one for a thousand years has someone 
else’s property, it will not become his rightful property.”112  That is, even though Silesia might 
not have been an official part of it, its historical and cultural roots still connected it to Poland.  
Most curious, the article conceded, “No unprejudiced researcher can deny that all of Silesia was 
a Polish country, and that a great part has been Germanized.”  However, “most of Upper Silesia 
was miraculously saved from Germanization.”  In the previous articles discussed, and in most of 
the others from this time period, Silesia is referenced as a whole; distinctions are not made 
between Lower, Middle and Upper Silesia.  Yet here, Katolik divided the area.  This was likely 
done with an eye towards the Paris Peace Conference and the decisions being made there.  While 
Lower and Middle Silesia might have been lost of Germanization, Upper Silesians remained true 
to their Polish roots; this was, after all, the “Polish Silesia” to which the title referred.  
 The Polish papers also directly addressed the German claim that they were responsible 
for the area’s culture.  “Germany claims…that without them, Silesia would be, if not entirely, at 
least a half-wild country, as we would be without education, without morals, without science, 
without property, without almost anything,”113 declared the 11 January article, entitled “Some 
things about our and German culture.”  Of course, the article scoffed, this isn’t true: “No, a 
hundred times no!”  It was the Poles, not the Germans, who first settled Silesia, who built the 
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towns and cleared the fields.  “It was the first and most important culture of this land, and the 
lives of the people on it.  Therefore, this land henceforth rightfully belongs to the Poles.”  Again, 
we see the importance of history in determining “rightful” ownership of the land.  Much as 
Kossinna referred to the five hundred years of Polish rule as “an episode,” so, too, does Katolik 
downplay the importance of German rule in the region.  “Germany can never say that the whole 
culture was theirs exclusively; the culture of Silesia’s first centuries…is exclusively Polish.”  
The article almost immediately contradicted itself, stating, “Henceforth, we have in Silesia two 
cultures, German and Polish,” but “the Polish population still retains its good old Polish culture.” 
 “Retaining Polish culture” had been a common cry among the Polish nationalists in the 
late nineteenth century, when Polish parents were urged to “teach [their] children to read and 
write in Polish.”  Such sentiments returned immediately after the war’s end and during the 
plebiscite period.  In an article printed in both Katolik and Górnoślązak, parents were again 
implored to raise their children as good Poles.  This included not only language – “Remember 
that when your child learns to read and write in Polish, only then will they become a child of the 
Motherland and a member of the Polish nation,”114 – but also raising the children as Catholics.  
“Polish parents!  Show that you are Poles, by way of your mother tongue, by way of your Holy 
Faith.”115  Downplayed during the war, the connection between Polishness and Catholicism came 
back with a vengeance in the immediate post-war period.   
 Both German and Polish nationalists appealed to a deep sense of history.  With no clear 
line of continuity, both sides looked to the ancient past to justify their claims in the present.  
Cultural contributions were also stressed, with nationalists on either side claiming their people 
 




had made the most lasting impact on the region and its inhabitants.  Arguments of history and 
culture would again be used during the plebiscite period.  In many ways, these arguments were 
‘preaching to the choir.’  It is unlikely that neither German nor Polish nationalists believed they 
could turn the opposition to their side.  Instead, the papers were more interested, to use a horribly 
21st century term, in firing up their base.  By encouraging their supporters to agitate for either 
Germany or Poland, the papers hoped to convince the Victorious Powers in Versailles that Upper 
Silesia belonged to them, for it was there that any real decision about their region’s fate would be 
made. 
2.3: “Upper Silesia for Upper Silesians”: The Autonomist Movement  
In the fall of 1918, centuries-old borders were suddenly in flux.  The Treaty of Brest-
Litovsk, signed eight months early on 3 March, had transferred a vast swath Eastern Europe from 
Russian to German control, and would be undone in the aftermath of the Western Front’s 
Armistice.  A full two weeks before the Armistice, on 28 October, Czechoslovakia declared 
independence, and, as discussed above, Poland returned to the map on 11 November.  But 
neither of these new countries – one reconstituted, one entirely new – had definitively 
established borders.  These would eventually be set – in many cases a few years down the road, 
in rooms hundreds of miles away, by men who had never visited the region – but in the 
immediate weeks and months after the end of the First World War there was a kind of heady 
chaos in East Central Europe.  If old nations could be brought back to life, and new ones created 
whole-cloth, if U.S. President Woodrow Wilson himself was advocating for national self-
determination, then who was to say that a small area of mixed ethnicity could not also declare its 
own independence? 
 The Upper Silesian autonomous movement – movements, really – was a messy affair.  
Historian Andrea Schmidt-Rosler has noted that it “remained largely inhomogenous, without a 
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firm political program and without structure.”116  Indeed, it is hard to pin down a set program, as 
the goals of autonomy (Autonomie/autonomia) and independence 
(Selbstständigkeit/samodzielność) ranged from cultural autonomy (mainly allowing the Catholic 
Church to maintain its preeminent position in the region), political autonomy (separating Upper 
Silesia from Prussia and establishing it as its own province (Bundesstaat) within Germany) or 
outright political independence (the establishment of new Upper Silesian state).  Self-
preservation, in addition to or rather than self-determination, was the leading motivation behind 
the cause.  Fear of both the new Polish state and the revolutionary unrest in Berlin led the 
Breslau Volksrat, dominated by the MSPD and DDP, to consider separating from Germany and 
forming, along with some southern German states, an independent confederation.  Paul Löbe, the 
chairman of the Silesian SPD, went so far as to declare on 24 November, “If a coup were to take 
the Spartacusists in power, we would have to make ourselves independent.”117  The 
announcement a few days later, that a date had been set for elections to the National Assembly, 
indicated that, for the time being, the revolution would not tip over into radical Bolshevism, 
allaying the fears of most of the members of the Breslau Volksrat. 
 Simultaneously, another group also began to advocate for Silesian – and specifically 
Upper Silesian – autonomy and independence, and it was this movement, of the various calls for 
separatism and autonomy, that would have the largest and most lasting impact on the region.  
The movement’s earliest supporters were the Catholic land barons and titans of industry, who 
looked at the choice of rule from Berlin (Socialist) and rule from Warsaw (Socialist and Polish) 
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and found them both to be lacking.  The movement received a boost on 13 November, when 
Adolf Hoffmann, the Prussian Minister of Culture and leading member of the USPD, issued his 
decrees for separation of church and state; school prayer and religious holidays were to be 
outlawed, as were compulsory religious courses and religion as an examination subject.  The 
Catholic Center immediately decried these decrees as a second Kulturkampf; historian Edmund 
Klein notes that the centerpiece of the Center’s program in late November was devoted to 
defending the Catholic faith and church from the “atheistic socialist Berlin government.”118  The 
separatists were also quick to use the decrees to rally support behind their own agenda, arguing 
that only through autonomy or independence could Upper Silesians guarantee that their cultural 
peculiarities – in particular the Catholic Church – would remain intact.  It was a message 
targeted at the Polish-speakers in the region, who associated the Catholic Church and religious 
education with Polish national rights.  By the end of November, the two main groups advocating 
autonomy – the Loslau group, led by Ewald Latacz, and the Gliwice group, led by the Reginek 
brothers – had come together to form one movement that, for the moment at least, had the same 
singular goal in mind.119 
 Both Latacz and the Regineks came from the same milieu – Catholic, well educated, 
culturally and linguistically German, but with a healthy disregard for the politics in Berlin.  Born 
in 1885, Latacz, as historian Rudolf Vogel puts it, “came from an old Upper Silesian family.”120  
His father, a school teacher, rose to serve in the Prussian Landtag – the first Upper Silesian of his 
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profession to do so.  Latacz attended the University of Breslau, earning a law degree from there 
in 1908.  During the war he worked in the Office of Wartime Economy in Rybnik, where he 
cultivated the ties with Upper Silesia’s economic leaders he would later need to support his 
autonomous movement.  When revolution broke out in November 1918, Latacz became the 
Chairman of the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council in Loslau.121 
 The Reginek brothers, Jan (born 1879) and Tomasz (born 1887), were two of ten children 
born to a farmer in a small town roughly ten miles north of Oppeln.  While both were educated in 
the German gymnasium system, the Regineks, unlike Latacz, were more inclined towards Polish 
nationalism and culture.  Jan, a schoolteacher, became the Chairman of the Workers’ and 
Soldiers’ Councils in Ratibor.  Tomasz, a priest, had served as an army chaplain in a prisoner of 
war camp near Stettin/Szczecin, and had recently returned to Beuthen.122  Of the two, Tomasz 
seems to have a cast a larger shadow and played a more influential role in the autonomous 
movement than his brother. 
 Roughly two weeks after Hoffmann’s decrees, on 26 November, the Regineks met with 
two representatives of Upper Silesia’s large industry, two men whose, as Tomasz would later 
recall, “exemplary social reforms […] made them fit for the Upper Silesian popular movement 
[Volksbewegung].”123  Shortly after securing their financial support, Father Reginek and a few 
others travelled to Prague, seeking to gain international support for the movement.  Highly-
industrialized Czechoslovakia could possibly prove to be an important consumer of Upper 
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designs on the region.  A small portion of southeastern Upper Silesia, known as Cieszyn, was 
already being eyed by both Poland and Czechoslovakia.  In late November, there was a real fear 
that either one of these new nations might take the Upper Silesian coal fields by force.  
Independence was seen as a safe-guard against this.  Father Reginek notes that “one must be 
astonished…at how much interest”124 Prime Minister Karel Kramar showed in the idea of an 
independent Upper Silesia.  According to Father Reginek, Kramar expressed a desire for the 
“newly established small states”125 to economically align and promised to take the case to the 
Victorious Powers in Paris.  A week later, a second group travelled back to Prague, this time 
meeting with President Tomas Masaryk.  In both cases, Father Reginek’s recollection of the 
meetings seem to be rosier than the reality.  While the Czechs might have politely entertained the 
Upper Silesians, they were never going to promise anything without thorough consultation with 
the Victorious Powers.  Realizing that international support was unlikely to materialize, the 
Regineks’ Gliwice group officially met with Latacz’s Loslau group in early December and began 
a grassroots effort to shore up local support.   
In the first week of December, brochures and placards advocating Upper Silesian 
independence began to appear in newspapers and towns throughout the region.  One, appearing 
on 9 December in Beuthen in both German and Polish, was reprinted the next day in Katolik; the 
paper snidely noted it is “giv[ing] [it] verbatim, with all the mistakes in the Polish version.”126  
“Silesia, an independent Republic!” it announced.  Perhaps most importantly, the placard 
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declared that “the relationship between church and state cannot be shaken,” again stressing the 
need for an independent Upper Silesia to protect its relationship with the Catholic Church.   
It was becoming clear to Berlin that the situation in Upper Silesia could easily spiral out 
of control.  A meeting on 28 December was called specifically to discuss “the Upper Silesian 
question.”  Friedrich Ollendorf, representing the Breslau Volksrat, began the meeting by stating, 
“The situation in Upper Silesia has intensified in the last week” and that the Catholic center had 
“strongly exploited” the separation of church and state.127  In the wake of this, the autonomous 
movement had begun to gain traction.  The Breslau Volksrat was scheduled to hold a meeting in 
two days, on 30 December, to discuss this as well as the Polish and Czechoslovak designs on the 
region.  Ollendorf stated that the presence of a member of the Council, as well as a member of 
the Prussian government, at the meeting might go a long way to dissuade the people that 
autonomy or independence was a viable option.  Ebert agreed that “something must be done to 
keep Upper Silesia in the empire [beim Reiche]” and decreed that representatives from the 
Council and Prussian government would attend the Breslau meeting.128 
Two days later, Father Reginek and Latacz argued their case for an autonomous Upper 
Silesia.  Father Reginek stated that, while most Upper Silesians did not wish to join with Poland, 
they were “averse” to Germany – mainly Prussia.  Should the populace be made to vote, the fear 
was they would choose Poland.129  For this reason, some kind of split was necessary to protect 
Upper Silesia from falling to Poland.   
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Latacz made a similar point in his speech.  “Gentlemen,” he began.  “I would like to state 
from the outset that I am a native Upper Silesian, a genuine Upper Silesian, grown from Upper 
Silesian earth.  I want to state that I can speak Polish, but I am fully German-minded and want to 
further state, that I am decidedly against any separation.”130  Strange words, from the leader of 
the separatist movement.  But Latacz would go on to spell out exactly why some kind of 
separation from Germany and Prussia was imperative for Upper Silesia’s survival.  To start, 
Latacz claimed that if Upper Silesia were to vote on its fate, of “the part right of the Oder – that 
is, the essential and important part, the Industrial region – at a minimum 80 percent would speak 
out for joining with Poland…[I]t could possibly be 90 percent.”131  It is doubtful these stats were 
ever accurate, and in fact, the future plebiscite would prove Latacz to be wrong about this, but 
both he and Father Reginek stressed that the majority of the population would betray 
Germany/Prussia and vote for Poland.  Latacz leaves little room for arguments here, repeating 
throughout that he is a native Upper Silesian and that those outsiders from Berlin, and even 
Breslau, do not know enough to have a firm understanding of the region.  He went on to explain 
that Upper Silesians are a mixed people [Mischvolk], a combination of their Slav, German and 
Czech heritage,132 but that “Upper Silesia owes its entire well-being to Germany.  This…will 
have to be acknowledged by any rational, thinking person in Upper Silesia.  But it has been said 
that the greater part of Upper Silesians is not rational, and the unreasonable ones are the great 
masses of the Upper Silesian people.”133  These people will allow their hatred of the past forty 
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years of “Hakatist and Germanization politics”134 to cloud their judgement and will vote for 
joining with Poland.  Warned Latacz, “As soon as an Anschluß with Poland occurs, Upper Silesia 
will be ruined.”135  Separating Upper Silesia from Germany, then, was “self-defense.”136  It was 
the only to ensure Upper Silesia did not fall to Poland, and could maintain its close ties to and 
orientation towards Germany. 
These arguments did not sway the Breslau Volksrat completely, but a consensus was 
reached that something had to be done to appease the region.  The main source of upset for most 
was the Hoffmann Decrees, and so the Volksrat issued the Breslau Resolutions, essentially 
undoing them in the region.  There would be no separation of church and state; religious 
instruction in one’s mother tongue would continue.  Other concessions, such as filling 
governmental positions with Polish-speaking Catholics, were also included, although ultimately 
ignored.137   
What the Breslau Resolutions did do, though, was take a bit of the wind from the 
separatists’ sails.  Moderate Catholics, satisfied that the Catholic Church and religious instruction 
would be protected, pulled their support for outright Upper Silesian independence.  Still, Latacz 
and the Regineks formed the Upper Silesians’ League (Bund der Oberschlesier) in January 1919.  
The League would remain a presence in the region up until the plebiscite, and even beyond, but 
outright independence was never truly an option for the region.  But, in the closing weeks of 
1918, when anything seemed possible, autonomy and independence was yet another road down 
which Upper Silesians could have travelled. 
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3. The Path Determined: The Allied Decision and its Impact on Upper Silesia 
In the immediate weeks and months following the Armistice, Upper Silesia found itself 
faced with several options for its future.  Socialists, Polish and German nationalists, even 
autonomists, all vied for support among the populace.  By summer, however, it was clear that it 
did not really matter which of the above choices most appealed to the majority of Upper 
Silesians.  Their future had already been decided for them, almost one thousand miles away, at 
the Paris Peace Conference.  At a Conference attended by hundreds of men from dozens of 
nations as far-flung as China, Cuba and Australia, the Polish question, and its important 
corollary, the Upper Silesian conundrum, would become one of the most heavily contested 
debates.  Initially given outright to Poland, in the final draft of the Versailles Treaty the future of 
the region was to be made in one of several plebiscites held throughout East Central Europe. 
 The decision pleased no one – not the Germans to whom the land currently belonged, not 
the Poles to whom it had been promised.  In Upper Silesia this delayed decision allowed tensions 
between German- and Polish-speakers, already at a strong simmer, to boil over completely.  By 
mid-August the region was engulfed in violence as striking Polish miners and German security 
authorities clashed, resulting in the First Silesian Uprising.  Peace returned by the end of the 
month, but it was fragile and fraught with tension.  Then, in November, Upper Silesians would 
return to the polls once more, in an election that both German and Polish advocates framed as a 
prelude to the plebiscite.  Once again, though, decisions were taken out of the Upper Silesians’ 
hands, as Inter-Allied Commission troops, comprised mainly of French soldiers, arrived in early 
1920.  They were charged with protecting the peace until the plebiscite – the date for which had 
not yet even been set.  
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3.1: The Peace Treaty at Versailles  
 The Treaty of Versailles, according the David Lloyd George, Britain’s Prime Minister 
and one of the primary authors of the document, was “the most absurd and least perused 
document in history.”138  Ostensibly a series of five peace treaties ending the First World War, 
the Paris Peace Conference redrew the maps of East Central Europe, Africa and the Middle East, 
tearing down old empires and giving rise to new nations.  History has not looked fondly on the 
Treaty, remembering it mainly for establishing a Europe in which the radical right was able to 
co-opt power.  But for six months in 1919, the Big Four – Wilson, Lloyd George, French Prime 
Minister Georges Clemenceau and Italian Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando – attempted to create 
a new world order, one guided by Wilson’s own idealized version of liberal democracy.  They 
would soon discover, as Clemenceau complained, “It is much easier to make war than peace.”139 
 The Paris Peace Conference and the resulting Treaty of Versailles have their own 
extensive historiography, and as such the details of the overall conference will not be discussed 
here.140  Instead, the focus will remain on establishing the borders of the new Poland.  In this 
respect, negotiations started well before the Conference began – indeed, even before the end of 
the war.  In March 1917, in the aftermath of the February Revolution in Russia, Dmowski had 
approached British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour about Poland’s place in post-war Europe.  
In order to provide a bulwark against Bolshevik Russia and to keep Germany sufficiently weak, 
Dmowski wrote, Poland “must be economically independent of Germany, especially with regard 
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to access to the sea and possession of the Silesian coal mines.”141  Dmowski did not call for a 
return of Poland’s 1772 borders, as these both included lands in which Poles were now a 
minority, such as the eastern borderlands that would eventually become the Baltic nations and 
Belorussia, and excluded areas where Poles were in the majority – namely the Prussian east and 
Upper Silesia.142  In August 1918 he joined Paderewski in the United States, and the two met 
with Wilson on 13 September to discuss Poland’s future borders.  In the meeting and in 
discussions afterward the two Poles stressed the importance of Prussian Poland, including 
especially the Silesian coalmines, for the economic future of the new Polish state.143  
 The Peace Conference officially opened on 18 January 1919, although the Big Four had 
already started informal discussions during the past month.144  As elected officials from 
democratic nations, Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau all agreed on the importance of 
promoting liberal democracy and the new doctrine of national self-determination.  It was over 
how these lofty ideals were to be executed that they argued.  The European leaders held no small 
resentment towards Wilson, the first sitting American president to visit Europe, and the 
American delegation, who seemed to have arrived just in time to save Europe from itself.  The 
issue of Germany’s treatment also divided the men.  Clemenceau was the most vocal proponent 
of meting out harsh punishment and supported moves to cripple Germany economically, 
advocating for the Saar and the Rhineland to be placed under French occupation.  A strong 
Poland would help to counter Germany’s presence in the east, and to this end he also supported 
Dmowski’s borders.  According to historian Piotr S. Wandycz, “Security on the Vistula 
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complemented security on the Rhine, and the more Germany was weakened in the east, the less 
menace she offered on the west.”145   Lloyd George, however, was less inclined to reduce 
Germany to a second-tier power only to have France assume hegemonic control over the 
Continent.  While he wished for Germany to suffer for the war it had unleashed, Lloyd George 
also wanted to one day welcome it back into the fold of European nations.  To this end the 
British delegation urged moderation on the issue of reparations and, as will be seen, were the 
main impetus behind a series of plebiscites held to determine the German-Polish border.146 
 After the official opening, the Big Four returned to their respective homes for a few 
weeks before gathering again in late March and setting to work on drafting the peace treaty with 
Germany.  Entwined with this were the borders of Poland, as this would determine how much 
territory would be taken from Germany.  Dmowski and Paderewski had already successfully 
convinced the Victorious Powers that Upper Silesia belonged to Poland.  Now they needed to 
resolve Wilson’s promise to give Poland access to the sea, which would not only require an area 
of Prussian Poland to be ceded to the new state but also separate East Prussia from the rest of 
Germany.  On 21 March the Polish Commission, presenting to the Big Four, advocated that 
Danzig be given outright to Poland, while the fate of Allenstein/Olsztyn would be determined by 
plebiscite.  Lloyd George noted that Marienwerder/Kwidzyn, with a majority German 
population, had also been given outright to Poland and asked if some other arrangement could be 
made.147  He brought up the issue again in a meeting among the Big Four on 1 April, arguing to 
make Danzig a free city under the League of Nations and returning Marienwerder and her 
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420,000 Germans back to East Prussia.  When Wilson suggested another plebiscite, Lloyd 
George agreed.  Cleamenceau quickly replied, “We cannot decide anything definite unless the 
Poles are present,” to which Lloyd George retorted, “It is vain to hope that we can ever satisfy 
the Poles….After all, we do not owe the Poles a great deal.  They fought against us as much as 
for us during the war.  What we have to avoid is to make it difficult for the Germans to sign the 
treaty.”148 
Unfortunately, the Victorious Powers had already made it challenging for the Germans to 
agree to the peace. Germany was not privy these early rounds of negotiations, and were not even 
invited to Versailles until mid-April.  When the German delegation finally did arrive on 29 April, 
they were made to wait another week before they received the draft treaty.  The draft provided 
for plebiscites to be held in Allenstein and Marienwerder, as well as in North Schleswig (on the 
Danish border) and the Saarland, but Upper Silesia was to be incorporated outright into Poland.  
The German delegation then had but fifteen days to present their observations, written in both 
English and French.149  They submitted their counterproposals on 29 May, in which special 
attention was paid to Upper Silesia.  Not only did the separation of the territory violate Wilson’s 
much lauded principle of national self-determination, but it also “constitute[d] a quite 
unjustifiable inroad into the geographical and economic structure of the German Empire.”150  
The Germans argued, “There are no national Polish traditions or memories in Upper Silesia.  The 
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Upper Silesian knows nothing about the past or the history of Poland…The districts of Upper 
Silesia demanded for Poland are not inhabited by an indisputably Polish population.”151   
In addition to this ethnic argument, the German delegation claimed that the separation of 
the region from Germany would prove economically disastrous for both the German state and the 
people of Upper Silesia.  “Germany cannot dispense with Upper Silesia…The cession of Upper 
Silesia to Poland would not only result in the industrial decline of Upper Silesia, but entail also 
very serious economic disadvantages for Germany.”152  The chief concern, of course, was the 
loss of the region’s coalmines, which, as discussed above, supplied almost a quarter of 
Germany’s coal.  Not only would the loss of Upper Silesia hurt Germany, it would prove 
detrimental to the residents of the region.  “Upper Silesia owes all her intellectual and material 
development to German activity,” the delegation argued.  “Living conditions in Upper Silesia, 
especially in the field of health and social precautions, are incomparably better than those in the 
adjoining Poland.”153  This two-pronged approach, combining ethnic and economic arguments, 
would be echoed in the plebiscite propaganda.  
Lloyd George had already proven himself reticent in simply handing Dmowski and 
Paderewski whatever territory they claimed in Poland’s name, and now, having read the German 
counter-proposals, he called for an additional plebiscite to be held in Upper Silesia as well.  He 
did not necessarily question the validity of Poland’s claim to the region, but was concerned that 
simply ceding the region to Poland would give German nationalists and irredentists fuel for 








recovery of the lost territory [Upper Silesia] will be the burning desire of every German.”154  
Without a plebiscite, Germany would always be able to claim the territory had been unlawfully 
stolen from them; the plebiscite would legitimate the Victorious Powers’ decision, as the region, 
Lloyd George was sure, would vote Polish.155   
Preventing German retaliation was a reason Lloyd George could assert in public; his 
other primary motive for securing an Upper Silesian plebiscite was to keep France out of the 
Central European coal fields.  Though ostensibly France’s ally, Britain was less than eager to see 
the French gain more influence in the region; Poland and France had historical ties, and the 
French, like the Americans, were among newly reconstituted Poland’s staunchest supporters.  
Stripping Germany of her eastern coalmines would severely weaken the new republic, allowing 
France to become the hegemonic power on the Continent.156   
Lloyd George expressed his concerns of German irredentism to Wilson and Clemenceau 
in a meeting on 3 June.  Both the American and French leaders opposed the idea of an Upper 
Silesian plebiscite, insisting that the region was “indisputably Polish.”  Besides, the region had 
already been promised to Dmowski and Paderewski.  To this Lloyd George replied that the 
Treaty had not yet been ratified, and thus could still be amended; besides, he argued, “We could 
never have been thinking of giving Poland a province which has not been Polish for nine 
hundred years.”157  Two days later the three met with Paderewski to hear the Polish case for not 
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agricultural communes would vote German but Poland would carry the vote in the eastern, 
industrial areas, Lloyd George asked, “If you took the opinion of Silesia, as a whole, it would be 
German?”  Paderewski replied, “Yes, as a whole it would be German.”158  The Polish Prime 
Minister then tried to backtrack, but it was too late.  Wilson had been swayed and now agreed to 
the plebiscite – but only with the caveat that the commission could declare the plebiscite null and 
void if it felt undue pressure had been exhibited before the voting occurred.159   
Article 88 of the Versailles Treaty addressed the terms and conditions of the Upper 
Silesian plebiscite.  Several Kreise to the west of the Oder River were left to Germany without 
subjection to a plebiscite, as 1910 statistics showed them to be between 85 and 97 percent 
German-speaking.  Part of a southern Kreis was ceded without plebiscite to Czechoslovakia, per 
prior agreement.  The remaining participating territory covered 4,150 square miles and included 
2,280,000 people.  All German troops, as well as non-natives, were required to leave Upper 
Silesia within fifteen days of the Treaty coming into force.  The territory was placed under the 
rule of an International Commission, whose authority was supported by Allied troops.  Any 
Upper Silesian over twenty years of age, regardless of sex, could vote in the plebiscite, thus 
opening the vote to women.  Participation in the plebiscite also included those born in the region, 
and those who had lived there since 1904.160  Perhaps most important, Point Five of the Annex of 
Article 88 delineated the role the Allied Powers would play after the plebiscite.  Point Five read:  
On the conclusion of the voting, the number of votes cast in each commune will be 
communicated by the Commission to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, with a 
full report as to the taking of the vote and a recommendation as to the line which ought to 
be adopted as the frontier of Germany in Upper Silesia.  In this recommendation regard 
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will be paid to the wishes of the inhabitants as shown by the vote, and to the geographical 
and economic conditions of the locality.161 
 
In other words, the Allied Powers could invoke the right to interpret the results of the plebiscite 
however they chose.  And, indeed, this is precisely what they eventually did.  Not surprisingly, 
neither Germany nor Poland were pleased by the prospect of a plebiscite.  Poland, especially, felt 
betrayed by the Allied Powers, who had promised them the whole of Upper Silesia only a few 
weeks before.  Germany had anticipated the possibility of a plebiscite since the Armistice.  
During the 21 November 1918 meeting of the Council of People’s Representatives, Bauer had 
declared, “In Upper Silesia the majority of the population is, of course, German. Even most of 
the coal workers want to stay with Germany.  We don’t need to fear any plebiscite here.”162  At a 
meeting held on 28 December, Landsberg echoed this sentiment, provided the plebiscite was free 
of Allied or Polish interference.  Germany, then, though confident that the majority of Upper 
Silesians would vote German, feared the Allied Power’s interpretation of the results.  Most in the 
government knew that some sort of division of the region was unavoidable; they could only hope 
that the coalmines remained part of Germany. 
3.2: Violence and Order in Upper Silesia in Late 1919 
“At the last moment…German newspapers are reporting that Versailles has given major 
concessions to the Germans, and in Upper Silesia a plebiscite is supposedly to be held.”163  So 
reported Katolik on 14 June 1919.  But, the article scoffed, this is preposterous.  “We think that 
this is only a silent wish of the German newspapers.”164  Still, the paper felt duty-bound to 
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prepare its readers for the impossible, and reprinted the plebiscite procedure that would be 
followed in East Prussia. 
 Unfortunately for Katolik, this “silent wish” came true.  Five days later, on 19 June, the 
paper reported the highlights of the Allied Coalition’s peace with Germany.  The Eastern border 
would be determined by plebiscite.  Danzig would become a free city.  And, in large, bold type, 
the paper proclaimed, “Whether Upper Silesia will stay a part of Germany or be Polish will be 
decided by popular vote. […] For now, we are refraining from any comments, waiting for closer 
details and explanations.”165 
 Gazeta Robotnicza, however, showed no such restraint, lambasting the Allied Coalition 
for not coming down harder on Germany.  The greatest of the paper’s ire, however, was directed 
at the Polish Delegation at Versailles, in particular “the Endek Dmowski.”  “The Polish Peace 
Delegation consists mostly of right-wing individuals, backward individuals, who did not enjoy 
any trust in radical and socialist French democracy.”166  The article seemed to argue that it was 
not Paderewski’s fault, “dilettante as a politician” though he was, that Upper Silesia would now 
be subject to a plebiscite, but the rather the conservative nature of the delegation, which failed to 
win over the French.  The Germans, meanwhile, according to the article, “mask[ed] their 
retrograde face” and sent numerous Socialists and “only one count,” thus impressing the 
Socialist French.  That it was Paderewski who misspoke in a meeting with the Allied Coalition 
leaders, as discussed above, or that it was the French who were eager to grant Poland the entire 
Upper Silesian region without question, were not mentioned.  There was only one fact which 
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concerned the article: “Now on our land there will be a plebiscite.”167  It ended with a call to 
arms: “We must now stand ready for a new fight under different circumstances and fulfill our 
duty to the nation.”168  The Polish Socialists, expecting to be a part of the new Poland, had 
thought their main mission would be “raising the working masses’ awareness and preparing them 
to vote”169 in Polish elections.  The decision undertaken in Paris had thrown these plans in 
disarray, as the Socialists now stood to fight a national battle. 
 But while, throughout the summer of 1919, Gazeta Robotnicza and Katolik would return 
again and again to discussions of the plebiscite, and while both claimed with certainty that the 
vote would fall easily in favor of Poland (“For us, there is only one desirable settlement […] – to 
be connected with Poland.  We do not doubt it will eventually happen.”170), they advocated for a 
specific kind of Upper Silesian future.  Gazeta Robotnicza continued to place the blame on the 
“Endek” Poles who had represented Poland at Versailles, writing the day the Versailles Treaty 
was signed, “Let what our Polish representatives in Paris and Versailles and politicians of the 
coalition did not accomplish be carried out by the vigilance, zeal and dedication of the working 
class in Polish Upper Silesia.”171  In other words, the right-wing Endeks may have gotten Upper 
Silesia into this mess, but the members of the working class would get them out of it and deliver 
Upper Silesia to Poland.   
Meanwhile, Katolik invoked the legacy of the Kulturkampf and advocated for a Catholic 
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Polish extraction, were urged to consider three questions before deciding how to vote: “1) Where 
is the Catholic Church, the faith of our people, better ensured, in Protestant Prussia or in Catholic 
Poland?  2) Where is my nationality, my mother tongue, better assured – in Prussia, the 
homeland of HKTism, or in free Poland, where Poles and Germans will be equal citizens?”172  
(The third question asked Upper Silesians to consider the economics of living in Germany 
(“close to bankrupt”) or Poland.)  The paper seemed to have enjoyed taking these (not so) subtle 
jabs against the HKT and the Kulturkampf.  Earlier in the summer, Katolik had explained the 
rights of national minorities – Germans specifically – in the new Poland, which would “provide 
them with freedom of religion and the right to speak as well as the right to teach children in their 
mother tongue.”173  Then, in a line that can only be read with one’s nose in the air: “They will 
not experience any of the persecution that Poles in Germany experienced.”174  Both Katolik and 
Gazeta Robotnicza, then, urged Upper Silesians to vote for Poland in upcoming plebiscite (the 
date of which, at this point, was still to be determined), while also advancing their own social 
and religious causes.  As summer turned to fall, though, the plebiscite receded into the 
background, as Upper Silesians faced two new fights – the First Silesian Uprising in mid-August, 
and the communal elections in November. 
The First Silesian Uprising was the result of long-simmering tensions that suddenly 
bubbled over in the wake of a large-scale mining strike.  One of the main causes of this tension 
was the presence of Freikorps troops in the region.  With the dissolution of the old German 
Empire’s army, and the limits placed on the new Reichswehr, the new Republic found it 
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necessary to supplement its numbers with Freikorps – volunteer units, which had mainly served 
in the East and Baltics during the First World War – in what one historian called “a huge sub-
contracting out of security by the metropolitan state.”175  While most Upper Silesians, Polish and 
German alike, had no love lost for the old German Empire, members of the Freikorps were 
notoriously right-wing and anti-Republic, fighting, in the words of Karl Hoefer, for their 
“betrayed homeland.”176  Used as a blunt instrument against Communist, or simply unwelcomed 
left-wing, agitation throughout the German Republic, the Freikorps units in Upper Silesia took 
on an additional anti-Polish bent.   
In early May, Polish demonstrations and strikes resulted in the dissolution of the Upper 
Silesian NRL; many of its leaders fled across the border into Poland.  In the weeks that followed 
several thousand more Polish Upper Silesians would join them, many fleeing arrest and 
persecution by German authorities.  These men would make up the core of the Polish fighters in 
the Uprising.  Strikes again broke out in the mines in July, as Polish workers agitated for higher 
wages in order to afford rising food costs.  These individual strikes might have been successfully 
dealt with if not for two changes to the situation, arriving in quick succession.  In early August, 
unemployed workers – still predominantly Polish – from mines and factories that had been 
recently closed joined the fray, demanding the mines be reopened and their jobs reinstated.  State 
Commissar Hörsing’s attempt to break up the strikes failed when, on August 15, the electrical 
power and railway workers – who were predominantly German – also went on strike.  Now 
numbering 200,000, the workers issued a list of ten demands, including reopening the closed 
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mines, reinstating all workers who had been fired in the course of the strike, a wage increase, 
opening the Polish border to alleviate food shortages, and releasing all political prisoners.177 
As often happens in a fast-paced and ever-changing situation, facts began to give way to 
rumor and innuendo.  Talk of men being rounded up and sent to France for work spread through 
the towns and villages of the eastern industrial area.  In Myslowice, as they waited to collect 
their pay, miners were ordered by Grenzschutz volunteers to form into groups of ten.  The men, 
who feared this meant they were on the verge of being deported, refused.  According to Katolik, 
“Suddenly a shot was fired, it is not known from whose hands, and wounded one of the soldiers.  
The officer in charge then ordered the men to shoot into the crowd.”178  The “Massacre at 
Myslowice” resulted in ten deaths and more injured, and was the spark that finally caused the 
region to explode.  By morning, the “rattling of machine guns and rifles could be heard,”179 and 
the First Silesian Uprising had begun.   
What followed was a week of bloodshed and mayhem as fighting spread from the eastern 
borderland and into Pleß and Rybnik.  Those men who had fled into Poland in the previous 
months now returned, 9000 strong, in hastily-organized POW units.  They were met by the 
Reichswehr and Freikorps, and as the fighting went on it became clear that Berlin was not in 
control of the latter.  To be sure, the presence of the Freikorps raised the level of violence in the 
uprising.  The German forces used artillery, machine guns and even gas against the Polish 
insurgents, whom they outnumbered nearly 7-to-1.  Civilians, mainly the wives and children of 
those fighting, were targeted, with some 22,000 escaping into Poland.  While most Poles chose 
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death over surrender, those who did were often executed anyways.  At Janów, Freikorps 
volunteers tied hand grenades around prisoners’ necks; this, according to historian Peter 
Leśniewski, was “one of the Freikorps volunteers’ favorite method of execution.”180  By 24 
August the fighting was over, save for a few skirmishes in border villages, and on 25 August 
Berlin touted the re-establishment of order and the return to work of all strikers in the area.  State 
Commissar Hörsing, however, was quick to point out in a 28 August Reich Cabinet Meeting that 
this peace was by no means permanent; it was, he stated, “a peace after the storm and before the 
new storm.”181 
As summer turned to fall, a new storm did emerge, in the form of municipal and 
communal elections.  Those holding office in local governments – mayors, city councilmen, 
magistrates – had been elected under the old, pre-war three-tiered Prussian system.  These new 
elections would replace them with leaders chosen by the new direct and universal suffrage 
system – which would include women for the first time.  Initially scheduled in January to occur 
later in the spring, strike activity and general animosity and uncertainty in the region caused 
authorities to postpone the elections until 9 November – the first anniversary of the declaration 
of the German Republic.182   
From the beginning, but especially after the Versailles Treaty established the need for a 
plebiscite, the elections were contentious, starting with a debate about whether now was a smart 
time to hold them.  For Hörsing and other Social Democrats, it was imperative to hold these 
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elections before the region was ceded over to the Inter-Allied Commission, which was set to 
control the area starting in early 1920 in order to ensure the plebiscite was carried out in an 
orderly and just manner.  This decision to hold elections before 1920 was, according to historian 
Edmund Klein, “directed against the Polish population…The Germans’ main goal was to control 
the governments in the municipalities and create favorable conditions for the plebiscite.”183  
Hörsing and others also expressed the hope that these elections would be a sort of pre-plebiscite; 
a strong German showing could help convince the Allies that Upper Silesia was, and wanted to 
remain, German.  These elections, while local, were an important component of the larger 
national scheme to keep Upper Silesia in Germany.  The local officials would be in a position to 
help the German organizations in their plebiscite campaign, thus ensuring the region remained 
German.184 
Not all Germans agreed with this plan, however.  Joseph Bitta, a senior Center leader 
who, thanks to the Breslau Resolutions, found himself President of the Oppeln Regency, argued 
the plan could backfire spectacularly and lead to the election of Polish nationals in key 
communal and municipal positions.  Like a modern-day Cassandra, Bitta spent the summer 
trying to convince Prussian authorities not to hold elections in the fall.  After learning about 
Hörsing’s plan through the newspaper, he sent a report to Wolfgang Heine, the Prussian Interior 
Minister, on 26 June, urging him not to grant Hörsing’s election request.  Bitta wrote, 
“Conducting elections on the basis of the new electoral law before the actual vote of the 
population on the future of Upper Silesia is a serious threat to the plebiscite to be held.  Using the 
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election as a trial plebiscite is very dangerous.”185  When Heine, on 1 August, ordered him to 
announce the elections, Bitta responded by again pleading for a reconsideration.  In a letter dated 
7 August, he argued the elections “will contribute to the creation of a Polish majority in 
municipal councils in the lands inhabited by a mixed, mainly Polish population...It would be the 
first step to disconnecting Upper Silesia from the Prussian state…In the countryside, by 
democratic suffrage, it would not be the German worker who would be included in the local 
councils, but the national Poles.”186  Not only would the elections result in a Polish victory, 
casting doubt on the German assertion that Upper Silesia should remain theirs and putting the 
Poles in a better position to advocate for their own national interests in the plebiscite, but, Bitta 
argued, the electoral campaign would fracture Germans along political lines  – just as they most 
needed to present a unified front.  In a meeting of the Central People’s Council on 4 July, all the 
German parties, save the USPD, had dedicated themselves to fighting Polishness together.187  
Now, the elections threatened to “destroy [this] unanimity […] and lead to a fierce struggle of 
the individual parties,” which would surely lead to “a complete failure of all efforts to bring 
about a favorable outcome for the plebiscite for Prussia.”188  The results of these local elections 
would greatly impact the broader national agenda. 
Despite these warnings, Heine again ordered Bitta to publically announce the election on 
16 September.  The selected date was 26 October, which would give the political parties enough 
time to sufficiently campaign, but also occur well before the Inter-Allied coalition troops arrived.  
Polish nationalists immediately rejected this date, claiming it would not give those who fled 
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during the August uprising enough time to return and establish the necessary residency in order 
to vote.  But German authorities magnanimously agreed to register all the returnees, pushing the 
date of the election to 2 November before finally settling on 9 November.  Klein notes that some 
of these postponements may have been the work of Bitta, who was in Berlin and met with Heine 
shortly before the elections.  But even this last-minute effort could not stop the elections from 
happening.189   
While Polish nationals had concerns about fairness of the elections and would have 
preferred to have had them held while under Inter-Allied control, there was never any doubt that 
Polish Upper Silesians would participate, even though they had boycotted the January elections.  
In a letter dated 2 February and published on 5 February in Górnoślązak, the Upper Silesian 
Subcommittee of the NRL explained this change of heart.  “We did not vote in the Prussian and 
German constitutional elections, because we know that the peace conference will separate us 
from Prussia, and because we want to belong to our Polish state.  But we want to stay and will 
stay in our municipalities, and there we must have our influence, as soon as possible.”190  The 
elections for the German and Prussian constitutional assemblies did not concern the Poles; they 
were matters for another country, another state.  But these municipal and communal elections 
would affect the very places in which they lived.  Polish Upper Silesians did not want to move to 
Poland – they wanted to move Upper Silesia into Poland.  They “want[ed] to stay and [would] 
stay” in their homes.  They, therefore, had a very vested interest in the results of the election.  As 
Klein writes, “The decision on the Polish participation in municipal elections was decided by 
their local character…In the position of mayor, village leaders and members of the magistrate 
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[…] Polish society wanted to see its own kind of people [ludzi sobie].”191  But this local 
character would have national consequences.  Like the Germans, Poles hoped that having “their 
own kind” in positions of power would allow them to more successfully prepare and campaign 
for the plebiscite. 
This sentiment was repeated throughout the fall in Katolik.  “What interests do we Poles 
have in the municipalities?  What should be the program for all of us who are focused around the 
Polish flag?”192 the paper asked on 21 September.  The answer: “We embark on an electoral 
battle as Poles to defend Polishness in towns and villages.”193  Only Polish municipal leaders 
would ensure that the Polish language and, more importantly, the Catholic faith were protected 
from the godless German Socialists: “Socialists everywhere strive to go to school without faith, 
so we must fight them in the municipal elections.  It is a matter of conscience.”194   
Socialists, particularly German Socialists, bore the brunt of Katolik’s fury in the run-up to 
election day.  German conservative parties had never really fared well in Upper Silesia, and 
while Katolik gave a glancing blow at the Catholic Center (which “would like to cover up the 
need for nationalism under the guise of defense of religion”195 – i.e. using its Catholicism to 
cover-up the fact that it was a German party), it was the Socialists who the paper viewed as its 
main opponent in the electoral campaign.  On 9 August, just after news of the elections, Katolik 
urged “every Pole, male and female, [każdy Polak i każda Polka] take part in the elections so that 
we remove the menace of the German Socialists, who in the short time of their reign have proved 
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that they hate us and our faith and our language…[T]hey are worse enemies than the 
Hakatists.”196  Given the vitriol the paper had spewed at Hakatists only a few years earlier, this 
was quite the damning pronouncement.  Again, we see the twin pillars of Polishness – language 
and religion – presented as needing protection – protection only Polish leadership could provide.  
“There is no other rescue for our Upper Silesian community, except joining Poland, where 
religion and religious education will be ensured!”197 the paper proclaimed less than a week 
before the election.  In its last edition before the 9 November vote, it again implored każdy Polak 
i każda Polka to vote for the “national, Catholic-Polish list”198 – katolicko-polską.  These are 
both nouns; one word is not modifying the other.  To be a Pole is to be a Catholic, and to be 
Catholic is to be against the godless German Socialists.  Only in Poland would Upper Silesians 
have the freedom to truly express their Polishness and Catholicism – and electing like-minded 
Poles into municipal leadership positions would help ensure they got there. 
Polish Socialists also looked to the elections as a way to rid themselves of their enemy – 
“the government of the bourgeoisie.”199  While nationality is implicit in the text, Gazeta 
Robotnicza also framed the election primarily as a battle between classes.  It did so quite 
explicitly roughly two weeks before the election, proclaiming, “Electoral struggle is also class 
struggle, so try to win for the Polish Socialist Party.”200  Repeating the sentiment expressed 
shortly after the announcement of the plebiscite, the paper claimed, “The greatest hindrance of 
the workers’ movement is the unconscious and indifference of the worker, so we should 
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enlighten the workers so that they do not choose new enemies of their own and do not make a 
new whip for themselves.”201  Those already loyal to the cause were urged to “bring all those 
who sleep”202 from their slumber and show them justice for the working class would only be 
possible through the Polish Socialist Party.  This was an important distinction.  Gazeta 
Robotnicza was advocating for the working class and proletariat to “remove the enemies of the 
workers,” but this movement was to be “centered under the PPS banner.”203  Not all Socialisms, 
after all, were created equal.  In an area in which class lines largely followed national ones, 
voting for the German SPD was anathema to the cause.  Germans held the managerial positions 
in the mines; they were the “capitalist ministers” the PPS was trying to bring down.  As the paper 
proclaimed on 11 October: “Down with the traitors of the Polish working people.”204  The Polish 
proletariat could not be expected to find safe harbor with the German socialists; they needed, to 
steal from Klein, to stay with “their own kind.”  But neither did the PPS want voters to vote for 
the Polish national candidates.  They did not advocate specifically for the workers, and could not 
be expected to promote the working-class agenda if in office.  Still, at the last minute – the day 
before the elections – the paper did concede that “in places where our own lists have not been 
submitted, vote on the Polish list!”205  Even for the PPS, when push came to shove, nationality 
mattered more than class. 
For Volkswille and the SPD, the focus was much more on keeping their coalition intact – 
and that meant worrying particularly about women splitting off and voting against the party.  In 
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January, some areas of Germany had used different ballots for men and women, allowing the 
parties to break down their electorate by gender.  To the SPD’s shock and disappointment, 
women preferred to vote for conservative or religious parties.206  This apparently happened 
again, as on 22 October, roughly two and a half weeks before the election, the paper reported that 
women in Köln had voted for the Center instead of the SPD in their local election, allowing one 
to “determine precisely the influence of women's suffrage on the strength of the individual 
parties.”207  “It turns out,” the paper mused, “the women’s right to vote has not been used by the 
workers, but by their opponents.  The women, who are still very weak in their political 
convictions, often don’t have the capacity to appreciate political programs for their importance, 
but rather become victims of a shrewd electoral campaign.”208  These “irrational women” are 
unable to comprehend the SPD’s political platform and are instead swayed by fancy words and 
empty promises.  Volkswille points specifically at the Center and Catholic priests as the worst 
offenders.  While any reading of Katolik would lead one to believe that all Socialists are godless, 
religion-hating heathens, here Volkswille directly addresses the question of faith.  “Many women 
have a keen desire to preserve their children’s religiosity.  This is their right, which no one is to 
take from them.”209  First, it must be pointed out that, according to the article, only women are 
concerned with their children’s religious upbringing and education; their fathers, no doubt true 
Socialist men, have no use for this.  Religion, education, and, as we have seen on the Polish side, 
language, all fall under the purview of the mother; it is she who is responsible for these aspects 
of her child’s life.  We will see the importance of language and religion as it relates to children 
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play out quite strongly in the plebiscite propaganda.  Here, Volkswille is feminizing religion, 
placing it squarely in the domestic sphere.  Still, these women have the right to be wrong.  But, 
the paper warned, this freedom of religion will only be possible under German leadership.  
“Once Polish imperialism dominates the country, then the German schools, the German spirit, 
will be gone, and there is no longer a place in life for religiosity.”210  This is quite an interesting 
argument for a socialist newspaper to make.  It is almost an inverse of the popular claim found in 
Katolik, except here it is the Poles who will take away one’s rights to religion.  It could be that 
the paper was addressing the Protestant faithful here, but given that the vast majority of Upper 
Silesians were Catholic, this would not have resonance for a very wide audience.  Instead, the 
paper’s main concern was not religion at all, but the loss of “the German spirit” in Upper Silesia.  
Unspoken, but implicit, is the fear that, under Polish leadership, German language and culture 
would be treated as a second-class other – i.e., how Polish language and culture was viewed 
under German leadership.  Socialist men, of course, already knew these dangers, but the women 
needed to be shown the way.  That is why, the paper declared, “It is a serious duty for all our 
comrades to pay the greatest attention to the women problem.”211 
The results of the elections were exactly as Bitta feared – the Polish parties were 
immensely successful, claiming municipal and communal seats throughout the region.  Of the 
8434 seats, Poles claimed 6251, or just shy of 75 percent.212  These gains were not equal 
throughout Upper Silesia, however.  In what could be a precursor for the plebiscite, the Polish 
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for German parties.  For example, across Kattowitz county (powiat / Land), Poles claimed 219 of 
the 291 seats, amounting to 75 percent.  But in the city of Kattowitz (miasto / Stadt), they won 
only 8 of 42 seats – or 19 percent.  Similar results can be found in the other cities and counties of 
the Industrial Triangle; Poles won 76 percent of the seats in Beuthen county, but only 31percent 
in Beuthen city, while the split between Gliwice county and city was 80 percent to 39 percent.  
Poles did best in the southeastern counties of Pleß (89 percent), Rybnik (85 percent) and Ratibor 
(81 percent) – although, again, the county/city divide is stark, as they won only 10 percent of 
seats in Ratibor city.213  These figures, again, serve as a precursor of things to come.  Compared 
to the January elections, we do see a rise in voter turnout, especially in those counties when 
Poles did especially well.  For example, around 65 percent of the electorate of Beuthen county 
voted in the November election, compared to 42 percent in January; Kattowitz county witnessed 
a similar jump.214  Given the Polish boycott in January and the large gains made by the Polish 
parties in these counties, it is safe to assume that the increase in votes came from Polish Upper 
Silesians.  Still, overall turnout in the whole region was around 50 percent.215  It would seem that 
this was due to a depressed German turnout, the reasons for which could be a feeling that, with 
the Inter-Allied Commission set to take control in a few short months, the local elections did not 
matter, or simply voter fatigue, as this was the third election in which Germans had participated 
in less than a year. 
As a result of this electoral thrashing, Hörsing issued his letter of resignation on 24 
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municipal councils.  But, once again, the future of the region was not completely in the hands of 
the Upper Silesians.  In February 1920, the Inter-Allied Commission took control of the 
plebiscite area, removing the previous Prussian and German authorities from power.  Headed by 
French general Henri LeRond, the Commission was tasked with keeping the peace in Upper 
Silesia until the plebiscite.  Control of the region was supposed to be shared between the Allied 
Powers – but the U.S. opted out of participating altogether, and Britain was reluctant to provide a 
large contingent, only sending their four battalions a few weeks before the plebiscite.217  The 
lion’s share of the troops charged with supporting the Commission, therefore, were French.218  
The twenty plebiscite Kreise were divided among the French, British and Italians, to be headed 
by a Controller; the French controlled the whole of the Industrial Triangle, with Controllers 
established in Kattowitz Land and Stadt, Beuthen Land and Stadt, Königshütte, 
Hindenberg/Zabrze and Gleiwitz.219  While the Inter-Allied Commission was supposed to 
maintain the peace and ensure the plebiscite was carried out in a fair and orderly manner, in 
reality the opposite occurred.  This was in no small part due to the over-representation of French 
troops on German soil; Tooley notes, they “would have been less than human of they had not 
compared their stay to the four-year occupation of northern France.”220  LeRond himself 
followed the French line of vengeance against Germany and support for the Polish cause.  While 
the Inter-Allied Commission was supposed to take over all aspects of government, save 
legislation and taxation, the reality of the situation proved this to be impossible.  Thus, many 
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aspects of the German bureaucracy – such as currency, police officers, and teachers – remained 
in place.221 
The end of the First World War did bring, as the Górnoślązak article said, a new world – 
one which was chaotic yet full of possibilities.  In the fifteen months following the end of the 
war, Upper Silesia underwent the German Revolution, witnessed the establishment of a new 
Polish state, and experienced multiple strikes, an uprising and three elections.  As in the rest of 
East Central Europe, the end of the war did not mean automatic peace, but rather a period of 
continued violence and unrest.  But in Upper Silesia, there was an attempt to return to the normal 
electoral order.  The elections for the National Assembly were to provide stability and legitimacy 
to the new German Republic – a legitimacy a large number of Polish Upper Silesians denied 
through their boycott.  Both Germans and Poles viewed the November municipal elections as a 
pre-plebiscite, the results of which they could hold up to the international community as 
evidence that Upper Silesia truly belonged to them.  Throughout 1919, Upper Silesians of all 
political and national stripes attempted to make their will known, only for outside powers to 
intercede – culminating in the Inter-Allied Commission’s occupation of the region. 
 Now, all eyes turned towards the plebiscite.  In February 1920, the date for the plebiscite 
had not yet been set.  It would be over a year before Upper Silesians returned to the polls, during 
which the region was inundated with propaganda.  Upper Silesians were now tasked with 
“practicing democracy” in perhaps its purest form – one person, one vote, one answer to a 
deceptively simple question: Do you wish to stay in Germany, or become Polish? 
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PART THREE: 
“STAY IN GERMANY” OR “BECOME POLISH”?: 
THE UPPER SILESIAN PLEBISCITE PROPAGANDA 
In 1919 Dr. Paul Michaelis wrote a small pamphlet, entitled German or Polish?  In it, he 
“described the situation in the East as unbiased as possible.”1  Such a statement usually indicates 
that the exact opposite is true, but in Michaelis’ case, it appears that he truly tried to remain as 
impartial as possible.  He described the Polish people as “chivalrous, of dignified behavior, 
hospitable and helpful”2 and freely acknowledged the “numerous imperfections” and 
“detrimental effects”3 of Germany’s transition from Reich to Republic.  His argument hinged not 
on the ethnic superiority of the Germans (although he could not help but claim that “before the 
war Germany was the first Kulturland on the world”4), but rather on the economic uncertainties 
and obligations awaiting the new Poland.  It is because of these that Michaelis claimed the 
answer to his question – German or Polish? – to be, “We want to be and remain German!”5 
Roughly two years later, in 1921, an untitled pamphlet argued the case for Poland on 
almost entirely ethnic, national and historical grounds.  “Silesia has remained under German rule 
for seven centuries, and for seven centuries Germany has been trying to convert the faithful sons 
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of this ancient Piast district into Germans, to suppress their native speech, their Polish faith, their 
Polish customs!”6  This played a bit fast and loose with the real history of the region – Prussia 
only took control in 1742 – but the overall message was clear: Upper Silesia had been and 
remained a true Polish land, despite having been snatched away by Germany for centuries.  Now, 
with the plebiscite approaching, it was time for the “Silesian people, who never stopped being 
Polish, as one man, [to cry] out loudly: To Poland! to Poland!!!"7 
When the Inter-Allied Commission took control of Upper Silesia in February 1920, the 
date for the upcoming plebiscite had not yet been set.  Article 88 of the Versailles Treaty 
stipulated that the vote would be held no earlier than six months and no later than eighteen 
months after the arrival of the Inter-Allied Commission.  This put the date any time between 11 
August 1920 and 11 August 1921.  It was not until February 1921 that the final, official date was 
declared: 20 March 1921, Palm Sunday. 
In the thirteen months leading up to the plebiscite, Upper Silesia was inundated with 
propaganda – posters, leaflets, pamphlets, stamps, stickers, newspaper articles and satirical 
magazines, all produced to convince Upper Silesians to “stay in Germany” or “become Polish.”  
Germans and Poles on the ground, but with significant influence and input from Berlin and 
Warsaw, scrambled to form Plebiscite Commissariats – the central organizations involved with 
everything from disseminating  propaganda to setting up polling places – and other, less official 
organizations to generate and distribute propaganda materials.  For the Germans, the result was 
an, at times, unwieldy constellation consisting of several distinct organizations.  For Poland, all 
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plebiscite material flowed from one monolith, headed and completely controlled by Wojciech 
Korfanty.   
The two pamphlets discussed above are but a sampling of the propaganda produced, but 
they represent two of the strongest and most prevalent themes found in both the German and 
Polish propaganda – economics and ethnicity.  German propaganda typically argued it was 
ancient Germans who first brought culture and civilization to Upper Silesia, marking it forever as 
German land.  Broadly speaking, however, the strongest German pieces centered around 
Germany’s economic might and social security system.  While Polish propaganda highlighted 
Poland’s lack of war debts and new agricultural reforms, its most effective arguments focused on 
returning the lost Polish brotherhood of Upper Silesians to the Motherland, stressing the 
historical ties between Upper Silesia and a medieval Poland.  German propaganda asked Upper 
Silesians to “stay” or “remain with Germany,” to maintain the status quo.  Upper Silesians did 
not have to be Germans; they just needed to remain what they already were – German citizens, 
regardless of their national or ethnic background.  Polish propaganda, then, had the harder sell.  
It had to entice Upper Silesians to join a completely new country, one which was still, in 1920, 
struggling with its own afterbirth.  In voting for Poland, Upper Silesians would become Polish – 
a choice that required a leap of faith.  For this reason, much of the Polish propaganda is much 
starker in tone than the German offerings.   
All of this propaganda was highly gendered – an aspect historians have largely 
overlooked.  Examining this material through a gendered lens provides a much richer and deeper 
understanding not only of the plebiscite propaganda, but also to the ways in which the two 
nations experimented with reinventing themselves in a post-war world.  Representations of men, 
women and the family reflected the strength of the German or Polish national family.  By 1921, 
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Upper Silesian women had had the opportunity to vote in three elections, but they were still a 
new electorate, one which the propagandists appealed to directly.  On both sides, women were 
depicted primarily as mothers, who vote for the safety and security of their children, and thus the 
nation; especially in the Polish propaganda, it was the women who kept the Polish language and 
Catholic faith alive in the face of Prussian Protestantism.  In the German propaganda, German 
men were presented as middle-class husbands and fathers, while Polish men were destitute or 
drunkards, unable to provide for their families.  Conversely, the Polish propaganda depicted 
German men as weak, unfit, or part of a bygone era, while Polish masculinity was represented by 
the Polish worker – young, strong and vigorous. 
The majority of this part will be devoted to analyzing the German and Polish plebiscite 
propaganda.  After describing the origins and structures of their propaganda apparatus, the part 
will examine the role of the German and Polish press played in spreading the Plebiscite 
Commissariats’ messaging.  This includes the newspapers previously discussed in this work, as 
well as two satirical magazines founded in the summer of 1920 – the Polish Kocynder and the 
German Pieron.  Finally, the part ends with an analysis of the various posters, pamphlets and 
other materials produced during the plebiscite period.  I argue that the plebiscite propaganda 
provided a new arena in which German and Polish nationalists could experiment with and define 
and redefine perceptions of themselves and each other.   
First, though, this part explains the historical context in which the propaganda was 
produced, particularly the summer of 1920.  While this year was, overall, more stable than the 
tumultuous 1919, there were three events which occurred in the summer of 1920 which must be 
addressed: the Marienwerder and Allenstein plebiscites, the Polish-Soviet War, and the Second 
Silesian Uprising.  It is to these separate, yet interconnected, events that this paper now turns. 
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1.  The Summer of 1920: Another Plebiscite, Another War, Another Uprising 
 By late spring 1920, both the German and Polish Plebiscite Commissariats were fully and 
firmly established and well on their way to churning out the materials that would fuel the 
propaganda campaign right up until the last moment.  The Plebiscite Commissariats were the 
central organizations presiding over all plebiscite matters and were the official bodies with which 
the Inter-Allied Commission communicated; of special importance was coordinating messaging 
with the various press organs.  However, with the summer heat came a heightening of tensions.  
From July to August and into September, three major events would transpire, each influencing 
the next, with the result being yet another August uprising in the Industrial Triangle. 
 The Polish-Soviet War had begun almost a year and a half earlier.  During the First 
World War, German forces had held the eastern borderlands after March 1918.  As the armistice 
went into effect, these troops withdrew, creating a power vacuum in the area that Polish and 
Soviet forces now rushed to fill.  On the morning of 14 February 1919, Polish forces (57 men 
and five officers) entered the Byelorussian town of Bereza Kartuska, only to find that Soviet 
soldiers were already there.  In the ensuing engagement eight Bolshevik soldiers were taken 
captive, and the two new countries were plunged into war.8  Indeed, when the war began there 
was not even an official Polish army; the soldiers who started the war were, in historian Norman 
Davies’ words, “a rag-bag of units left over in Poland from the World War.”9  Only two weeks 
later, on 26 February, did the new Sejm pass the necessary legislation to create a Polish army.  In 
mid-April, Piłsudski captured Wilno.  At the same time, Polish troops pushed into East Galicia, 
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reaching the River Zbrucz in July.  This advancement meant the front, which had run for 300 
miles through Byelorussia, was now stretched to 500 miles. 
 Polish forces advanced eastward, slowly but steadily, that fall and winter.  In the spring 
of 1920, however, Piłsudski set his sights on Kiev.  After a month’s long advance, Polish troops 
took the city on 7 May 1920.10  Ironically, the fall of Kiev proved most beneficial to the Soviets, 
allowing the state to send out an appeal for all to support the defense of Russia.  Even Alexei 
Brusilov, former Russian Commander-in-Chief and the general behind to most successful 
Russian campaign in the First World War, sent out an appeal to his former subordinates: “Forget 
the wrongs you have suffered.  It is now your duty to defend our beloved Russia with all your 
strength.”11  By the end of May, Soviet forces had regrouped and launched their own counter-
offensive in Ukraine.  On 10 July the front had been pushed back to its position from nearly a 
year earlier.12  This attack was coordinated with Soviet gains in the north, as the Red Army took 
both Wilno and Grodno in mid-July.  General Mikhail Tukhachevsky ordered the Red Army to 
advance beyond the Curzon Line and march on Warsaw.13 
 The Polish retreat took place just as another German-Polish borderland was preparing to 
vote in their own plebiscite.  The East Prussian lands to the south and East of Danzig/Gdańsk, 
around the Masurian Lakes, were ethnically mixed, historically ambiguous and strategically 
important for both Germany and Poland.  Comprised mainly of sand, marshes and moors, 
Allenstein/Olsztyn and Marienwerder/Kwidzyn were almost the polar opposites of Upper Silesia; 
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here, the main economic driver was agriculture, with the chief products being fodder, to feed 
livestock, and cattle.  The whole of the area was part of the Polish Piast kingdom in the Middle 
Ages, but was separated between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Warmia and all of 
Allenstein) and East Prussia (half of Marienwerder and the Masurian Lakes) by 1466.  With the 
First Polish Partition in 1772, the entire area was under Prussian rule, where it remained until the 
end of World War I.  Thus, while Polish national advocates could claim a close tie to Poland for 
some of the region, they were still reaching far into the past for the other half.14 
 Complicating matters were the unique ethnic, linguistic and religious divisions among 
those who lived in the area.  In the Marienwerder plebiscite zone, the 1910 language census 
listed 136,359 German-speakers (85 percent), 22,588 Polish-speakers (14 percent), and roughly 
1800 speakers of other languages; German-speakers were the overwhelming majority in every 
town save Stuhm/Sztum, where they still accounted for 54 percent of the population.15  In 
Allenstein, the same census reported 292,534 German-speakers (52 percent), 72,031 Polish-
speakers (13 percent), and 172,318 speakers of Kassubian, Mazurian or Lithuanian (31 
percent).16  By some quirk of history, the Mazurs converted to the Lutheran faith during the 
Protestant Reformation, but kept their Polish dialect, making them the rare Poles who were not 
Catholics.  As such, they were neither targeted nor affected by Bismarck’s Kulturkampf, during 
which, as has been discussed, anti-Catholic legislation took on a decidedly anti-Polish bent in the 
east.  Elsewhere in region, Polish was not allowed in schools or in civil service, and Poles were 
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allowed to enter only the very lowest level of government.17  The Polish national movement was 
confined to the city of Allenstein and its surrounding area, which was inhabited by Catholic 
Poles.  While the largest – and only – city in what would become the plebiscite zone, in 1910 
Allenstein had a population of only about 40,000.18  Thus, the area with the largest number of 
Polish speakers was also the area in which Polish national sentiment was lowest.  This was 
confirmed in the 1912 Reichstag elections.  Across the entire Regierungsbezirk, Polish Party 
candidates received only 12 percent of the vote; the strongest showing for the party was in the 
towns of Stuhm and Marienwerder, where it garnered 35.2 percent of the vote.19 
 Still, at Versailles the Polish delegation claimed the area for itself, arguing to return the 
1772 Partition to Poland.  It added to its claim Allenstein city and its surrounding country (Stadt 
and Land).  The Protestant Mazurians spoke Polish, and therefore, according to the Polish 
delegation, were “Polish in sentiment or, if not, their national awakening would be rapid.”20  As 
with Upper Silesia, the French were quick to give the Poles everything they wanted, especially if 
it was at the expense of Germany.  But the British and American delegations were not so 
convinced that the whole of the Regierungsbezirk should be given out-right to Poland, citing the 
Mazurians’ Protestant faith.  In a report dated 12 March 1919, the subcommittee suggested that 
Marienwerder be given to Poland, but that a plebiscite would be held in Allenstein.  A week 
later, David Lloyd George, as he did with Upper Silesia, objected to ceding Marienwerder to 
Poland.  His public reason was the 1910 language census, which showed German-speakers to be 
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sign the treaty if it included such a loss; privately, it is likely Lloyd George wished the thwart 
any plans France had for controlling the Baltic Coast alongside Poland.  Thus, in the 7 May 1919 
draft treaty presented to the Germans, plebiscites were ordered for both Allenstein and 
Marienwerder.  Poland gained a small victory in demanding that the ballots read “East Prussia” 
instead of “Germany,” to highlight the ties to the old German Empire.21   
 As with the Upper Silesian plebiscite, men and women who were twenty years of age by 
a set date could vote – in Allenstein and Marienwerder, 10 January 1920.  If not native-born, 
residency must have been established by 1 January 1905 in Allenstein, and 1 January 1914 in 
Marienwerder.22  All who were born in the region, even if they had moved away, could vote, and 
native non-residents were encouraged to return for the vote.  Poland initially pushed, here and in 
Upper Silesia, to allow these “outvoters” the right to vote, believing emigrants from Germany or 
even America would make the trip “home” and vote for Poland.  As will be seen, both here and 
in Upper Silesia, the overwhelming majority of outvoters who returned cast votes for Germany. 
 The plebiscite occurred on 11 July 1920 – in the midst of the Polish retreat – and, 
according to historian Sarah Wambaugh, “absolute order prevailed in both areas.”23  By 
midnight, telegraph operators made results known as they came in over the wires, and the Inter-
Allied Commission, here headed by the Italians, released the official results over the next two 
days. 
 The Allenstein and Marienwerder plebiscites were a crushing defeat for Poland.  In 
Marienwerder, out of 396 voting districts, East Prussia/Germany carried the majority in 368.  Of 
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the 28 districts that went for Poland, all but five were in Kreis Stuhm.  Over 105,000 voters 
participated in the plebiscite, and 92 percent of them voted for Germany.24  The results of the 
Allenstein plebiscite were even more lop-sided.  There, East Prussia/Germany garnered 97.86 
percent of the vote; Poland, a scant 2.14 percent.  Only nine of the 1704 voting districts had a 
Polish majority; four of them were in the Kreise of Allenstein and Rössel, but these were so far 
from the Polish border it was impossible to justify joining them to Poland.  Poles tried to blame 
the outvoters for their loss, but a look at the numbers proves this to be false.  In Allenstein, 
112,152 outvoters participated in the plebiscite; removing them from the overall vote tallies still 
gives Germany an electoral victory of 94 percent.25 
 “To be sure, it was foreseen that the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of the 
voting area would opt for Germany,” boasted Volkswille four days later.  “It cannot be denied 
that the current political situation has influenced the vote very much in favor of Germany.  The 
young Poland has not introduced itself particularly well in world history.”26  The results of 
Allenstein and Marienwerder  plebiscites placed that much more importance for the Poles on the 
Upper Silesian plebiscite, while giving the Germans a boost of confidence that they again would 
carry the region.  The general consensus was that whichever nation was perceived to be the 
strongest and most stable would win out – and, in the summer of 1920, things were not looking 
particularly well for Poland, in large part to its on-going war with Russia.  “More reckless and 
unprepared a military adventure has never been started,” scolded Volkswille.  While blunt, this 
assessment was correct.  The Inter-Allied Commission’s report on the Allenstein and 
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Marienwerder plebiscites cited the war as one of the determining factors for Poland’s utter defeat 
at the polls.27  In July 1920 Soviet forces continued to push back into Polish territory, taking 
Wilno on 14 July and Grodno on 19 July.28  It did appear, as Volkswille wrote, that “the dream of 
a Greater Poland is suddenly over.”29  Avoiding a military defeat would take a miracle. 
 The Red Army approached the gates of Warsaw in mid-August 1920.  The resulting 
battle has become known as the “Cud nad Wisłą” (“Miracle on the Vistula”).  Norman Davies 
writes, “It was an act of faith that Piłsudski could have considered this operation feasible; that in 
the main it was effected, was a miracle.”30  A more thorough account of the battle can be found 
elsewhere.31  For these purposes, the important points are these: The Red Army attacked the city 
on 12 August.  The Polish Army, exhausted after its long retreat, found the strength to hold them 
off.  The Red Army retreated on 18 August, with the Polish Army chasing it back to Grodno.  
The Miracle on the Vistula saved not only the war for Poland, but the future of the Polish state 
itself. 
 Throughout the Polish-Soviet War, but especially once the Red Army had crossed the 
Curzon Line and was thus officially “in Europe,” the German government had found itself 
between the proverbial rock and a hard place – back the Soviet Union, and thus Bolshevism, or 
send aid to Poland, which could strength the country’s position in the upcoming plebiscite.  
Opting for the middle road, the German government’s stance was one of neutrality, and it 
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announced that neither war material nor troops could be transported across German territory – 
including Upper Silesia.  The Allgemeine Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund took advantage of this 
policy by stopping all trains bound for Poland.  On 14 August, just as the Battle of Warsaw was 
raging, the Inter-Allied Commission decided to transport French and Italian troops from Teschen 
to Oppeln.  Mistaking them for troops meant for Warsaw, railway workers in Ratibor and 
Gleiwitz, acting under orders from their union leaders, stopped the trains.  While the troops did 
eventually reach their destination, the German unions announced a twelve-hour strike to 
commence at noon on 17 August, during which time rallies would be held to protest this 
violation of German neutrality.32  The day before, on 16 August, a rumor spread throughout 
Kattowitz that Warsaw had fallen and Poland was days away from utter defeat.33  Thus, on the 
afternoon of 17 August, Germans throughout the Industrial Triangle came out to both celebrate 
Poland’s loss and participate in the protest demonstrations. 
 For the most part, these gatherings were peaceful.  But around five in the afternoon in 
Kattowitz, an Inter-Allied controller stationed French and Sipo (Sicherheitspolizei, or Security 
Police) troops around an orderly crowd of around ten to twelve thousand protestors.  Seeing the 
troop presence was what actually incited the crowd, which began to push the troops down the 
street towards the Inter-Allied Commission’s headquarters in the city, then on to the hotel 
housing the local Polish Plebiscite Commissariat.  There, the mob started a fire in the hotel’s 
lower floor.  At least three people were killed, and all the Commissariat’s files were destroyed.34 
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 On 19 August, Korfanty and the Polish Plebiscite Commissariat called on Poles to “take 
up arms against marauding German bands.”35  Korfanty claimed this was necessary, as the 
violence on the night of the 17th had shown the Inter-Allied troops were unable to keep Polish 
Upper Silesians safe.  Karl Hoefer, a retired German general who fought in the Silesian 
Uprisings, claimed “the conflict” that occurred that night “was a welcome excuse for Korfanty to 
have his armed, volatile organization attack the unarmed Germans of Upper Silesia.  He staged a 
big strike and, disguised by it, began the Second Uprising!”36  The truth, as is often the case, is 
likely somewhere in the middle.  To call an event in which three people are killed and a building 
burned down a “conflict” is quite the understatement, and Polish Upper Silesians certainly had 
the right to feel concerned about their safety in the wake of the 17 August riot.  However, Hoefer 
is not entirely wrong to blame Korfanty for manipulating a situation to his best advantage.  It was 
what he had done as an upstart politician before the First World War, and what he had continued 
to do as the Polish Plebiscite Commissioner. 
 Polish miners heeded Korfanty’s call, going on strike and taking up arms.  Those Upper 
Silesian Poles who had previously fled across the border now returned, alongside members of the 
Polska Organizacja Wojskowa (Polish Military Organization, or POW) and even members of the 
Polish Army.  The next day, 20 August, as many as 50,000 Polish paramilitary troops seized 
control of the Industrial Triangle, meeting very little resistance.  The Sipo, comprised mainly of 
Germans, had been undergoing a process of downsizing since the spring, in anticipation of 
replacing the organization with the Abstimmungspolizei (Plebiscite Police, or Apo).  As such, by 
August the Sipo’s numbers were greatly reduced and they had been issued only light arms.  
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While they attempted to resist, they were simply out-manned and out-gunned.  Meanwhile, the 
French Inter-Allied troops – the ones charged with keeping peace and order in the plebiscite zone 
– mainly turned the other way where Polish violence was concerned.37  A “reliable reporter” 
claimed to see small hand grenades passed out to Polish insurgents “in the presence of a French 
officer in the police station…Any intervention of the French against the Polish terror did not 
occur.”38  In at least one instance, French troops helped the Polish POW disarm and imprison 
members of the Sipo.39  By 23 August, the whole of eastern Upper Silesia was under Polish 
control.   
 The Polish insurgents focused their wrath on those who represented German authority in 
the region.  This included business leaders, local officials, and school teachers – members of the 
conservative classes and free professions, who had most strongly supported the national 
movements, like the H-K-T, at the turn of the century.  School teachers were especially targeted, 
as one of the main causes of the Polish nationalists was the teaching of Polish in schools.  The 
Kattowitz Landrat reported to Colonel Blanchard on 22 August that “Polish gangs have formed 
in Zalenze and are plundering homes by force of arms.  For example, the teacher’s apartment 
was broken into and robbed.  The teacher had to flee.”40  In Groß-Weichsel, one report claimed 
“40-50 Polish bandits attacked the local school…[They] surrounded the school property and 
opened fire with rifles, hand grenades and revolvers.”41 
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 After the initial burst of fighting, the situation did begin to calm down after 23 August.  
Polish insurgents, however, still refused to lay down their arms to the Inter-Allied Commission, 
although it is unclear just how hard the French troops tried to enforce this demand.  Korfanty, 
operating from a position of power, decided to bargain for peace.  In a meeting with the German 
Plebiscite Commissariat on 27 August, he offered to hand in all weapons, provided the German 
authorities disband the Sipo immediately and entirely.  What Korfanty did not know was that the 
Germans had already internally decided to do exactly this, as well as ensure the Apo was 
comprised equally of Germans and Poles.  The two sides published the terms on 28 August, and 
formally signed them on 2 September in Beuthen.42  In an appeal to the insurgents, Korfanty 
wrote, “Now that we have reached the goal, you should immediately listen to our call to restore 
peace and order in Upper Silesia.”43  Both Commissariats issued a joint statement, listing the 
terms of the agreement and calling for all to “lay down your arms and return to quiet work.”44  In 
their own papers, however, the German Plebiscite Commissariat asked “the people to name all 
persons who have become insurgent in the last few days…We will see to it that all criminal 
offenses go through the court for investigation.”45 
 The result of the Second Silesian Uprising was a reversal of fortune for both the German 
and Polish causes.  Riding high after the results of the Allenstein and Marienwerder plebiscites, 
defeat in the Second Uprising had brought the Germans low.  Both sides believed Upper 
Silesians would vote for the nation which held the most power – and in September 1920, that 
was no longer Germany, which lost much of what administrative and security power it had left in 
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the wake of the Second Uprising.  In addition to this, one of the major reasons for the German 
victory in the eastern plebiscites – the Polish-Soviet War – had become an advantage for the 
Polish plebiscite cause.  Poland had survived the Red Army invasion and repelled it back; an 
armistice was reached by mid-October, with the official signing of the Peace of Riga eventually 
occurring on 18 March 1921 – two days before the Upper Silesian plebiscite.  For the Poles, the 
Second Silesian Uprising finally placed them in a position of power.  The German Sipo 
disbanded, and Poles made up half of the newly-formed Apo.  Le Rond had proven that he and 
the French Inter-Allied troops were firmly in the Poles’ corner, a position that would cause 
friction between Le Rond and his British and Italian counterparts.  Le Rond now openly took a 
harder line against German harassment and discrimination.  For the Poles, this was seen as a 
reckoning; after centuries of suffering under Prussian cruelty, justice had arrived.  For the 
Germans, this new world order was cause for panic.  After the Second Uprising, Berlin would 
funnel even more funds and material into the plebiscite campaign.46 
 The summer of 1920 was a critical one for the region.  These three events – the eastern 
plebiscites, the Polish-Soviet War and the Miracle at Warsaw, and the Second Silesian Uprising 
– highlight the interplay between and influence of events outside and inside the Upper Silesian 
plebiscite zone.  Despite the Polish victory at Warsaw, Germany would continue to use the 
Polish-Soviet War in its propaganda, attempting to shed its own reputation for militarism by 
making Poland out to be a war-mongering nation.  Especially with regards to the Second 
Uprising, we see again the balance between violence and peaceful politics.  Upper Silesian Poles 
did not dream to take the region by force during their insurgency; that decision would and could 
only be made at the ballot box.  But they could use the Uprising as a show of strength vis-à-vis 
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the Germans, and gain a better position in the region’s political standings.   The plebiscite would 
not take place in a vacuum; Upper Silesians would look to the situations in both Poland and 
Germany, as well as in Upper Silesia, and weigh their options carefully.  It was the job of the 
German and Polish Plebiscite Commissariats, as well as various organizations, to see to it that 
Upper Silesians chose wisely. 
2. The Upper Silesian Plebiscite Campaign 
 “Countrymen!” Korfanty proclaimed in the 26 February 1921 issue of Katolik.  “The day 
of the great battle for our happiness and freedom, for the future of our children, grandchildren 
and all our following generations, has finally been decided.”47  A little over a year after the 
arrival of the Inter-Allied Commission, and halfway through the appointed time period, Upper 
Silesia finally had its plebiscite date – 20 March 1921.  But the pro-German and pro-Polish 
forces had not been sitting idly by, waiting for a date.  While some groundwork had been laid out 
in late 1919, it was in the spring of 1920 that both sides began their propaganda initiatives in 
earnest.  By April, both Plebiscite Commissariats were up and running; the summer saw the 
publications of Kocynder and Pieron.  Throughout 1920 and up until the very day of the 
plebiscite, Upper Silesians were caught in a great deluge of plebiscite propaganda, all designed 
to entice them to “stay in Germany” or “become Polish.” 
2.1: The German and Polish Plebiscite Commissariats 
 While both were tasked with securing the vote for their respective countries, the German 
and Polish plebiscite campaign organizations could not have been more dissimilar.  The German 
side was a byzantine, bureaucratic maze, as no less than three major organizations jockeyed for 
supremacy and funds.  Every major political party, save the USPD and KPD, wanted a say in 
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how the propaganda campaign would be run.  The Commissariat, once it was finally established, 
often clashed with the more conservative, nationalist VHO/VVhO (described below); while the 
former focused on luring Polish Upper Silesians to Germany with economic arguments, the 
latter’s campaign was aggressively anti-Polish.  Funds were shuffled from Berlin to Breslau and 
then to various ground organizations which actually operated in the plebiscite zone.  The central 
Reich and Prussian governments argued over who should have to pay for what, and how much.  
Meanwhile, the Polish propaganda campaign can be summed up in just one name: Wojciech 
Korfanty. 
 The first iteration of a German campaign organization formed in mid-December 1918, 
under the leadership of Walther v. Stoephasius, a leader on the Oppeln Chamber of Commerce.  
The war had been over for barely a month, yet the titans of Upper Silesian industry were not 
about to take any chances.  Stoephasius, along with other industrial leaders, met in Oppeln in 
early December and formed a secret agency to produce pro-German propaganda.  It did not stay 
secret for long; Gazeta Opolska reported on this secret plot, forcing Stoephasius to officially 
announce, on 15 December, the founding of the Freie Vereinigung zum Schutze Oberschlesiens 
(Free Association for the Protection of Upper Silesia, or FV).  The organization quickly set up 
offices throughout Upper Silesia, financially backed by the major industrialists.48  Most 
members, however, came from the middle class: civil servants, business, and, above all, school 
teachers – the same professions and class which had supported the Ostmarkverein before the 
war.  While the FV claimed to be separate from the politics of the H-K-T, its actions proved 
otherwise.  It did not help matters that the FV focused its resources on the cities in which 
 
48 Waldemar Grosch, Deutsche und polnische Propaganda während der Volksabstimmung in Oberschlesien, 1919-
1921 (Dortmund: Forschungsstelle Ostmitteleuropa, 2002), 37-8. 
 190 
Germans were already in the majority, instead of trying to make in-roads in those areas which 
were more ethnically or linguistically mixed.49 
 After the Versailles Treaty established a plebiscite, as well as ordered the region to be 
placed under Inter-Allied control, the FV moved its headquarters to Breslau.  As will be seen, 
several of the plebiscite propaganda organizations chose Breslau as their base of operations.  
Outside the plebiscite area, and thus not under the auspices of the Inter-Allied Commission, 
Breslau allowed the organizations more freedom.  In November 1919, the FV reinvented itself as 
the Vereinigten Verbände heimattreuer Oberschlesier (United League of Patriotic Upper 
Silesians, or VVhO), denouncing the FV as a “hakatist” organization.  It was difficult to believe 
this distancing, however, as the upper level organizers and managers remained the same.50  It is 
at this point that things began to get complicated. 
 As the FV was making to move to Breslau and rebranding itself as the VVhO, 
Staatskommissar Otto Hörsing decided the region needed a central plebiscite organization that 
could coordinate messages and distribute funds to the myriad groups in the region, some devoted 
specifically to plebiscite propaganda, others which were not but whose actions helped the 
German cause.  Shortly after setting up this Silesian Committee, Hörsing resigned from his 
position as Staatskommissar, following the disastrous results of the November 1919 municipal 
elections.  Hans Lukaschek succeeded Hörsing as the head of the Silesian Committee.  
Lukaschek was young – only 35 years old in 1919 – but already a well-established figure in the 
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region, having served as mayor of Rybnik during the war; he was a Catholic with strong ties to 
the Center Party.51  
 At the same time, the VVhO split into two parallel organizations.  The VVhO remained 
in Breslau and mainly focused on the outvoter program, raising funds and awareness, as well as 
helping organize transportation and lodging, for those non-resident Upper Silesians to “return 
home” to vote in the plebiscite.  The second group, now named the Verband heimattreuer 
Oberschlesier (League of Patriotic Upper Silesians, or VHO) moved back to Oppeln and was 
concerned with issuing propaganda materials on the ground in the region.  The VHO was 
ultimately responsible for the lion’s share of the propaganda produced – everything from posters 
to pamphlets to postcards.  The VHO had over 100 local groups and between 10-12,000 agents.  
But even with the multiple name changes, the organization could not shake its association with 
the Ostmarkverein.  Once again, most of its members were civil servants or school teachers.  
While its propaganda did include an economic message, the focus was Germany’s historical right 
to the region, and much of its materials contained a sharp anti-Polish bent.  Korfanty made for an 
easy and frequent target.52  In addition to this, while its members were called “Heimattreuen” – 
“Home Loyalists” or “Patriotic” – its leaders were not even from Upper Silesia.  For example, 
the head of the VHO, Heinz Quester, was from the Rhineland.53 
 The outsiders made easy targets for the Polish propagandists; in large part because of this 
criticism of the VHO, the Germans formed yet another plebiscite organization.  The Germans 
needed an official organization to represent them in front of the Inter-Allied Commission, as well 
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as take care of the more mundane tasks involved with the plebiscite, such as voter registration 
and local preparations for the vote.  Lukaschek did not want his own Silesian Committee to be 
this entity, fearing doing so would place the organization under more scrutiny from the Inter-
Allied Commission and jeopardize its funding from Berlin.54  Instead, he helped form the 
German Plebiscite Commissariat in April 1920 – “quite late,” according to historian Waldemar 
Grosch.55  Like the Silesian Committee itself, the German Plebiscite Commissariat was 
comprised of and represented the major German parties, except the USPD and KPD, who 
declined to participate.  The first person put up as Plebiscite Commissioner was Carl Ulitzka, but 
the Poles spoke out against him, citing his close ties to the Center Party.  The second choice, 
Georg Brüning, the Center mayor of Beuthen, was also dismissed by the Poles, who complained 
to the Inter-Allied Commission; LeRond was more than willing to give into the Polish wishes.  
Finally, a compromise candidate emerged: Kurt Urbanek, the relatively unknown Center mayor 
of Roßberg, a suburb of Beuthen.  The Center, SPD, DDP and DNVP were all represented in the 
Commissariat’s Executive Committee, but given Urbanek’s ties to the Center, and his choice of 
DDP-member Otto Ulitz as his assistant, the Center and DDP dominated the Commissariat.  He 
established their headquarters in Kattowitz, in the Hotel Goldener Stern (Golden Star).56 
 The German Plebiscite Commissariat had four main tasks.  The first was to craft a unified 
message among the various German political parties and interests, and disseminate this message 
throughout the region.  Second, as mentioned above, it was to deal with the technical aspects of 
the vote.  Third, the Commissariat was charged with securing transportation, lodging and food 
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for all the returning outvoters.  Finally, the Commissariat communicated directly with the Inter-
Allied Commission about all plebiscite matters, which meant, in the words of German historian 
Rudolf Vogel, “neutralizing the Polish and French wishes to bend the electoral provisions in 
their interest.”57 
 Thus, the German plebiscite propaganda campaign was comprised of a constellation of 
organizations, sometimes working in concert with each other, sometimes at odds.  The VHO, 
along with its sister organization, the VVhO, was responsible for most of the actual, printed 
propaganda, and maintained its nationalist, anti-Polish bias.  The Silesian Committee acted as an 
overseer to the entire enterprise, collecting money from Berlin and then doling it out as it saw fit.  
The German Plebiscite Commissariat handled the day-to-day tasks of preparing for the 
plebiscite.  While it did produce some propaganda, it was limited in its number and scope.  The 
Commissariat faced competition on several fronts.  It often clashed with the VHO, which insisted 
on highlighting ethnic differences among Upper Silesians just as the Commissariat, with this 
Center and DDP leadership, was attempting to resolve and minimize these tensions.  Internally, 
the various political parties each tried to place their agendas front and center, even though all had 
agreed to promoting a unified German front for the plebiscite.  Because of this in-fighting and 
organizational fracturing, the German Plebiscite Commissariat was not nearly as strong as its 
Polish counterpart. 
 In contrast, the Polish Plebiscite Commissariat – indeed, the entire Polish plebiscite 
operation – was run under one single, and single-minded, entity – Wojciech Korfanty.  Vogel 
referred to him as “the Polish dictator of the vote.  With sole power over the financing of Polish 
propaganda and the command of the apparatus of the Polish Plebiscite Commissariat,” he 
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“brought all the Polish organizations together in one fist.”58  In December 1919, the Presidium of 
the Council of Ministers of the Polish Republic tapped Korfanty to establish and lead the Polish 
Plebiscite Commissariat, although Piłsudski did not sign the official act of nomination until 20 
February 1920, after the arrival of the Inter-Allied Commission to the region.59  By then, 
Korfanty had been running the Commissariat out of its headquarters in the Hotel Lomnitz in 
Beuthen for nearly two months.  On 11 February, Korfanty issued an appeal to the people:   
Compatriots!  The moments ahead are decisive for the future happiness and prosperity of 
Upper Silesia. […] According to the provisions of the Versailles peace treaty, the 
inhabitants of Upper Silesia…are to determine whether they want to be joined with a free 
and popular Poland in the future, or still belong to Germany, to be a slave to the brutal 
Prussian persecutor.  We do not doubt for a moment that the people of Upper Silesia, 
after seven centuries of separation, suffering and slavery, will hurry, in a triumphant 
procession, to embrace the Motherland [Matka Ojczyzna] and connect with her 
forever…The struggle for the conquest of Upper Silesia for the Polish people and for 
Poland has begun.  Its fate is in your hands.  With peace, work, stability and faith in the 
good cause, we will win and join Upper Silesia with Poland forever.60 
 
In his appeal, one can find what would become the hallmarks of Polish plebiscite propaganda: 
the “brutal Prussian;” a longing to “return to the Mother/Fatherland” even after a separation of 
seven hundred years; and the absolute certainty that Poland would carry the vote. 
 Indeed, the Polish Plebiscite Commissariat was established and organized with the 
understanding that Upper Silesia would become a part of Poland.  The ties of the Polish 
Plebiscite Commissariat to the Polish state were much stronger than those of their German 
counterpart.  The Commissariat not only represented the interest of Upper Silesian Poles, but 
also those of the Polish government in Upper Silesia.  The Commissariat intended to pave the 
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bureaucratic way for Upper Silesia’s seamless transition into Poland.61  The Polish government, 
preoccupied with the Polish-Soviet War for much of 1920, could not devote all its resources and 
attention to Upper Silesia.  However, after the loss of Allenstein and Marienwerder, and 
especially after the signing of the armistice with the Red Army on 12 October, the Upper 
Silesian plebiscite became of serious interest to the Polish government.62   To promote political 
peace, Korfanty selected three men from three different parties as his deputies, with all of whom 
he had served on the NRL.  The Commissariat employed nearly 1000 people working in 27 
different departments, covering every imaginable aspect of political, social, economic and 
administrative life in Upper Silesia; the last was the Church Department, added in October 
1920.63  Wrote Grosch, “[T]he German accusation that the PKP [Polish abbreviation for the 
Commissariat] was already a veritable government appears perfectly justified.”64 
 Among the various departments in the Commissariat were the Diplomatic Department, 
which liaised with the Inter-Allied Commission and the Polish Government; the Legal 
Department, which provided aid to Poles in trouble with German authorities; and the Housing 
Department, which managed the Commissariat’s finances, the bulk of which consisted of funds 
from the Polish government and donations from Poles from abroad, mainly the United States.  
While the German VHO focused on those Upper Silesians already likely to vote for Germany, 
the Polish Department of Domestic Policy targeted passive voters, hoping to convince them to 
vote for Poland.  Propaganda was produced among several different departments, including the 
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Press Department, the Publication Department, which printed brochures, and the Department of 
Culture and Education, which promoted Poland through theater, music and lectures.65 
 At the center of all this was Korfanty.  He was the Polish plebiscite personified.  Every 
decision and action was overseen or approved by him.  Because of this, the Polish Plebiscite 
Commissariat was able to put forth a singular, central message throughout the campaign.  
Despite the bureaucratic tangle of departments, all roads led to Korfanty.  This was the opposite 
of the disjointed German Plebiscite apparatus, and as such the Polish Plebiscite Commissariat 
was the stronger of the two. 
2.2: The German and Polish Plebiscite Press: Newspapers and Satirical Magazines 
 For both the German and Polish Plebiscite Commissariats, one of the most important 
missions was to consolidate and control the various press organs in order to present a unified 
message to the public.  On the German side, both the VHO and the Silesian Committee, working 
in concert with the German Plebiscite Commissariat, had their own, separate press departments.  
The VHO published its own papers, such as Der Schwarze Adler (The Black Eagle, a 
counterpoint to the Polish Der Weisse Adler) and Dzwon (Bell).66  Under the Silesian Committee, 
the region’s various German newspaper editors held monthly meetings, during which the events 
of the region were discussed and a single, unified message was crafted.  In return for their 
cooperation, the Silesian Committee provided substantial financial support to the papers.  
According to Vogel, “Every German Upper Silesian newspaper publisher received assistance, 
either in the form of cash, equipment, paying of staff wages, or purchase of subscriptions;” 
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Volkswille received “a fully equipped printing plant.”67  The Polish Press Department was spread 
across five sections in the Polish Plebiscite Commissariat.  Korfanty, again, was at its center, and 
by summer 1920 controlled all but two of the region’s Polish newspapers.  In addition to this, the 
Commissariat published its own papers, including The White Eagle (Der Weisse Adler) and 
Strzecha Śląska.68 
 The press departments, and their output, were vast, and it would be impossible to discuss 
every publication here.  Instead, we will focus, first, on the papers which have already been 
introduced and analyzed throughout this paper; and second, on two satirical magazines: the 
German Pieron and the Polish Kocynder.  The newspapers’ central messaging was largely 
dictated by the Plebiscite Commissariats in order to present a unified, national front to the 
residents of Upper Silesia.  Even here, though, the various organs found a way to insert and 
promote their own political agendas as well.  Especially in the German press, a message of unity 
and cooperation was highlighted; the papers tried to avoid ethnic strife or rhetoric denigrating 
Poland.  The opposite is true of the magazines, which were much more stridently nationalist in 
tone.  Largely illustrated, the cartoons and images in Kocynder and Pieron emphasized the 
“innate” differences between Germans and Poles, with a focus on class and gender. 
The German and Polish Press 
  On the eve of the plebiscite, two articles appeared.  The first, printed 18 March 1921, 
urged its readers to remember, “You have to choose between bondage and freedom!  We want a 
free and happy Upper Silesia!”69  The second, printed the next day, heralded the plebiscite as the 
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day in which “you, the Upper Silesian people, are to throw off the eternal chains of captivity.”70  
While using comparable language and rhetorical tropes, the two articles were, in fact, arguing for 
the exact opposite outcome.  The first, printed in the Kattowitzer Zeitung, stated that the answer 
to a “free and happy Upper Silesia” was to “vote for Germany!”71  The second appeared in 
Gazeta Robotnicza; once the “eternal chains of captivity” had been shed, Upper Silesia would 
“finally join the ancient Polish motherland.”72  This small example illustrates just how similar 
the German and Polish propaganda were in terms of arguments.  Economic arguments featured 
heavily on both sides.  Both regularly ran appeals or announcements from their respective 
Plebiscite Commissariats.  While it appeared more frequently in the Polish press, both sides did 
employ a national/historical argument as to why Upper Silesia should remain German or become 
Polish.  As such, the same themes that would appear much more blatantly in the propaganda 
posters and pamphlets are also found here. 
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 In the German press, the main economic argument was that Poland was a land of ruin, of 
poverty and depravation, a failed state that would never prosper, at war with its eastern neighbor.  
In June 1920, as Soviet forces were marching towards Warsaw, Volkswille ran an advertisement, 
financed by the major German political parties, which referred to Poland as state “whose 
existence is even now questioned by the bloody struggles with Russia.”73  In another ad, a 
skeleton dressed as a soldier shoveled coal into a cannon – an almost literal depiction of cannon 
fodder.  Its caption read, “Upper Silesians! This is your fate, if we vote for Poland!”74  The date 
of this advertisement was 9 March 1921, 
demonstrating that, even though the war had, for all 
practical purposes, already ended, German 
plebiscite still stressed the specter of Polish war in 
its propaganda.  Joining with Poland would mean a 
return to war and, with it, certain death.  The press 
also played into the tropes of the East as a desolate 
wasteland, an image brought back to Germany by 
soldiers stationed on the Eastern Front.  “Ask your 
comrades who saw Poland in the war, what it looks 
like,” advised the Kattowitzer Zeitung.  “Dirty 
houses, villages and towns, poor people who for the most part cannot read and write.”75  
Volkswille was not quite as harsh in its assessment of its eastern neighbor, but did comment that 
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“agriculture in Poland, apart from perhaps a few larger estates, is not yet beyond the beginnings 
of agricultural technological development,” compared to Germany, “which has – and this is its 
privilege – an extraordinarily increased intensive soil culture, which is almost unique in the 
world.”76 
 Of most concern was the lack of social services and security in the new Poland.  “There is 
no old age and disability insurance in Poland!” exclaimed Volkswille.  Even forgetting the other 
hard-won workers’ rights in Germany – an eight-hour day, legal protections for workers – 
(undoubtedly included as a reminder of exactly what they could lose should the vote not go 
Germany’s way) the article implored its readers, “[Y]ou have to vote for Germany because of 
social security.”77  This is raised up as the most important of workers’ rights, one which cannot 
ever be risked or lost.  Such sentiment was echoed in the Kattowitzer Zeitung article quoted 
above.  “In Poland, there is no health insurance, no accident and disability insurance as in 
Germany.  In Poland there is no labor protection legislation like ours.  In Poland, there are no 
workers’ councils like in Germany.  In Poland, there is no right to organization for the 
workers…In Poland the workers are without political influence.”78  Such language is expected in 
a socialist paper like Volkswille – but the Kattowitzer Zeitung was a conservative, national organ.  
Such an article would have been nearly impossible to find in this paper prior to or during the 
war.  That the Kattowitzer Zeitung would so boldly and proudly extol the accomplishments of the 
workers’ movement demonstrates just how in sync the press was with each other.  While not 
totally free of political in-fighting, the German Plebiscite Commissariat and the Silesian 
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Committee worked to create a central, unified message for the people of the region.  In this case, 
at least, it appears to have been successful. 
 In addition to social security, the German press also worried about taxes and the value of 
currency.  In Poland, a cow was taxed 200M; a pair of horses, 600M.  “And even a bike is taxed 
10M.  If you don’t want to carry these loads, then vote German.”79  The German Mark might 
have plummeted in the aftermath of the war, but Volkswille found a silver lining a month before 
the plebiscite, writing that “for about ten days, the market value of the German Mark…has been 
steadily increasing.”  For example, on 4 February, 63M was equal to one U.S. dollar – but on 14 
February, the rate was 56.75M:$1, a gain of ten percent.  The Polish Mark, in the meantime, “is 
constantly sinking and has slowly but surely climbed back down to the value of 7.5 German 
pfennigs...The catastrophic situation of the entire Polish 
economy will ensure that the value of the Polish Mark 
continues to decline.”80  Poland would never be able to make 
good on its economic promises to Upper Silesia when its own 
internal finances were in such disarray.  The Kattowitzer 
Zeitung made this point clear in an advertisement appearing on 
the day of the plebiscite.  A young boy blows bubbles.  “Polish 
promises are like soap bubbles.  Vote German,” read the 
caption, as bubbles labeled with Polish promises pop around 
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him.  One such promise was the infamous “Korfanty Kuh” – a promise by Korfanty to provide a 
cow to farmers.81 
 The Polish press scoffed at Germany’s repeated economic arguments, even as it made the 
same claims for Poland.  “Upper Silesia is the cash cow for the German state,” stated Gazeta 
Robotnicza; the Germans took everything of value from the region for themselves, leading Upper 
Silesia into “misery and poverty.”82  When Germany “pleads” for Upper Silesia, Katolik 
complained, “it is mainly about coal.  We Poles are talking about human souls.”  Of course, this 
indignation is ruined by the next sentence: “But at the same time, you should be aware of the 
economic importance of the plebiscite districts.”83 
 While the German press focused on Germany’s economic security and material well-
being, and what that would mean for Upper Silesians, the Polish press stressed the importance of 
Upper Silesia to Poland.  Gazeta Robotnicza bluntly stated, “Without Silesia, Poland cannot 
live.”84  Perhaps Poland could have survived in the old, agricultural world, but “young, industrial 
Poland” cannot.  “Without Silesia, it will not live, it will not succeed its rebirth.”  “The Polish 
currency depends on” Upper Silesian coal, and all the profits it would bring with it.85  Katolik 
noted that, should Poland win Upper Silesia, it would then be the third largest European coal 
producer, behind Britain and Germany.  Thus, “the entire economic future of the Polish state 
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depends on the results of the plebiscite.”86  Here, the Polish press stressed the material well-
being of the Polish state, not just its people.    
 The Polish press appealed to national sentiment as well, arguing that Upper Silesia’s 
historic ties, though in the distance past, lay with Poland; as Katolik wrote, the region was an 
“ancient Piast land, which for hundreds of years groaned under the [Prussian] yoke.”87  Its time 
as a Germany possession was simply, as Gazeta Robotnicza wrote, a “600-year old captivity” 
which “will end for the people of Upper Silesia, who will unite with their mother forever.”88  The 
paper repeated this language on the eve of the plebiscite, writing, “The hour is approaching in 
which you, the Upper Silesian people, are to throw off the eternal chains of captivity and finally 
join the ancient Polish motherland.”89  Katolik lamented, “We have been waiting for more than 
750 years to unite with Poland.  Neither our ancestors nor we have ever lost hope that the 
moment will come when, after an age of wandering, we will return to our Motherland 
[Macierz]!”90  Such articles argued that Upper Silesians carried within them a latent Polish 
identity, one that simply needed to be awakened.  The idea of Upper Silesians as wandering 
Poles, lost in the German wilderness, is repeated in another Katolik article.  “The Fatherland 
[Ojczyzna] calls to each of us!  It calls its best sons and daughters to finally return to the bosom 
of a loving mother, to the Motherland [Macierz] – Poland – after a long wandering.”91  Both 
Fatherland [Ojczyzna] and Motherland [Macierz] are used in the articles, sometimes even, as 
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seen here, together, in a mixing of gendered metaphors.  As will be seen in the posters, the Polish 
plebiscite propaganda stressed the importance of Poland as a family – specifically, a young 
family.  Framing Upper Silesians as lost children being called home by their Father and/or 
Mother fits into the trope of the nation as a family.  Gazeta Robotnicza stated this very clearly: 
By voting for Poland in the plebiscite, Upper Silesians would become a part of the “happiness of 
a great Polish family.”92     
 But the centuries of separation from this “great Polish family” had real consequences that 
Upper Silesians would need to overcome in order to fully return to the family fold.  Greatest 
among these was the lack of formal Polish education.  “Poland will be what we build,” claimed 
Katolik.  “Poland will not be how they build us, but how we build ourselves…The miracle will 
be the education of the people!”93  But who would take the lead in this education?  According to 
Gazeta Robotnicza, the Polish workers themselves must take control of this initiative.  “We will 
not wait for the help of the intelligentsia, but must raise our own workers’ intelligence 
ourselves,” the paper declared.  “Every conscious worker must understand this it is his duty to 
learn to read and write well in the coming months…Everybody must learn Polish.”94  This push 
for Upper Silesian Poles to learn to read and write – and correctly speak (centuries of German 
rule had “caused many Upper Silesians [to] speak Polish poorly”)95 – Polish was not about 
preparing for the plebiscite, but for what would come after.  Upper Silesians could only be 
integrated into Polish society if they were fluent in the language.  A Polish victory was a 
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foregone conclusion in the Polish press; the papers, much like the Polish Plebiscite 
Commissariat, was already planning for the future. 
 While they both espoused the party line set by Korfanty, Katolik and Gazeta Robotnicza 
still managed to promote their own, individual points of view.  For Katolik, this meant stressing 
the connection, once again, between Catholicism and Polishness.  “Every Silesian should vote 
for Poland, not only as a Pole, but also as a Catholic,” it argued.  It conceded that parts of 
Germany were Catholic, but “the government was and is Protestant, and now socialist, without 
religion.  Since time immemorial, Catholics have been persecuted and tormented in Germany”96 
– a clear reference to the Kulturkampf, which Polish propaganda made a point of frequently 
mentioning even as their counterparts attempted to separate their “New Germany” from this 
recent past.  Again focusing on the importance of education, the paper argued that in Germany, 
Upper Silesian children would attend non-denominational schools: “Catholic, Protestant and 
Jewish children are supposed to go to school together.  Consider what a great danger this is for 
your children, for the faith and for the Catholic Church!”97  In Poland, they would be taught with 
“Catholic books” and “only Polish books and newspapers would be used, in the Catholic 
spirit.”98  Joining with Poland meant preserving the Catholic faith, and becoming a part of a 
Catholic nation would save the Polish culture and language of Upper Silesians.  The article 
ended with a dire warning: “If Silesia stays with Germany…in a hundred years, Silesia will be 
Germanized.”99  Were that to happen, the region would be lost not only for Poland, but for the 
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Catholic faith.  Polishness and Catholicism were so intertwined in the views of Katolik that one 
could not survive without the other. 
 Gazeta Robotnicza, meanwhile, continued to stress the importance not only of socialism, 
but of differentiating between German and Polish versions of socialism.  As it had done the 
previous year, the paper noted repeatedly that German socialists were anything but.  “German 
socialists do not deserve a socialist name.  They are fighting Polish national interests in Upper 
Silesia, while participating in capitalism.”100  In advancing the German cause, these so-called 
socialists had revealed themselves to be, in actuality, nationalists.  The paper argued, “German 
socialists say that Upper Silesia must be preserved to the Germans, because its German industry 
would disappear with its loss and the German proletariat would suffer.  Such a statement is 
sincerely nationalistic and is not socialist.  We do not recognize German socialists as 
socialists.”101  The Germans are not thinking of what is best for the workers, the proletariat, but 
what is best for the German nation.   
Here, though, Gazeta Robotnicza had to tread carefully, least it, too, be accused of 
advancing a national agenda.  The paper reconciled this by claiming that, for Upper Silesian 
Poles, class and nation were linked.  “The class struggle here in Upper Silesia is identical to the 
national struggle, and must then be directed against Germany as a state.  The common interest of 
the proletariat…speaks for joining Upper Silesia to Poland.”102  In this, the paper argued, even 
the German workers should agree, as they, too, have “suffer[ed] under the yoke of German 
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capital.”103  It was these nationalistic and capitalist German state policies which Gazeta 
Robotnicza and Polish socialists opposed, not necessarily the German people or, especially, 
German workers.  Because these policies combined class and national discrimination, the Polish 
socialists justified their own support of Poland.  “Polish workers should not only vote for Poland 
for national reasons…We must vote for Poland for social reasons, as socialists….A Silesian 
worker in Poland will be a decisive force; in Germany, he would remain a second-class citizen 
forever.”104  In Poland, the Silesian would be welcomed as both a worker and a Pole; in 
Germany, he would be forever discriminated against for being these. 
 Both papers spoke often of this German – or Prussian – persecution.  It seems that the 
period of Prussian rule over the region was conflated with the 600-750 years of separation from 
Poland, even though Upper Silesia only became a part of Prussia in 1742.  The papers spoke of 
the region’s “misery under Prussian rule;”105 “captivity” and “yoked” frequently appeared in the 
articles.  The day before the plebiscite, Katolik asked, “Do you remember!  Persecution by the 
Prussian government, which treated you as a second-class citizen?”106  But now, “the Polish 
people will free themselves from Prussian-capitalist slavery.”107 
 The culmination of all these threads – economic, Polish nationalism, Prussian persecution 
– can be found in a series of snippets published in both Katolik and Gazeta Robotnicza starting in 
late January 1921.  Each began with a call: “Remember, Upper Silesians! How the Germans hurt 
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you!”108  After an airing of grievances, the articles concluded, “Remember this, Upper Silesians, 
when you vote!”  Many of these snippets centered around unequal pay, Poles’ blocked access to 
civil service jobs, and other examples of anti-Polish discrimination.  Katolik claimed, “The 
Prussian government has spent over 1.5 million marks on the Germanization of Poles from 1898 
to the end of the war.”109  After taking into account taxes paid and some back-of-the-napkin 
calculations, the paper determined, “Every Polish father, therefore, has had to pay 2800PLN for 
Germanizing his own children.”110  “Around 3770 officials work in Upper Silesia,” noted Gazeta 
Robotnicza.  “There is not a single Pole among the 170 higher positions.  Out of 2250 midlevel 
officials, there are only 350 Poles, i.e. 13.46%.”111  Extrapolating from the “falsified official 
Prussia statistics,” the article concluded that Poles should hold at least 100 of the high-level 
positions and 1534 of the lower.  “Is this justice?”112 the article asked.  The post office employed 
59 senior officials, not one of them Polish.  “Is this justice?  Why should you always deal with 
German officials?  You are Poles!”113  Unequal pay also featured heavily in the articles.  Upper 
Silesian workers, according to Katolik, produced 22.81 percent more coal than German workers 
in Dortmund, but were paid 28.51 percent less.114  Women and minors in Upper Silesia earned 
85 percent of their Dortmund counterparts.  “Why are our women and children so abused and 
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exploited?” asked the paper.  “Because they are Polish!”115  For all these reasons and more, the 
Polish press argued Upper Silesians must vote for Poland. 
 One of the last of these snippets, published on 19 February in Katolik, recalled the 
sacrifices Upper Silesians made during the First World War.  “For all these injustices and 
persecutions, the enemy rushed you to war, where you shed blood for ‘Kajzer’ and Prussian 
militarism and imperialism…56,200 Upper Silesians died in a war caused by German 
imperialism.”116  Upper Silesians were forced to fight for a country that did not value them, 
indeed, one which had persecuted them at every turn.  The Polish propaganda consistently 
stressed the old Prussian militarism, as will be seen below.  This “new” Germany might try to 
distance itself from this militaristic past, but Katolik knew better: “The German monarchists and 
imperialists will raise their heads again and prepare a new war against the world.”  For the Poles, 
the First World War was the height of Prussian imperialism and militarism.  Did Upper Silesians 
wish to continue to live in such a society?  “Do you want to spill blood again for the enemy?”117  
The answer, of course, must be a resounding no.   
 Not surprisingly, the German press’ view on the First World War, and those who had 
died fighting in it, was quite different than that of the Polish press.  In the latter, Upper Silesians 
served only as cannon fodder, forced to die for “the enemy.”  In the former, the fallen soldiers 
are heroes of the nation, whose memories must be preserved and sacrifices honored.  In a poem 
published the Kattowitzer Zeitung, Hedwig Mira laid out how this was to be accomplished, and 
who would be responsible for it.118  The poem begins with an old woman, silver-haired, “back 
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bent under the weight of her years,” walking to the cemetery to visit the graves of her husband 
and two of her sons.  Her third son, Heinz, “the youngest, her darling,” is far away in Flanders 
fields, but at least his two older brothers had been brought home; “now they rest in German soil.”  
These boys were “loyal [treudeutsch] and brave to the last breath.”  But now, the old mother 
thinks, “Others are stretching out their greedy hands again, after our Silesia.”  How can she lose 
her homeland, after sacrificing so much for it?  No, she tells her sons, “German you are and 
German you shall stay…In German soil she, too, wishes her grave.”  Two of her three sons have 
been brought home – but now this home is once again threatened, and there could come a time 
when her boys no longer rest in German soil.  “The old woman grasps her staff more firmly;” 
now it is time for the old mother to do as her sons did – defend the German homeland.  “Sleep 
well,” she tells her sons.  “Mother is going to vote! [Mutter geht zum Wahl!]”119  Women were 
still a new electorate in 1921, but a powerful one.  As will be seen in more detail below, the 
propaganda appealed to them not as voters, or as women, but specifically as mothers.  Usually, 
they were mothers of young children, and the propaganda begged them to consider their 
children’s future when voting.  This poem stands out because it concerns an old mother, a 
widow, made childless by the war.  Even now, though, she is still protecting her sons’ futures, 
voting to ensure that their graves remain in the German homeland.  
 The nationalist argument, while present, was nowhere near as strong in the German press 
as it was in the Polish.  This was largely due to the fact that the papers’ messages were 
coordinated through the Silesian Committee and the German Plebiscite Commissariat, both of 
which wished to downplay the national divide.  The more stringently nationalistic propaganda 
was produced by the VHO/VVhO, which did run ads in the papers.  One such ad, appearing early 
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in the propaganda campaign, urged “all German-minded Upper Silesians” to support the local 
Königshütte VHO office.  “In the interest of our dear German fatherland…it is necessary to 
harness everyone’s strength in order to prevent Upper Silesia from coming under Polish rule.”120  
Illustrations also encouraged Upper Silesians to remain loyal to their Silesian Heimat.  In one, a 
miner stands proud and true, his pickaxe at his feet.  His heart glows – literally.  “Our heart 
belongs to the Heimat,” states the caption.  “And the Heimat is German!”121  Another ad, 
consisting only of text in an eye-catching design – declares, “To all!  Remain true to the Heimat!  
Vote German!”122   
What sets these messages apart from their Polish counterparts is that they are not calling 
on all Upper Silesians to become German.  They ask Upper Silesians to remain true to their 
Heimat – but the Heimat is Upper Silesia, not Germany.  The best place for Silesia is within the 
German state, but Upper Silesians themselves are not expected to all belong to the German 
nation.  They are asked to “remain” – remain in Germany, remain loyal.  It is, in a way, the 
passive option, maintaining over a century-long status quo.  This is contrasted with the Polish 
press, in which one became Polish by living in the Polish state, by speaking correct Polish, by 
living amongst fellow (Polish) Catholics; becoming Polish required one to push past the 
centuries of Germanization and tap into one’s dormant sense of Polishness.  It was an active 
choice, one much harder to make.  It is for this reason, as has been shown above and will be 
discussed below, that the Polish propaganda was much starker, especially in its nationalism, than 
its German counterpart. 
 
120 “An die Oberschlesier,” Volkswille, 9 May 1920. 
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The Satirical Periodicals: Kocynder and Pieron 
Founded within six weeks of each other, the Polish Kocynder and German Pieron 
operated along parallel tracks.  Both were satirical magazines that couched their sharp critiques 
of the other in humor.  Subtlety had no place in either; the opposing nation was presented in 
broad strokes and heavy caricature.  The protagonist, for lack of a better word, of each was an 
Upper Silesian worker who made pithy insights about the world around him.  The magazines 
were published in what each thought was the “Upper Silesian dialect,” although Kocynder was 
more successful at this trick.  While both fell under the purview of their respective Commissariat 
press departments, the magazines were much starker in tone than the newspapers, holding little 
back when it came topics both mundane (the amount of national debt) and scandalous 
(allegations of murder).   
Kocynder appeared first, on 10 June 1920, and ran three issues a month.  Initially 
published by Karl Miarka in Nikolai/Mikołów, by Number 5 (17 August) the magazine had 
moved to Beuthen, where Karol Koźlik took over as publisher, with Franciczek Miądowicz 
serving as editor-in-chief.  Illustrators included Antoni Romanowicz, Wacław Lipinski and, 
above all, Stanisław Ligoń, who worked for Kocynder under the pseudonym “Karlik;” 
Romanowicz and Ligoń especially were heavily involved in the production of plebiscite posters.  
In the periodical, Prussians appeared as pompous and arrogant, often wearing the spiked 
Pickelhaube or a sash bearing the letters HKT; those labeled “Heimatstreuer” were viewed as 
loyal not to their homeland, but only to their own self-interests.  Kocynder proved immediately 
popular in the plebiscite region, with a circulation of 20,000.123  
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A little over a month later, on 17 July 1920, the weekly German Pieron appeared to act as 
a countermeasure against the Kocynder – although, as historian Waldemar Grosch points out, 
such a quick publication indicates that the project had been in preparation for some time.124  
Credited to Hans Pilot, a teacher, who served as editor-in-chief of the periodical, Pieron was 
actually the brainchild of Karl Spiecker.  The Deputy of the State Commissar for the Supervision 
of Public Order, Spiecker arrived in Upper Silesia in 1919 and made a name for himself by 
building a network of informants.  His recruits, mainly school teachers, were tasked with what 
was known as “quiet” or “secret propaganda” – hyping the German cause at work or on trains.  
By mid-1920, Spiecker was receiving funds from the Silesian Committee, but otherwise working 
independently from it.  It was with the Silesian Committee’s help and cooperation that he 
founded three periodicals in the summer of 1920, including Pieron.125  And it was because of this 
relationship that Pieron quickly proved problematic.  As discussed above, the Silesian 
Committee, along with the German Plebiscite Commissariat, sought to downplay any ethnic and 
national strife in the region.  Pieron did the exact opposite, portraying Poles as dumb primitives 
at best and dangerous threats at worst.   
Especially controversial was the “Upper Silesian Dialect” in which Pilot wrote.  
Kocynder also featured stories written in the Upper Silesian dialect of Polish – pejoratively 
known as “Wasserpolnisch” – but, as is often the case, did it first and did it better.  In his 
dissertation, Rudolf Vogel quotes Pilot as claiming, “There are still some fools in Upper 
Silesia…who reject the Upper Silesian dialect…This is the splendid merit of Pieron, that it 
“discovered” the Upper Silesian dialect and raised it to the level of literature, and through it 
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saved tens of thousands of souls for Germany.”126  To which Vogel writes, “We do not hesitate 
to count ourselves among the ‘fools’ who reject the so-called Upper Silesian dialect of Pilot.”127  
He argues that there is no such thing as German Upper Silesian dialect, only a Polish one, 
“which Kocynder brilliantly mastered.”128  Such language in Pieron only served to mock poor 
German-speaking workers, driving an unnecessary wedge in the German camp. 
Despite all this, Pieron was a success in the region, with a peak publication of 45,000 
copies sold.  To avoid problems with the Inter-Allied Commission, the “official” publisher was 
listed as the Gutenberg Verlag in Gleiwitz.  In reality, the periodical was produced in Berlin 
under Rudolf Dammert, who had assembled a team of well-known Berlin caricaturists and 
journalists.129  They produced a periodical defined by, in Vogel’s words, “relentlessly bitter 
satire, cheeky mockery and cynical worldly wisdom.”130   
The periodical’s favorite target for satire and mockery was Korfanty, who embodied the 
Polish plebiscite campaign.  In a cartoon by Berlin artist Paul Halke, Polonia dresses a young – 
but still mustachioed – “Woitek.”  Polonia is an old woman, hunched over and thin; she’s 
dressed in rags, and her shoes are simply soles strapped over her socks.  A spider web has 
claimed a corner of the room, while the dirty floor, broken window, dead plant and bare table 
speak to her abject poverty.  In spite of this, she dresses Korfanty in a sharp suit, bearing only a 
small patch on the legs.  His shoes are clean, his bowtie appears new.  Polonia tells him, “And if 
the Germans ask you what it’s like for us, then you say: Everything is velvet and silk, and finely 
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set tables, and servants, and there’s meat three times a day, every day, to eat!”131  Poland’s only 
chance to win the plebiscite is to lie about its material well-being.  In another illustration, also by 
Halke, Korfanty is puffed up like a 
balloon, waving his hands and shouting.  
His pants trail behind him like a hose, at 
the end of which is a figure labeled 
“Piłsudski,” who blows into the tube.  
“Why is Korfanty roaring so loud?” the 
caption asks.  “Because he inflates from 
behind.”132  Both suggest Korfanty is, as 
the title of the second cartoon states, “the 
Mouthpiece of the East,” doing whatever 
Poland and Piłsudski order him to do to help Poland win the plebiscite.  This included, as the 
first cartoon demonstrates, lying about the conditions in Poland to make it seem more appealing 
to Upper Silesian voters. 
 The magazine also gleefully mocked “Korfanty’s Kuh” – the cow Korfanty had promised 
every farmer.  It came to represent all the empty promises made by the Polish campaign.  A 
poem in the fifth issue asked, “What haunts every association house? About whom do you hear 
in speeches?/ And who is promised in full halls/ to each and every Pole?/ Moo, Moo, Moo/ 
Korfanty and his cow!”133  This magical cow, the poem went on, was known throughout Upper 
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Figure 6: "Woitek geht auf Abstimmung," Pieron, No. 3, 31 
July 1920 
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Silesia, even by its dung, and its milk filled the bellies of children on the first pump of the udder.  
Of course, the poem concludes, no one has actually ever seen Korfanty’s cow.  This “Immortal 
Cow” was the subject of a joke elsewhere in this same issue.  “Korfanty,” someone asks.  
“Where is that cow you promised so long ago?”  “I don’t know of you’ll ever see her!” Korfanty 
answers.  “Because Piłsudski has now drafted her into the Polish army!”134  This joke did 
double-duty, lampooning “Korfanty’s Kuh” while also alluding to Poland’s on-going with war 
with Soviet Russia.  This issue appeared just as the Battle of Warsaw was waging; Pieron very 
likely believed the war would soon end with Polish defeat. 
 This gleeful derision of Korfanty took on a much more sinister tone as summer turned to 
fall.  In July 1920, Polish journalist Teofil Kupka had a falling out with Korfanty over the 
former’s support for the separatist movement, although historian Władisław Zieliński hints that 
dissatisfaction with his salary was also a contributing factor.135  Kupka formed the short-lived 
separatist organization, and then fully defected by joining the German Plebiscite Commissariat, 
where he founded the paper Wola Ludu (The Will of the People).  Korfanty could not abide.  On 
the evening of 20 November 1920, Henryk Myrcik, a locksmith and member of the POW, 
knocked on Kupka’s door under the pretense of looking for work.  He then shot him eight 
times.136 
 The German plebiscite press capitalized on Kupka’s murder.  In the 11 December issue, 
Pieron ran a series of illustrations mocking Polish “sports.”  The last frame depicted a 
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fictionalized version of Kupka’s murder, as he is attacked by three men armed with knives and 
truncheons.  The caption read, “This is the only sport in which the Poles are better than us!”137  
While never definitively proven, the German press was quick to claim Myrcik had committed the 
murder on behalf of Korfanty.  The end of 1920 witnessed a slew of brutal attacks on Korfanty’s 
character.  The 18 December edition featured an illustration of Korfanty hanging lifelessly from 
a Christmas tree while a band plays merrily in the background.  The caption read, “The gift 
Upper Silesians wish for most of all: Hang for us Korfanty from the Christmas tree!”138  In this 
same issue, an illustration showed Korfanty walking alone; snow swirls around him.  As he 
passes a grave marked “Kupka,” he thinks, “Rest gently.”  A voice from grave replies, “On the 
day of eternal judgment, we will meet again!”139  Finally, the Christmas edition was a special 
“Korfanty Issue,” and from the very first page Pieron pulled no punches.  The frontispiece, 
illustrated by Willi Steinert, depicted Korfanty’s arrival in Hell.  Red flames fill the cavern as 
demons laugh and grotesque creatures slither and crawl on the floor.  The Devil, with crown and 
pitchfork, casts Korfanty out of hell: “Get out!  You cannot go to Heaven, Purgatory has not 
taken you.  You!  You are too bad even for Hell!”140  A “profile” listed his mouth as “3m opened 
wide” and eyes as “always turns a blind one.”  His “Special Features” are “incites Upper Silesian 
Poles against heimattreuer Upper Silesians, instead of letting both live side by side in peace.”141  
Lastly, Korfanty is shown meeting with a band of ruffians in a dark room.  The three men wear 
tattered clothing and have raggedy beards.  One wears a rifle across his back, and a bottle of 
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spirits rests on a nearby table.  Korfanty, despite his fine coat and bowler hat, seems at ease in 
such a world.  As he places money on the table, he says, “Kupka or me – both of us are too much 
for the world!  Here, Ladislaus, I’ll pay you forty thousand Marks – because you have such 
beautiful eyes!”142  
 Korfanty was not just the face of the Polish plebiscite campaign – he was the campaign.  
No one else in the Polish apparatus came close to him in leadership or influence.  By mocking, 
and then outright attacking, Korfanty’s promises and character, the German press hoped to 
defame the Polish cause by proxy.  In presenting him as a murderer, a liar, a mouthpiece of 
Piłsudski, the German press asked the Upper Silesian people: Can you support the Polish cause, 
when it is led by such a man?   
 Due to its complex system of organization, as discussed above, the German constellation 
of plebiscite organizations had no such central figure equal to Korfanty.  Kocynder, then, was at 
a disadvantage in this regard.  Instead of Korfanty’s Kuh, Kocynder presented Urbanek’s Goat.  
In a cartoon illustrated by Ligoń, Urbanek, in checkered coat, striped trousers and top hat, leads a 
goat to overlook Upper Silesia.  According to the caption, Urbanek has promised to supply 
Upper Silesian workers with goats, in order to provide milk for their children.  He plans to show 
off such a goat at a Heimattreuer rally, but stops first to show the goat her new home.  “See, this 
is Upper Silesia, which you, Goat, have to save for Germany.  You’re our last hope!”  To which 
the goat replies, “Too laaaate!”143   
 This cartoon does not quite measure up to the levels of wit or malice seen in Pieron’s 
strikes against Korfanty.  It does, however, serve as a good example of Kocynder’s bilingualism.  
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Whereas Pieron was written exclusively in German, Kocynder often sprinkled German words 
and phrases into its stories and captions.  Here, Urbanek takes his “deutsche Ziege” to town, 
although elsewhere it is referred to as a “niemiecka koza.”  When the goat speaks, she does so in 
German, bleating, “Zu sp-ä-ä-ä-ät!”  Perhaps most interesting, “heimatstreuer” appears as if 
spelled phonetically in Polish: “hajmatstrojów.”144  Kocynder expected its readers to be 
bilingual, having grown up speaking Polish at home but learning German in school.  Prussian 
caricatures often speak auf deutsch as a way emphasize their foreignness and highlight the 
differences between “true” Upper Silesians and the German interlopers.  This is a continuation of 
the pre-war rhetoric, which lumped Germans, Jews and Socialists as foreign conspirators. 
 The near-exclusive use of German language in education was heavily attacked by 
Kocynder, which viewed the practice – correctly – as the forced Germanization of Upper Silesian 
children.  Early in its run, Kocynder’s front page featured a classroom of boys demanding Polish 
instruction, as their rotund German school teacher sweated with fear; above the fray, a portrait of 
Kaiser Wilhelm II looked down in dismay.145   The entire 10 December edition was a special 
“School Issue.”  A common theme throughout the issue was (Polish) children fighting back 
against their (German) teachers, insisting on being taught Polish.  In a small image, a matronly 
schoolteacher – one of the few female teachers depicted – stands sternly in front of the 
chalkboards and scolds a young girl.  “You, Glagla, want to learn Polish?  But your father is a 
civil servant!”  “But a clever man,” replies the girl.146  Here, again, Kocynder employs both 
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German.  This, combined with the information that her father is a civil servant (Beamte) 
indicates that the girl herself is German.  And yet, she still wishes to learn Polish.  Her father, a 
“clever man,” knows Upper Silesia is on the verge of becoming a part of the Polish state, and 
wants his daughter to be prepared.  Kocynder’s message is clear: Even Germans believe Poland 
will win the plebiscite! 
 In another image, a sinister-looking teacher, balding and bespectacled, rebukes his 
students: “Don’t you know, you polnischer Hund, that you can’t speak Polish in school?  How 
much longer will I need to remind you of that?”  “Not much longer,” is the cheeky reply.  “Only 
until the plebiscite!”147  A full-page cartoon, illustrated by Romanowicz, shows an elderly 
German teacher holding copies of Dzwon and Der Schwarze Adler.  A handsome young Polish 
boy rips up the German newspapers, while a young girl looks on approvingly.  In the caption, 
these Upper Silesian children (Dzieci górnośląskie) proclaim, “We want Polish instruction, not 
German politics!  Away with the Prussian teacher!”148   
But all will soon be set to right, as the three-panel cartoon, entitled, “The Moment of 
Justice is Approaching!”,149 made clear.  The first panel shows how Germans “teach” their Polish 
students, as two teachers, in separate rooms, beat down and wrestle students to the ground.  “This 
was the teaching of Polish children in Upper Silesia in a Prussian school.  No wonder everyone 
hates the German teacher and remembers school as an institution of physical and spiritual 
torture.”  But, “after the plebiscite, more than one Upper Silesian municipality will arrange a 
‘farewell party’ (‘Abschiedsfest’).”  Here, Upper Silesians send their Prussian schoolmaster off in 
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a wheelbarrow, to the delight of others in the town.  Finally, the town rejoices as the new Polish 
schoolteacher arrives.  He is greeted by Upper Silesians dressed in their finest clothing, carrying 
the Polish flags and a banner which reads, “Long Live the Polish School!”  Children gather 
around him and gaze up in adoration.  They have been “waiting for centuries” for such a teacher; 
“he will teach in Polish, he will love children…Then there will be children willing to go to 
school, they will become smarter and better and Upper Silesia will be better.”150 
For Polish Upper Silesians, victory at the polls would indeed be a “moment of justice,” a 
chance to right all the wrongs committed against them after centuries of Prussian rule.  One 
small blurb involved a conversation between two friends.  Zeflik states, “Germany claims that 
Silesia has belonged to it for 700 years.”  Francek replies, “Then it’s about time for it to go back 
to Poland again.”151  This echoes the language used in the Polish newspapers – although, again, 
Prussia only took control of Upper Silesia in 1742.  Likewise, Kocynder also used terms such as 
“slavery” and “yoked” to describe Upper Silesians’ lives under Prussian/German rule.  On the 
day of the plebiscite, Kocynder ran a special “Plebiscite Issue.”  The last page featured an image 
of a strong, masculine worker set against the backdrop of the Polish flag.  He holds the remains 
of his newly-broken chains in his hands and says, “Under the sign of the White Eagle, we will 
free ourselves from the Prussian yoke and gain independence.  Long live Poland, and Upper 
Silesia connected with it!”152  With the plebiscite, Upper Silesians would finally break from their 
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Visually, Kocynder often portrayed Germans as old-guard Prussians, dressed in military 
garb and the ever-present Pickelhaube.  In fact, ‘German’ and ‘Prussian’ were used almost 
interchangeably, as in the Polish newspapers, evoking memories of Prussian persecution of 
Polish Catholics and its militarism.  This is exactly the depiction seen on the front page of the 
magazine’s first issue – a giant, mustachioed Prussian, in full military uniform, being over-run 
by a mob of Upper Silesians carrying Polish flags.153  So prevalent were these famous helmets 
that Kocynder turned them into the punchline of a joke.  “What is the difference between a devil 
and a Prussian?  The devil has two horns, and the Prussian only one! (Pickelhaube).”154  Prussian 
demons abound in the periodical.  For example, in a frontispiece illustrated by Ligoń, a demonic 
Prussian monkey threatens two Upper Silesian children.  The demon, grotesque in his 
movements and features, sports a Pickelhaube with the letters “H-K-T” balanced on its spike.  
The innocent children, dressed in smart, traditional clothing, run to St. Nicholas for protection.  
The “German Krampus” growls, “Your children belong to me, because Upper Silesia is German 
[Oberschlesien ist deutsch]!”  St. Nicholas responds, “Ho, Ho, Prussia demon!  Upper Silesian 
children are Polish, because their parents are Polish and speak Polish in prayers.  Whether Upper 
Silesia is deutsch, you’ll soon find out at the plebiscite.”  He then turns to the children, and offers 
these comforting words: “And you, dear Silesian children, do not be afraid of this German Satan, 
because soon one big word – Poland – spoken by your parents, brothers, sisters, relatives and 
friends will drive this devil from Upper Silesia.”155  
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If not a war-mongering Prussian, then Germans usually appeared as a Heimatstreuer, a 
catch-all term for any German whose main motivation was stamping out any and all aspects of 
Polishness in Silesia; he was often denoted as such by the letters “H-K-T” somewhere on his 
person.  Physically, these men were either obese fat-cats or skinny weaklings, with thinning hair 
and glasses; either way, neither met the strong, masculine ideal.  Both such men were found in a 
two-panel cartoon printed in the 29 July 1920 issue.  A thin man with glasses opens a tanker, 
from which water spills out onto a plowed field.  In his arms, he carries a package, marked, 
“Germanize as soon as possible.”  In the background, a fat man throws seeds from a bag marked 
“H-K-T.”  Both look smug.  All that changes in the next panel.  Instead of a crop of Germanized 
Upper Silesians, their harvest has only yielded happy, smiling Polish faces, each wearing a 
rogatywka, the Polish four-cornered hat.  Despite, or perhaps in spite of, the forced 
Germanization of the region – through education, through language policy, through the 
Kulturkampf – Polish culture remains, and, indeed, has flourished.  Upper Silesia remains a 
Polish land, according to this cartoon.  As the caption concluded, “That’s the curse of the evil 
deed.”156   
While Germans were denoted by their sharp military uniforms or posh suits in the Polish 
press, the portrayal of Poles in the German press occurred at the opposite end of the spectrum.  
Playing again into the stereotypes Germans held of Eastern Europe, Poles in Pieron were poor, 
dirty and stupid.  In the same vein as the stereotypical American riddle, the magazine joked, 
“The Pole is very stupid.  He looks around and around the electric light, and yet still can’t figure 
it out – Why can’t he light a cigar with it?”157  In the 28 August 1920 issue, “Pieron” takes his 
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uncle, visiting from Norway, on a tour of Upper Silesia.  As they drive down a city street, two 
groups of residents are seen.  On the left, the people are neatly dressed; the men are in suits and 
ties, while the woman dons a fashionable hat.  All is neat and orderly.  On the other side of the 
street, however, a drunken brawl breaks out.  The people are dressed in tattered clothes; a man 
takes a heavy swig from a bottle.  “So two nations of people [Völkerschaften] live here in Upper 
Silesia?” the uncle naively asks.  “Yes, Uncle,” answers “Pieron.”  “The Upper Silesian and the 
Pole.  The differences are small, as you can see!”158  The Upper Silesian is an upstanding citizen 
of Germany; the Pole is a buffoon who only drinks and causes trouble.  It should be noted, 
however, that Pieron, a week before the plebiscite, did concede that it was painting Poles with a 
rather large brush.  Under the faces of five ragged and sinister men, the magazine admitted, “Not 
all Poles look like this.  There are also decent and smart people among them.  And they vote for 
Germany.”159     
This depiction of Poles occurred again in three “Polish Fairy Tales” retold in Pieron.  In 
“Hansel and Gretel,” they are dirty little thieves, whom even the witch will not take into her 
house until they are deloused.  In “Sleeping Beauty,” a Polish price comes the castle of the 
slumbering princess – and proceeds to steal not a kiss, but her gold ring, her necklace and her 
earrings, before emptying the king’s safe and pickpocketing the rest of the court.  Finally, in 
“Littler Red Riding Hood,” the “Polish wolf,” stops the maid on her way to grandmother’s 
house.  Upon hearing she carried only “a little bit of cornmeal cake and a pot of cocoa,” the wolf 
exclaims, “What? No wine, no schnapps?  Are you crazy?”  He then hits her in the face with his 
tail, causing her to drop the basket, and runs to town, where he “broke into a brandy tavern.”  
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Alone in the woods, Little Red Riding Hood weeps, “Oh, if only we were rid of these Polish 
wolves!”160 
Depicting Poles as wolves is a minor trope found both in Pieron and the plebiscite 
posters.  It was the first image readers of the magazine saw, appearing on the front page of the 
initial issue.  Here, a happy family tends to their farm; featured prominently is a mother holding 
an infant.  Just outside the fence, however, five large black wolves are on the prowl.  Two of the 
wolves wear a rogatywka, and a third hat lies abandoned on the ground.  The Polish wolves 
search menacingly for a way into the farmyard, looking to break in – but “they shall not 
succeed!” the caption stated.161  In this same issue, a cartoon panel showed the Big Bad (Polish) 
Wolf, again wearing the rogatywka, opening his jaws as he threatens Little Red Riding Hood.  In 
her basket, marked Oberschlesien, the girl carries a bag of money (1000M) and what appears to 
be two smoke stacks, representing the industry of the region.  “The Polish wolf wants to eat 
Little Red Riding Hood,” claimed the caption.  “He can’t forget Upper Silesia’s goods.”162  In all 
these instances, the Polish Wolf is an interloper, a thief looking to take that which in not 
rightfully his – Upper Silesia.  The region, like Little Red Riding Hood, must be protected from 
these wolves by those true Upper Silesians, who will vote to stay in Germany. 
Pieron dedicated the entire 7 August 1920 issue to what exactly would happen to Upper 
Silesia should the Polish wolf succeed.  The opening illustration imagined the day Polish forces 
would arrive in Upper Silesia – “31 February 1921” – to “a cheering crowd greet[ing] the 
invasion of the liberators!”  The officer, the only clean Pole, smugly rides his emaciated horse.  
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Around him, his men are dressed in tattered, mismatched uniforms.  As they march down the 
street, the townspeople run into their houses; there are no open windows, no cheering crowds.  
Only one man welcomes the Polish Army.  With his bare feet, raggedy clothes and nose red from 
drinking, this man is a prime example of the type of “Pole” that ‘Pieron’ pointed out to his uncle.  
Only he is happy to be joined to Poland.  The others, the respectable “Upper Silesians,” hide in 
fear.163 
The trope of the dirty and destitute Pole continued throughout the issue.  As part of a 
series of single-panel cartoons, a man vigorously scratches his head as lice flock to him; “The 
Poles have no goods, except these!”164 the caption exclaimed.  Polish farms are equipped “with 
the latest Polish achievements,” stated another, as in the accompanying image a woman pulls a 
plow in place of a horse.165  “Polish Cleanliness” is depicted in a stark illustration.  Under a 
sickly, yellow sky, Death looks down from his wagon at the dead who lie prone on the street.  
Crows flock and pick at the dead flesh.  “If Upper Silesia becomes Polish,” the caption warned, 
“cholera from Poland will arrive.  That would be the bane of Polish filth!”166  “What would 
happen if Upper Silesia became Polish?” asked the magazine.  The answer: nothing good.  “Your 
business: broken…The mines: overexploited.  Your health: threatened by epidemics.  Your new 
money: worthless…And you?  What are you?  Disenfranchised.  Worthless.  “Only” Upper 
Silesian.  Let this evil dream pass you by!”167  Luckily, as the last page of the issue made clear, 
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this future would never happen.  As a new day begins, a strong and sturdy (German) Upper 
Silesian awakes and says, “I had a bad dream.  Upper Silesia, Polish?  It shall never happen!”168   
It is impossible to cleanly separate Pieron’s anti-Polish rhetoric and its economic 
arguments that Germany was the sounder, safer choice for Upper Silesians.  As seen in the image 
of the poor Polish farmwife pulling her husband’s plow, the two went very much hand-in-hand.  
Poland suffered economically because its people were stupid, lazy and uncultured; poverty and 
destitution were essential elements of what it meant to be Polish, according to the Germans.  
Poland may argue that it needed Upper Silesia – and its coal – to survive; Germany’s counter to 
that claim was that, even if Poland had this wealth, it would squander it and drag Upper Silesia 
down.  Polish “intelligence” was on display in an illustration featuring two miners on a break.  
“Listen,” one tells the other.  “If you choose Germany, you’ll work seven hours and get fifty 
German Marks.  If you choose Poland, you’ll only work thirteen hours, but you’ll get twenty 
Polish Marks for it.  Understand? [Rozumisz?]”169  “Are you crazy?” his friend asks.  The 
implication is clear – Poles are so dim-witted they will take less money to do more work.  In 
another issue, Poland’s poverty is made into a joke, as Pieron presented “recipes” from a “Polish 
Cookbook.”  These included a recipe for bouillon: “Take half a liter of water, put in half an 
earthworm, and let it boil for fifteen minutes.”  Or another, for “spinach with egg”: “Grind a few 
large pieces of bark into powder and add five or six large pebbles.”170  Here again, poverty is, 
quite literally, baked into Polish culture.  It is a defining characteristic, according to Pieron, of 
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what it means to be Polish, and nothing, not even the acquisition of Upper Silesia, could change 
this. 
In touting Germany’s economic might over Poland, Pieron turned to the two aspects also 
found in the newspapers: the strength of Germany’s currency (at least, vis-à-vis the Polish 
Mark), and its strong social security.  To the first point, the magazine pointed out that “If 
someone buys a cigarette with Polish money…To pay, he would need half a pound of paper!”171  
In an almost full-page illustration, a poor elderly man and his son work on a home-improvement 
project, of sorts, together.  Both are dressed in dirty clothing that is torn and patched; the son 
stares into the distance, unthinking, with his finger up his nose.  According to the caption, the 
farmer has won the Krakow lottery, but “because he cannot buy anything with the worthless 
Polish money,” he has decided to use it as wallpaper in his outhouse.172  Poles were shown to 
covet the German Mark.  For example, in one such illustration, a buffoonish, possibly drunk, 
Pole offers a neat, clean (German) Silesian woman a bouquet of flowers.  He sighs, “My dear 
Fraulein!  I love and adore you!  The sun of my emotions is not as big as the sea of my passions!  
I cannot be happy without you.  You or nothing!  Be mine!”  She fixes him with an icy glare and 
asks, “Do you mean me, or my German Mark?  Off with you!”173 
Germany’s strong social security was also highlighted in the periodical.  In “The Buried,” 
the aftermath of a mining accident emphasized the importance of this system.  A man lies on a 
stretcher, horribly injured, while his wife weeps.  The miner’s friend soothes her: “Don’t cry, 
Barbara!  Soon your husband will be well again, and then he will get a pension from the state.  If 
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Upper Silesia were to be Polish – from the Poles, he would get nothing!”174  This sentiment was 
repeated in a later issue.  Two panels, presented side-by-side, displayed how an injured worker is 
treated in Germany and in Poland.  In the first, a German worker in a neat suit and clean shoes, 
with his arm in a sling, approaches a bank of windows.  “I injured myself at the machine.  What 
can I do?”  The helpful German clerk responds, “Go to that counter.”  In the second panel, the 
man, now a Polish worker, again asks for help – but this time his clothes are dirty and torn, his 
hair unkempt.  Instead of a row of eager clerks, ready to help, he has only one Polish clerk at a 
cluttered desk.  The injured man repeats his question, and this time is told, “Go to the Devil!”175  
Miners and other workers would fare better in Germany, where the pay was greater, the Mark 
stronger, and a system of social security in place to ensure the miner and his family were taken 
care of in the event of injury.  While the worker in the second cartoon was clearly identified as 
“German” and “Polish” in each panel, the grieving wife and miner in the first example were not 
defined by nationality.  Given that the majority of miners working underground were Polish or 
Polish-speaking, it can be assumed that Barbara and her friend were not ethnically German.  
Thus, one did not need to belong to the German nation to reap these economic benefits – only 
the German state.  The German propaganda did not ask Upper Silesians to become German, only 
to stay in Germany.   
Kocynder could not strongly counter Pieron’s economic arguments; Poland was still 
trying to knit together a country out of three disparate empires while, for most of 1920, fighting 
an expensive war with Soviet Russia.  The best the Polish satirical magazine could hope to do 
was cast doubt about the might of the German economy.  In doing so, it focused on two main 
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issues: Germany’s war debts and taxes.  “Germany wants to pay its debts/With Silesian work and 
treasures,” began the poem “Plebiscite Thoughts.”  “It will lose the war for a second 
time/Because Silesians are not fools.”176  Kaiser Wilhelm himself appeared in a four-panel 
comic, dressed in his finest military garb, complete with spiked helmet and flowing cape.  He 
stands next to his strong man, Michel – a “Hercules.”  “He’ll lift anything I give him,” the Kaiser 
boasts as he hands more and more weight to Michel; each one is labeled “War Debt” or “War 
Loans.”  Michel holds strong, but eventually collapses under the weight of this enormous debt, 
much to the dismay of the Kaiser: “Oh, damn [Donnerwetter]!  Victory was certain!”177  The 
levity of this comic is juxtaposed with the pathos of Germania in a later issue.  Here, a sobbing 
Germania sits atop a wagon carrying sacks of debt.  Her poor mule has collapsed with 
exhaustion, and her wagon has lost a wheel – labeled, “Upper Silesia.”  She cries, “Upper 
Silesia, save me, because my Michel can no longer pull the cart with German debts.”178  Her plea 
is written in both German and Polish, again highlighting Kocynder’s use of both languages to 
appeal to readers. 
The burden of these war debts would fall to the working people, in the form of taxes.  
Kocynder made this very clear in its presentation of “Two Urns.”  The first voting urn bears the 
image of the black German eagle and is filled with papers marked “Taxes!” [“Podatki!]”  Chains 
spill over the top, and a gloved hand pushes out of the urn, brandishing a whip marked “H-K-T.”  
In contrast, the Polish urn is overflowing with industrial tools and wheat, with the bright flame of 
freedom towering above it all.  Instead of taxes, Poland offers “Freedom, Education, Work and 
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Prosperity.”  The caption warned, “Upper Silesians, choose.  A vote for German will give you 
further slavery, national and social oppression, and misery for you and your descendants, 
because you will have to pay Germany’s war debts.  A vote for Poland will give you 
independence, happiness and prosperity.  You will be the masters of your own land.”179 
Kocynder made clear that the cost of Prussian war-mongering was not just monetary; the 
human cost was even higher, as the “War Invalid” made clear.  A poor veteran teeters on one leg, 
precariously balanced between his wooden prosthetic and a box on a stand.  His poem is entirely 
in German.  “Deutschland, Deutschland über alles,” he says.  “But I’m without everything./ For 
my foot, fortune, life/ I was given a hurdy-gurdy./ In Germany there’s nothing to be found./ 
That’s why I’m voting for Poland!”180  But at least this man is still alive to vote.  The 10 
November 1920 issue marked the two-year anniversary of Germany’s defeat with a striking 
illustration of Kaiser Wilhelm sitting dejectedly on a mountain of skulls and bones.  No longer 
the military leader, “Willy” is dressed in a suit and coat, his top hat cast to the side.  “Here rests 
the Upper Silesian cannon fodder.  Fallen for Kaiser and Reich,” reads a sign in German.  In 
Polish, “Willy” asks the bones, “Ghosts of my loyal Upper Silesians, what will happen with 
Upper Silesia?”  The ghosts reply, “For Germany, a flop like two years ago.  Polish victory will 
avenge our blood and our lives lost here in forced war.”181  
This imagery and language, particularly referring to the fallen Upper Silesians as “cannon 
fodder,” is also found in the German propaganda.  While it could not simply brush its defeat in 
the First World War away, Germany did try to present itself as a new nation, no longer 
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associated with the Prussian militarism that had started the Great War.  Instead, the propaganda 
pointed repeatedly to the fact that Poland was now embroiled in a war with Soviet Russia – a war 
that, as the first issues of Pieron were released, Poland appeared to be on the verge of losing.  
Instead of a mountain of skeletons, Pieron produced a field of crosses, the land littered with 
skulls, bones and broken swords.  This was the “graveyard of fallen Upper Silesians, who fell for 
the Polish state!”182  More than the loss of life, Pieron argued that Poland did not respect and 
would not keep its promises to those Upper Silesians who fought on its behalf.  One cartoon 
showed two Polish officers chatting in a room filled with shoddy clothing and old boots; empty 
bottles litter the table and floor.  “What’s all this crappy stuff for?” asks one.  The other answers, 
“These are the uniforms for the Upper Silesians, if they vote Polish, Sir!  For them, the worst is 
just good enough!”183  But Poland’s supposed anti-Silesian bias had graver implications than old 
uniforms; Pieron contended that Poland would not pay pensions to the families who lost 
members in “the Polish War.”  In a two-panel cartoon, an Upper Silesian is drafted into the 
Polish army, and dies fighting the Russians.  But when his widow tries to collect his pension, 
“she learns that the Polish state gives nothing to dead Upper Silesians.”184  Poland has failed in 
its obligations to the family; it could not keep the husband safe at war, and now refused to 
protect his widow.  Circling back to its economic argument, the German state was able to 
provide pensions to the wives and children left behind, as seen in the illustration of Barbara, the 
miner’s wife.  These illustrations, then, confronted both men and women with the question of 
which state would keep their family, and thus the nation, safe. 
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The role of gender, and from that, the ways in which men, women and families were 
depicted in the propaganda, is a vital, albeit seldom discussed, aspect of the plebiscite 
propaganda.  More will be said in discussing the plebiscite posters, but it is important to examine 
the gendered representations and presentations in the satirical magazines.  Images of German and 
Polish men are found in both periodicals, but in depicting women they tended to stay within their 
national lines – that is, with a few exceptions, Pieron included only German women, while 
Polish women were almost exclusively the domain of Kocynder.  Two broad statements hold true 
for both the posters and the magazines: first, that each nation presented their opponent’s men as 
unmanly and their own men as the masculine ideal – although they differed on what exactly 
constituted this ideal; and second, women appeared almost exclusively as wives and mothers. 
As discussed above, German men in Kocynder were either militaristic Prussians, fat-cat 
capitalists, or scrawny weaklings – none of whom were viewed as positively masculine.  The 
school teachers are either violent towards their pupils or cower in fear as the students demand 
Polish education.  Often seen sporting the letters “H-K-T” somewhere on their person, these men 
were craven and shallow, thinking only of themselves.  As for the Prussian military man, he was 
viewed as a disgrace, a character for a time now past, with no place in the post-war future.  He 
was usually overweight, his rotund belly emphasizing that he was no longer a fighting-fit soldier, 
but a relic.  Polish men, on the other hand, were strong, young and handsome, often sporting a 
thick mustache.  Their masculinity was strongly tied to their class.  While some did appear in 
suits or coats, most often the Polish man appeared dressed simply in a white shirt and dark pants, 
carrying a pickaxe.  Mining tools appeared on his belt buckle.185  The Polish Upper Silesian was 
a worker, fit in health and firm in his convictions.  He was solid, both physically and morally, 
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working to protect his family and his nation from the villainous Prussians.  Here, being a worker 
is equated with manliness, while being a member of the middle or professional classes, as most 
“heimatstreuer” Germans were, was associated with physical fragility and moral turpitude. 
Polish women did not appear with the same frequency as did their male counterparts, and 
never without a man also present.  Women were wives and mothers, such as the farmer’s wife 
who worries about protecting the harvest from “those thieves in uniforms.”  She is older, with a 
plain face, and literally looks up to her husband for guidance and protection.  He provides this 
easily, reassuring her that the German security forces are no longer a threat.186  When a Polish 
man was not present to provide protection, however, Upper Silesian women were forced to 
defend themselves.  In a three-panel cartoon, a lecherous Prussian, dressed in military garb from 
his pointed helmet to his polished boots, approaches a beautiful, young Silesian woman as she 
sweeps.  With her full skirt and flowered apron, she is perhaps not dressed for housework; 
instead, her traditional outfit signals that she is a representation of the region – Silesia 
personified.  “Give me a kiss, my darling,” the Prussian demands.  But Silesia will have no more 
of these “Prusaks.”  “Out, you Prussian bastard!” she shouts, beating him away with her 
broom.187  Upper Silesia’s honor must be preserved from the Prussians who seek to exploit her, 
and virtuous Polish women would have to play a large role in achieving this. 
Women have a larger presence in Pieron, in which they again appear predominantly as 
wives and mothers, although the role they played in the magazine depended on their class and, 
by extension, their ethnicity.  As working class wives, women were used to highlight Germany’s 
economic and social security – Barbara, for example, the women who will soon receive a 
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pension after her husband’s accident in the mines, or the unnamed widow who will not collect 
such funds after her husband dies fighting against Soviet Russia.188  But it is important to note 
that the widow is defined as Polish, while Barbara’s ethnicity is ambiguous.  These women are 
poor, helpless creatures whose (Polish) husbands, by accident or choice, are no longer present to 
support them – an indictment against Polish masculinity.  The only place these women can turn 
to for protection is the German state.  While passive figures, Polish women were at least depicted 
as largely blameless victims, unlike Polish men, whom Pieron presented as drunken fools.  
Barbara and the widow are clearly poor, but their simple clothing is clean.  Polish men, on the 
other hand, are almost exclusively dressed in dirty rags and tatters.  
German women and men, on the other hand, were depicted as members of the ideal 
middle class family – father, mother, their children, and, usually, a member of the older 
generation, all living comfortably together.  Three generations of Upper Silesians appeared in an 
image found in the 16 October 1920 issue, which was a special edition devoted to “The Upper 
Silesian.”  It is a snapshot of what middle class life should be, with the family gathered around 
the dining table.  The father reads the paper while the mother, beautiful and elegant, rocks their 
youngest; an older woman, likely her mother, leans down to coo at the infant.  Another child 
finishes his meal, while a third plays with the family dog.  This is, as the title stated, the “Upper 
Silesian Family Happiness.”  The caption declared, “What the Upper Silesian desires: Quiet, 
Happiness and Peace.”189  The cover of the 18 December 1920 issue showcased another perfect 
middle class family as they prepare for Christmas.  Again the image included a father, mother 
and three young children, including an infant; here, the role of the older family member was 
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played by a kindly grandfather, who smiles from the sofa as he watches the family decorate the 
tree.190  Neither of these families are excessively rich, but they are financially secure; the 
children are well-fed and healthy; and, most importantly, all are happy and loved.  This is the 
future all Upper Silesians could achieve in Germany; it would not be possible if the region fell to 
Poland.    
A German mother, according to these 
images, was beautiful, kind, and always put her 
children above herself.  Such a mother was 
memorialized on the frontispiece of Pieron’s 4 
December 1920 issue.  A mother places her hand 
lovingly on her son’s head as she looks down at 
him, apparently deep in thought.  “The plebiscite 
nears,” her son says.  “Mother, think of me!”191  
Women were still a new electorate in 1920, and 
both Commissariats worked hard to appeal to 
them.  When they did, however, it was not to women as individuals, but specifically women as 
mothers.  It was for her child – usually a son – that a mother cast her vote for Germany; her 
thoughts were not of herself, but of her children, and thus the future of the nation.    
Every rule, however, has an exception that proves it, and that exception appeared in the 
29 January 1921 issue.  A young woman, probably in her early 20’s, stands tall in a field, a 
basket of potatoes in her hands.  She in no middle-class wife; instead, she is a farmer, dressed in 
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a simple dress and sensible shoes.  Behind her, another woman, perhaps her mother, digs for 
potatoes.  The girl smiles broadly and addresses the reader: “Do you think I want Korfanty’s 
rotten potatoes?  I’m an Upper Silesian and I am as smart as four Poles [Großpolen] from 
Warsaw put together!  I vote for Germany!”192  In all the material presented here – in the 
magazines, in the posters and pamphlets to be analyzed below – she is the only woman who 
appeared solely as a woman.  She is not a mother, she is not a wife; she does not follow a man’s 
lead nor need his protection.  Instead, she stands tall, confident in her own mind, and casts her 
vote for herself.  It is an amazing image because it is the only one of its kind, a propaganda 
image depicting an individual woman as just that – an individual. 
Taken together, Kocynder and Pieron held a vital, yet under-examined, place in the 
plebiscite propaganda landscape.  In them we find the sharpest depictions of Germans and Poles, 
and each often defined the other in the basest terms possible.  As will be seen below, in German 
posters Poles are also depicted as destitute – but in Pieron, they are also drunken fools who have 
engineered their own downfall.  Likewise, the Prussian officer is a disparaged figure across the 
Polish propaganda; in Kocynder, however, he is even more devious, a literal devil out for Upper 
Silesia’s women and children.  Even more so than other forms of propaganda, these satirical 
magazines eschewed any attempts to reach a broad audience and instead focused exclusively on 
stirring up passion in their respective bases.   
2.3: The German and Polish Plebiscite Propaganda: Posters, Pamphlets and Other 
Materials 
 Like Pieron and Kocynder, the posters, pamphlets and fliers produced as plebiscite 
propaganda covered a wide range of topics, many of which intersected with one or more of these 
themes.  Historian Waldemar Grosch, in his statistical analysis, divided over 450 propaganda 
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pieces into such categories as economics, ethnic belonging, religion, and fear of war.  He found 
that almost a third of all German and Polish propaganda espoused an economic argument, while 
the issue of ethnic or national belonging appeared more frequently in the Polish propaganda.193  
This tracks with the main arguments found in the newspapers and satirical magazines, and it is 
these two themes which will be the main focus of the analysis here.  However, Grosch fails to 
consider the role gender played in the plebiscite propaganda.  Germany was breaking away from 
its Prussian past and forging a new identity in the post-war world; Poland was piecing itself back 
together, attempting to make one cogent nation out of three disparate imperial pieces.  For both, 
the plebiscite propaganda provided a laboratory of sorts, in which the countries could experiment 
with how they wished to both present themselves to their people and be perceived by the outside 
world.  Gender, the roles and representations of men and women, played a large part in this 
experimentation.  Women were depicted solely as wives and mothers, who voted on behalf of 
their children.  For men, their masculinity depended on how well they could provide for their 
family, and by extension the nation.  But, again, German and Polish propaganda put forth 
differing ideals when it came to masculinity; more so than with women, this was explicitly tied 
to class, especially on the Polish side.      
“This is how we will fare”: Ethnicity and Economics 
As discussed above, Germany had the easier role in the plebiscite, in that its propaganda 
was really arguing for the maintenance of the status quo. German propaganda did not try to 
convince Upper Silesians to be Germans, per se.  They were, after all, already residents of 
Germany.  While posters, leaflets and pamphlets did stress the ethnic and historical legitimacy of 
Germans and Germany in the region, their primary argument was that, economically, Upper 
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Silesians would fare better in Germany than in Poland.  Posters urged Upper Silesians to not only 
“vote for Germany,” but also to “stay in Germany.”  The Polish offerings, meanwhile, had a 
much harder task: convince Upper Silesians to leave and become a part of Poland – a country 
that had not even existed for the past century.  Thus, though Polish propaganda contained similar 
ethnic and economic themes, its posters and leaflets were starker and more aggressive than those 
produced by Germany.  German propaganda, more so than its Polish counterpart, recognized that 
the voters were actually choosing the live in Germany or Poland, and not necessarily to become 
Germans or Poles.  Thus, their propaganda highlighted the dismal economic conditions Upper 
Silesians would face in the new Poland. 
 “This is how we will fare in Poland!” warned one such poster.194  Below the words a 
small family attempts to plow rocky, infertile soil.  The father, a tired man with a gaunt face, 
steers the small plow while his wife and young son pull; the family, apparently, is too poor to 
afford a horse.  A similar image appeared in Pieron, but there it was meant to be the punchline of 
a joke, a jab at Poland’s great “agricultural technology.”  Here, in a much more life-like 
illustration, there is nothing at which to laugh.  All three are thin, almost emaciated.  Their 
clothing hangs on their bodies like rags, and the woman’s eyes are dead.  This is the life that 
awaits the Upper Silesian farmer in Poland.  For this reason, the poster proclaimed, “We farmers 
vote for Germany!”195 
 The theme of desolate Poles was a common one in these German propaganda posters.  
Fritz Gottfried Kirchbach, who created the poster described above, produced another along the 
same lines.  The top half of the poster depicted a prosperous German, looking almost debonair as 
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he poses in front of his two-story house.  Next to him, the text read, “In Germany constant 
prosperity.”196  This sentiment was juxtaposed with the image below.  A small family (again 
consisting of a father, mother and young son) wanders the countryside, heads bowed in 
desperation.  The accompanying text reads, “In Poland poverty and emigration.”197 
 Likewise, Adolf Münzer’s 1919 poster highlighted the poverty of Polish emigrants, who 
were fleeing Poland in hopes of finding better economic prospects elsewhere.  The poster 
depicted what appears to be the curved roof of a peasant house.  Closer inspection, however, 
reveals that this roof actually consists of a large Polish family.  Three men are clustered in the 
center of the family, while two older women sit off to the side, obviously exhausted.  A young 
woman holds the hand of a young child (her daughter), while carrying an infant strapped to her 
back.  Just as the Poles described above, their clothing is ragged and worn (although much more 
colorful than in the other drab posters).  “So look the Polish emigrants,” the poster warned.  
“And so will you also look, if Silesia goes to Poland.”  At the bottom the poster cried, “Upper 
Silesians!  Stay with the new Germany!”198  Continuing to stress that this was a “new Germany,” 
a 1920 stamp, produced by the VVhO, told voters to “choose the German Republic.”199   
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This “new Germany,” like the old, desperately needed Upper Silesia and its coal just as 
much, if not more so, than the Upper Silesians needed Germany.  While careful not to stress this 
too heavily, the region’s economic importance for Germany’s economic future was featured in 
posters and pamphlets. In one of 
the most striking posters, a 
German Red Riding Hood 
(complete with rosy cheeks, 
blonde hair and the German 
eagle emblazoned on her cap) is 
chased by a Polish wolf.  Her 
basket, labeled “Upper Silesia,” 
contains a large coal mine, with 
three smoking chimneys.  
Above her read the following poem: “My little basket draws you near?/ Well, it holds my Silesia 
dear!/ In one piece with me it shall stay;/ With you it would wither and waste away.200  Here, 
again, we find the trope of the Polish wolf, hungering for Upper Silesia and all its treasure, while 
the region itself is depicted as a young, defenseless maid in need of the protection only Germany 
can provide.  But Germany also needed Upper Silesia, and its coal, in order to pay back its war 
reparations.  This fact is implicit in the poster but not stressed, as it would be a sign of German 
weakness to show such dependence on Upper Silesia.  After the plebiscite, however, the German 
press stressed its need for Upper Silesian coal as a way to convince the Allied Powers to grant 
Germany the lucrative Industrial Triangle. 
 
200 “Mein Körbchen liegt Dir wohl im Sinn?” APK, PKP, Syg. 281.  Translation from Tooley, 225.   
Figure 8: "Mein Körbchen liegt Dir wohl im Sinn?" APK, PKP, 
Syg. 281 
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Indeed, all of Upper Silesia’s successes could be credited to Germany.  In one poster, an 
Upper Silesian, smartly dressed, nears the top of a staircase – only to have a vindictive Pole, 
wearing a very Slavic fur hat, grab at his ankles, pulling him back down.  Luckily, a German, 
wearing a sash of black, white and red, is also at the top of the stairs; the steadies the Upper 
Silesian, ensuring he will not be dragged into the poverty of Poland.  “Germany has raised Upper 
Silesia to flourishing prosperity,” boasted the caption.  “Poland wants to pull Upper Silesia back 
to desolate misery.”201  The difference between the two countries was made clear by the 
background illustrations.  At the top, the German landscape features a mine, the smoke pouring 
out of its three chimney stacks indicating its success, and a pair of neat houses.  In Poland, 
however, only straw-roofed huts can be found.  At the bottom of the stairs, a desolate mother 
cries as she cradles her infant on a bed of hay; they are too poor even for proper sheets.   
“What Upper Silesia has become is thanks to the German spirit, German work and 
German tenacity.  Upper Silesia is not only by political right, but also by holy natural law, a 
German land,” declared Die Drei Fragen des Oberschlesiers [The Upper Silesian’s Three 
Questions],202 a pamphlet produced in Berlin in 1920.  It was the Germans who were actually 
responsible for first settling the region, the pamphlet argued; “The ancient Silesians were 
Germans.”203  Another pamphlet, entitled Oberschlesien am Scheidewege [Upper Silesia at the 
Crossroads] and produced in Kattowitz, also claimed ancient Germans were responsible for the 
establishment of civilization in Upper Silesia.  In 750, “blonde” Germans entered Silesia, 
 
201 F. Markau, “Deutschland hat Oberschlesien,” 1920. B.Śl., U.Śl 2091; also: APK, PKP, Syg. 281. 
 





carrying with them their livestock, farming tools and “a lot of good will.”204  Though the 
“brown-haired” Slavs of the region were at first wary, the two groups soon came together.  The 
Germans were more adapt at fieldwork and raising livestock than the Slavs, as well as better at 
building houses, churches, canals and factories.  According to the pamphlet, “The Blondes also 
taught the Brunettes to read, write and do math.”205  Regardless of which group arrived in Silesia 
first (and Upper Silesia at the Crossroads claimed it to be Germans, who initially arrived there 
2000 years ago), it is clear that the newer, “blonde” German settlers were responsible for Upper 
Silesia’s culture and infrastructure.  
As in the press publications, Germany’s plebiscite posters and fliers stressed their 
nation’s economic might vis-à-vis Poland, as well as its social securities. “The Deutschemark 
rises!” exclaimed one such poster.  “The Polish Mark falls!”206  The German is a happy, almost 
elfish man, while the Pole wears a rogatywka that covers his eyes; all that is visible is his wiry 
hair sticking out from under the cap, and his thick, unkempt mustache.  In another example, a 
leaflet depicted two men, each saddled with a large burden –  “the national debt that falls to each 
person.”  The man from German will need to pay 3346 M to cover his share – a hefty sum, to be 
sure.  But this is nothing compared to the Pole’s portion, which the leaflet declared to be 11,600 
M.207  In addition to its stronger currency and smaller debt, the German state was also more 
capable of caring for its inhabitants.  In a series of panels, life in Germany was contrasted with 
life in Poland.  “Compare and choose!” the title ordered.  In Germany, a sick worker is well 
cared for in a hospital; in Poland, he must fend for himself.  In Germany, an elderly German can 
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look forward to a comfortable retirement; in Poland, he is forced to beg in order to survive.  In 
both Polish pictures, the image of the Pole is ghoulish.  The sick man resembles a skeleton, 
collapsed on the ground under a tree, while the retiree has a large bandage wrapped around his 
face; with his sunken eye and bared teeth, his visage like that of a modern-day zombie.208    
For their part, Poles claimed to be the better choice for the economic and material well-
being of Upper Silesians, pointing specifically at Germany’s defeat in the war and its subsequent 
war debts.  A label declared, “In Poland there’s Speck and bread.  In Germany, debt and 
hardships.  Therefore, Vote for Poland!”209  Another cried, “In Poland you will eat bread and 
sausage, in Germany ‘ersatz’.”210  And a third stated, “In Germany, only the air is tax-free!”211  
Visually, Polish propaganda used the same techniques employed by the Germans.  Just as was 
described above, one leaflet showed two men holding sacks, which contained the national debt of 
both states.  But the numbers used here tell a completely different story.  The German carries a 
sack worth 4,761 billion Marks.  So weighed down is he that he cannot even stand, but simply 
crawls along.  The Pole, meanwhile, holds his satchel of debt neatly in the palm of his hand; it 
“weighs” only 17 billion Marks.212  Also like the Germans, Polish posters and flyers used two-
panel illustrations to contrast life in both states.  In German-run Silesia, one poster read, there is 
“compulsion, misery and infertile land.”  The image is that of a poor worker digging fruitlessly 
for potatoes while the German capitalist looms over his shoulder.  The next frame depicts life in 
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Silesia under Polish rule.  Here there is “agrarian reform and prosperity.”213  Sacks of food 
cluster at the proud Pole’s feet.  The implication is clear: Starve in Germany, or thrive in Poland. 
More so than in the German productions, in the Polish propaganda the ethnic depiction of 
Poles and Germans were tied to a specific class distinctions.  The Poles primarily appeared as 
members of the working class – that is, the miners of the Industrial Triangle.  Germans were 
portrayed as corrupted capitalists – “fat cats” with large bellies and an eye for profit at any cost.  
In one leaflet, two Germans sit in fancy restaurant, a glass of undoubtedly fine wine and a stack 
of bills on the table.  “For us gold, food, for us the best wine/ And the trash for the Polish 
swine!” they say.  Outside, an honest, hard-working Polish miner waves his pickaxe in anger.  
“Hey, workers!” he yells.  “Let’s kick out these guests!”214  In keeping with the bilingual nature 
of much of Polish propaganda, the Germans’ lines are written auf deutsch, while the Pole 
delivers his po polsku.  Another leaflet (also bilingual) lists the four types of people who will 
vote for Germany: the Jew, with his large nose; the Capitalist, donning a top hat and monocle 
and carrying a walking stick; the Junker, holding a riding crop and wearing black riding boots; 
and the Idiot, who appears to have just escaped from the cabinet of Dr. Caligari.  “Upper 
Silesians,” the leaflet asked, “will you follow their example?”215  These are all German figures, 
and all appear as gross caricatures (especially the Idiot).   
The above image is one of the few – on either the German or Polish side – to explicitly 
reference Jews.  Upper Silesian Jews accounted for about one percent of the region’s population, 
and they resided predominantly in the (German) cities.  Depictions of Jews are almost unseen in 
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the German propaganda.  In the Polish propaganda, while, again, Jews are not explicitly labeled 
as such, images do appear that fall into familiar anti-Semitic tropes – the pronounced nose, the 
glasses, the weak frame.  An example of this can be found in the Kocynder cartoon discussed 
above, in which a teacher, bearing anti-Semitic traits, berates a student for speaking Polish.  As 
in the pre-war press, Jews were placed next to Germans as a “foreign” element in the region. 
 Winning the plebiscite would, for the Poles, be the ultimate form of revenge against their 
Prussian-German oppressors.  This is clearly presented in a leaflet depicting Polish workers 
mocking a fat German (specifically, Prussian) capitalist in a butcher’s shop.  They cry, “You ate 
us out of hearth and home, you Prussian scoundrels.  Now we will eat meat, and you can eat the 
entrails!”216  Escape from exploitive German rule proved to be a potent theme in the plebiscite 
posters.  In one, a young man, dressed a worker, kneels in front of an industrial landscape.  On 
his back he supports three men who are clearly representatives of the Germans already 
encountered here: there is the “fat cat” capitalist, again with monocle; the militaristic Prussian 
officer; and a prosecutor.  “Free yourself from your oppressors!”217 the poster declared.  “Vote 
for Poland!”  In another, an eagle, the symbol of Poland, emerges from a chimneystack.  “Vote 
for Poland, and you will be free,”218 the poster read.  “Vote for Germany, you’ll remain a ‘Pole 
and Pig’ [‘Pollack und Schwein’]!” warned a label.  “Only in Poland will you be a person!”219  
Poland held Upper Silesians’ only hope for salvation.   
It was against Prussian militarism and imperialism that Polish propaganda most 
frequently railed.  It was a convenient way of reminding Upper Silesians not only of the war, 
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which Germany had just lost, but also of the Prussian persecution of the late nineteenth century, 
particularly the Kulturkampf.  A flier printed in Kattowitz in early 1921 reminded Upper 
Silesians of what they had lost in the war: “70,000 Upper Silesian War Invalids [and] 50,000 
widows and orphans of the fallen sons of Upper Silesia… You, who were exposed to the 
murderous fire of guns, machine guns and grenades and devastating poison gas.  You, whose 
blood has flowed so that the insatiable German imperialism dominates the whole world!”  Only 
Poland offered a reprieve from such “German baseness.”220  A small label, printed in green and 
navy blue, asked Upper Silesians, “Do you want to go again to the world slaughter?  If so – vote 
for the Prussians.”221    In another placard, a Prussian officer vomits papers labeled with names 
of lost German territory: Alsace, Posen, Schleswig, and so on.  The man is fat and balding, his 
helmet cast to the side.  The image captures him at the moment in which he chokes on the paper 
marked, “Upper Silesia.”  Below, the text read, “The Prussian gorged himself on others and 
cannot digest them.  He spewed Alsace, Schleswig, Poznań and Pomerania.  You must return 
Silesia, you greedy wolf.”222 
Upper Silesia and Poland, a pamphlet written by Vincent Rzymowski in 1921, argued, 
“The German occupation of Upper Silesia is an unceasing threat to the peace of Europe.  On the 
other hand, the incorporation of Silesia into Poland would be one of the permanent guarantees of 
peace.”223  During the First World War, Germany had relied heavily on Upper Silesia’s coal and 
metallurgic industries; Rzymowski claimed these resources allowed Germany to carry on the war 
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for an additional two years.  Thus, the war could only truly be declared a defeat for Germany 
when “they finally lose Upper Silesia, for then they will lose the means to their revenge.”224  
This “fall of Prussian militarism” would be “the greatest aim of this greatest of wars!  To free the 
civilized world from the curse of that iron vampire…German militarism was overset at the 
Marne.  But it can only be torn up by the roots in Upper Silesia, by taking that province away 
from Germany and returning it to Poland.”225  By voting for Poland and against Prussian 
militarism, Upper Silesians would be ensuring a future of “permanent peace.”226 
Prussian militarism would lead to Upper 
Silesia’s downfall; only fools would choose to stay 
with Germany after decades of persecution and a 
devastating war.  Stanisław Ligoń, of Kocynder fame, 
made that clear in his works.  In a postcard, a Prussian 
butcher, so designated by his Pickelhaube, prepares to 
slaughter an innocent calf, which stands calmly beside 
him.  The poster illustrated how Prussian 
aggressiveness (and, by extension, militarism) would 
destroy the defenseless Upper Silesians.  An 
interesting aspect of this poster is that its message 
(“Only the dumbest calves vote for their own 
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butchers”) was written exclusively in German.227  While German propaganda appeared primarily 
in German, pro-Poland texts could be written exclusively in Polish, in both German and Polish, 
or, sometimes, even exclusively in German.  As discussed above in the Polish press, one of the 
major projects for the new Poland would be to teach Upper Silesian Poles to read and write in 
Polish; many had received a German-language only education, speaking, but not reading, Polish 
at home.  A pro-Polish poster written in German could therefore be used to appeal to and awaken 
the latent Polishness inside these Upper Silesians, inspiring them to follow their national 
consciousness and vote for Poland.  Another Ligoń poster depicted a donkey standing up-right, 
dressed in high boots, a military jacket, and proudly wearing the Iron Cross.  “I vote for 
Germany,” he proudly declares.228  Again, the text was written in German, but the message was 
clear: Only Asses vote for Germany and their Prussian militarism.  
 Germany’s response to this line of attack was to stress that it was now Poland, not 
Germany, which was engaged in a bloody war.  It had set aside that old Prussian militarism; it 
was Polish aggression which now posed the greatest danger to Upper Silesians.  In an especially 
grisly poster Death, carrying a sword and riding a black horse, looks out on a distant Silesian 
town.  “Upper Silesian!” the poster warned.  “Poland needs you for cannon fodder!”229  One 
leaflet (printed in both German and Polish) called this “the Polish War Specter.”  While 
“Germany can think no more of decades of war,” Poland is engaged “again with the Bolshevists 
in a struggle of life and death.”230  In the series of two-panel cartoons comparing life in the two 
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states, described above, one such pair showed Germans heading to work, while Poles march off 
to war.231  In one leaflet, a mother hugs her adult son tight, as the text warned, “Mothers, 
consider: Poland has conscription!”232  In another, fathers are explicitly addressed.  If they vote 
for Poland in March, “In April, your son will be drafted into the Polish military!  Then he has to 
go to the new war!  Fathers, do you want to give your sons to the Poles as cannon fodder??”233  
Germany may have fought, and lost, the Great War, but that was in the past; now, it was Poland 
which was marching off to war and asking its young men to die for the nation.   
 Economic arguments featured heavily in the propaganda, with Germany touting its 
economic might and social systems, and Poland focusing on its opponent’s war debts and taxes.  
But even the most straight-forward economic argument could not be divorced from ethnic and 
class considerations.  Upper Silesians would fare better in Germany – because, according to the 
German propaganda, being poor was an essentially Polish trait.  In the Polish propaganda, the 
mix of these themes was even more striking.  Upper Silesia needs to become Polish so it can kick 
out the fat-cat capitalists – who value profit over people – and the militaristic Prussians – who 
sacrifice human lives in the name of German imperialism.  Both these groups had long 
persecuted Polish Upper Silesians, and only be removing them would the workers – who were 
always Polish in the propaganda – have the freedom to control their own economic interests.   
“Mother, remember me”: Gendered Representations 
 The above analysis of the economic and ethnic concerns gives one a good overview of 
the main arguments put forth by both sides during the run-up to the plebiscite.  Examining these 
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sources through a gendered lens, however, allows for a deeper understanding of the plebiscite 
period.  The plebiscite propaganda provided a space in which the two countries could experiment 
with new national images of themselves.  Gender played a vital role in this, laying out not only 
the roles men and women would play individually, but also how they would come together to 
form a new, national family.  This was especially true of the Polish propaganda, as the country 
attempted to stitch together three disparate parts, with different customs and histories, to form a 
unified Polish nation.  Sometimes subtle, sometimes explicit, gendered representations of men 
and women reflected how Germans and Poles viewed themselves, and each other. 
 Unlike in Pieron, German women do not appear in the propaganda posters of either side, 
and German men rarely feature in the German propaganda.  Instead, these posters and leaflets 
focused on disparaging Polish men and women, painting them as unfit husbands and mothers.  
On the Polish side, German men were cast as one of two stereotypes: militaristic Prussians, with 
their medals and Pickelhaubes, or capitalist fat-cats, who only cared about profits.  Polish 
masculinity stood in direct opposition to this; Polish men were workers, strong where the 
Germans were weak, morally sound where the Germans were bankrupt.  Polish women appeared 
exclusively as wives and mothers; as the former, she needed her husband’s protection to keep her 
safe and secure; as the latter, she stood firm in defense of her children.  
 When German men did appear in the German propaganda, it was to directly contrast 
them with their Polish counterparts – such as the debonair man in the Kirchbach poster described 
above, who lives in “constant prosperity” with his cozy house, while a Polish family is forced to 
wander the countryside in search of work and food.234  Or the young, blond German in a 
fashionable grey suit, who helps pull the Upper Silesian up a literal staircase of success, saving 
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him from the Polish grasp.235  These men were respectable members of the German middle class, 
just as pictured in Pieron.  They were not rich, but they made enough to provide their family 
with a comfortable life, never wanting for food or shelter. 
 In contrast to this prosperity, in the German propaganda Poland was financially weak and 
backward.  Women were forced perform hard labor in the field, as seen in the above Kirchbach 
poster, in which a mother and son pull the plow. The starving son works alongside his parents in 
the field, his bones clearly visible.236  In Münzer’s poster of Polish emigrants, the young mother 
has two small children and no food to give to them.237  At the base of the staircase that leads to 
the German Promised Land, another young mother cradles her emaciated infant.  None of these 
women were the traditional beauties found in Pieron.  Instead, they are poor, beaten down by 
life.  The mother pulling the plow has a gaunt face; the mother on the straw is dressed in rags, 
with short, unkempt hair.  Not only did they not meet conventional standards of beauty, but, 
more importantly, they had failed at their primary purpose – they had failed as mothers.  These 
Polish mothers were viewed as irresponsible for having children for whom they could not 
provide.  Here again the implication was that Poland could not provide for her children.238 
Viewed from another angle, however, these posters can also be read as harsh critiques of 
Polish masculinity.  In the iconography, men are expected to defend and provide for their family, 
and, by extension, the nation.  None of the Polish men here were able to do so.  The farmer 
cannot afford a horse; several of the fathers are unable to find work.  They are unable to provide 
food, shelter, or security for their families.  As men, they have failed to protect their families and, 
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therefore, the nation.  The emasculated Polish man represents the emasculated Polish nation – 
both are economically incapable of providing for their families. 
As is to be expected, the exact opposite 
was true in the posters produced for Poland.  In 
these, Polish masculinity was set apart from and 
above its German counterpart.  Just as class and 
ethnicity were intertwined in the Polish 
propaganda, so, too, gender intersected with class.  
Even in the most crudely drawn cartoons, German 
were presented as “unmanly” – old, obese, or 
physically weak.  The Pole, in contrast, was a 
strong, virile young man, ready and willing to 
fight to defend his homeland.  It is worth returning 
to a previously discussed poster to examine the 
contrast between German and Polish 
masculinities.239  Here, three Germans balance on the back of a worker.  The capitalist is quite 
rotund, his jacket straining to cover his ample belly.  The Prussian officer stands in his fully 
imperialistic, military glory, sword in hand.  And the prosecutor, a thin, elderly man, stares out at 
the viewer through his owlish glasses.  None of them could be considered paragons of 
masculinity.  In contrast, the Pole on whose back they stand is strong and steady; not a foppish 
rich man, but a worker.  This is the type of man who made Upper Silesia an industrial power, and 
it is he who will carry the region to further success as a part of the new Poland.  
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This new Polish, Socialist masculinity would triumph over the stagnant, Prussian 
militarism that has oppressed Poles of decades.  This criticism of German masculinity was 
perhaps most evident in a poster portraying the Poles’ victory over a Teutonic Knight.  Three 
(Polish) men stand over the knight’s dead body.  One of the Poles is dressed in the uniform of an 
officer, brandishing a sword, but he is placed in the back.  The other two men are dressed simply 
– black pants and white, unbuttoned shirts – and wield large hammers, the symbol of the 
workers.  “The Teutonic Knight lies in the dust.  Let him never arise,” announced the poster.240  
Dead is the Prussian, militaristic masculinity of Germany.  It has been defeated by the Poles, and 
their new, Socialist masculinity.  Taken together, these two posters argued that German 
masculinity was weak; it was on the strength of the new, Socialist man that Poland will rise 
again. 
If the ideal Upper Silesian Polish man was strong, young and virile, then his counterpart 
was the young, active caring woman, often seen as the mother of a small child. Indeed, 
motherhood was the only way women entered into the propaganda materials.  Women in 
plebiscite posters were rarely, if ever, seen without a child.  That is, according to the posters, all 
women were mothers of young children.  Elderly, childless or unmarried women were all but 
ignored. 
This is not to say, however, that these posters were trying to target only current mothers.  
Rather, these images speak to the potential of all women to become mothers.  As in other 
gendered representations of European nations, the woman/mother was expected to be the 
primary bearer of national culture, which she then passes on to her children.  But this notion took 
on special significance in the Polish case.  Remember that for over a century Poland had been a 
 
240 “Krzyzak lezy powalony.”  Kraków: Zakł. Ski Akc. „Ryngraf” Litogr. Kranikowski, 1920.  B.Śl. U.Śl. 869, U.Śl. 
1820. 
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“nation without a state.”  Thus, it was even more important in this context that women played out 
their roles are carriers of culture to the fullest extent. 
According to a flier addressed to “Polish Upper Silesian Women” [Polki Górnośląskie], 
this is exactly what they had done.241  Referring to the plebiscite, the text read, “You have 
already won one [battle], now you will win another! And what was this first victory?  That you 
saved the Polishness of Silesia. It is to your merit, Polish Women and Mothers, that Upper 
Silesia remained Polish!”  How did women accomplish this?  By speaking to their children in 
“the unblemished speech of our ancestors,” teaching them to sing and pray in Polish.  This was 
the first battle; now the Polish women of Upper Silesia faced another.  “In the fight for your 
home country, you will not stand idly by. And you will get a weapon in your hand, and it is 
ballot card.”  The flier concluded by reminding women that, if they saved Upper Silesia for 
Poland once again, their “descendants will repeat these great words: In the fight for Upper 
Silesia, the Polish woman's heart won!” 
Not surprisingly, women in the Polish propaganda were seen as loving, caring mothers, 
who vote on behalf of their children.  Indeed, this was the only reason for which a woman could 
vote, according to the posters.  It was for her children – and thus the future of the nation – that 
she votes for Poland.  In one flyer, a man and woman both cast their ballots of Poland into the 
voting urn (embossed with the Polish seal and set atop the helmet of a Prussian soldier). The man 
appears middle age or older, with a think handle-bar mustache; behind him industrial chimneys 
pump out thick smoke.  The backdrop on the woman’s side is much more agrarian – rolling hills 
and a small farmhouse, and a crucifix hangs round her neck.  A small child clutches the young 
woman’s skirt; as she votes, the woman places a loving hand on the child’s head.  The man votes 
 
241 “Polki Górnośląskie!,” date unknown, likely 1920.  APK, PKP, Syg. 267. 
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for himself; the woman votes to protect her child.242  A 
plebiscite bond depicted motherly protection in a much more 
frightening way.  Here, a Prussian soldier threatens a family 
with his bayonet, as the two small children run into their 
mothers’ arms.  “We won’t give up Silesia,” the bond read, 
and indeed the emotion in the mother’s eyes is at once 
frightened and determined.243  Finally, in one of the more 
well-known posters of this time, a small child with tousled 
blonde hair and light eyes stares out longingly at the viewer.  
He drags a toy of some kind behind him and clutches a 
Polish flag in his small hand.  “Mother,” he entreats.  
“Remember me.”244  This poster was the Polish version of the Pieron frontispiece, in which the 
son begs his mother to “think of me” when voting.  Again, a woman could not think only of 
herself, but had to also consider what was best for her children. 
 
242 “Głosujcie za Polską!“  APK, PKP, Syg. 268. 
 
243 “Nie damy Śląska.“  1920.  B.Śl. U.Śl. 102, U.Śl. 1610. 
 
244 “Matko pamiętaj o mnie,“ Poznań: Drukarnia i Księgarnia św. Wojciecha, 1920.  B.Śl. U.Śl, 875. 
Figure 11: “Matko pamiętaj o 
mnie,“ B.Śl. U.Śl, 875 
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Unlike Polish women in the German propaganda, who were predominantly passive 
figures, in the Polish propaganda they were much more active.  While in the former they simply 
suffer, in the latter Polish women help to save the nation – by voting.  Propagandists appealed to 
them directly.  “Polish women!” a sticker read.  “The fate of Upper Silesia is in your hands!”245  
Another flyer portrayed women as the “swing vote” in the election.  It asked, “Do you know, 
what will decide the greatest battle of Upper Silesia?  Not bullets nor guns, not bayonets nor 
poisonous gas, not Prussian tricks nor violence, but the invincible moral strength, that is found in 
the warm heart of a Polish 
woman!”246  The illustration 
shows the plebiscite as a 
scale, and it tips heavily in 
Poland’s favor, weighed 
down by the Polish heart.  
Behind the scale stretches a 
line of women that fades in 
to far background.  And, of 
course, next to the lead woman is a small child waving the Polish flag.  Even though the flyer 
calls to women in general, the implicit understanding is that they are mothers. 
Taken together, we can see that the images of the Polish man and woman complement 
each other.  Combined, they represent the future of the Polish national family.  It is a family 
headed by a father who is a strong and steady worker.  At home, the children will be well-cared 
 
245 “Kobiety Polski.”  1920. B.Śl. U.Śl. 46, U.Śl. 412, U.Śl. 451. 
 
246 “Polki Górnośląskie!“  APK, PKP, syg. 267. 
Figure 12: “Polki Górnośląskie!“  APK, PKP, syg. 267 
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for by a loving, doting mother, who will teach them the language and culture of their Polish 
homeland.  Both men and women have a duty in securing the future of the national family: the 
man protects them from the Prussian intruders, and the woman ensures that their Polish traditions 
are passed down to the next generation.  Both will provide for Upper Silesia’s future by 
participating in its most important fight yet – the battle at the ballot box.  
On 9 March 1921 – eleven days before the plebiscite – Volkswille noted the importance 
of the vote in deciding the region’s future, and asked, “Should our home stay German or become 
Polish?”247  Finally, after thirteen months – longer, really – of intense propaganda efforts by the 
German and Polish sides, the day of decision had arrived.  Efforts to sway or convince Upper 
Silesians to vote a certain way continued up to the very day of the plebiscite; Gazeta Robotnicza 
warned its readers, “Whoever votes for the Germans or stays home is a traitor!  Every Pole votes 
for Poland!”248  But now, on Palm Sunday, the process fell out of the hands of the myriad 
plebiscite commissions, organizations and publications.  It was now up to Upper Silesians to 
decide their own fate, to answer, after over two years of deliberation, the very question put forth 
by Volkswille: Would they stay German, or become Polish?  
 
 
247 “Werktätiges Volk Oberschlesiens!”, Volkswille, 9 March 1921. 
 
248 “W ostatnej chwili!”, Gazeta Robotnicza, 20 March 1921. 
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PART FOUR: TO THE POLLS: THE UPPER SILESIAN PLEBISCITE AND ITS 
AFTERMATH 
On 20 March 1921 – the last day of winter – Upper Silesians finally went to the polls.  
Voting was open all day, from eight in the morning until eight at night,1 and many went on their 
way to or from Palm Sunday mass.  The New York Times reporter covering the plebiscite noted 
that the event had “elements of a gigantic picnic, a Sunday school treat and a general election.”2 
After over two years of living in limbo, the day had come for Upper Silesians to cast their vote 
for Germany or Poland.  The Times reporter mused, “What will come of this bewildering 
mélange of racial instincts and economic interests?”3 
The answer to that was a muddled mess.  The three previous plebiscites concerning 
German territory – Allenstein, Marienwerder, and Schleswig – had resulted in clear majorities, as 
high as 97 percent for Germany in Allenstein.  But while Germany again carried the vote in 
Upper Silesia, it did so by a much slimmer margin.  Of the nearly 1.2 million votes cast, 707,605, 
or 59.6 percent, went to Germany; Poland garnered 479,359, or 40.3 percent.4  It was as 
Paderewski had said – taken as a whole, the region would go for Germany.  Based on this, 
Germany immediately declared victory.  There were, however, two key issues to consider.  The 
 
1 “Zwölf Gebote für die Abstimmungsberechtigten,” Kattowitzer Zeitung, 20 March 1921. 
 




4 Sarah Wambaugh, Plebiscites since the World War: With a Collection off Official Documents.  2 vols.  
(Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1933), Vol. I, 250.  Of 1,220,514 registered voters, 
1,190,846 did vote; 3,882 ballots were voided. 
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first was that, while Germany had won the overall vote, its victory was not evenly dispersed 
throughout the region.  Most of the German votes came from the agricultural districts west of the 
Oder and from the large cities.  In the communes of the industrial east, however, Poland was the 
clear victor.  Second, section 5 in the Annex of Article 88 in the Versailles Treaty stipulated that 
“the number of votes cast in each commune”5 would be reported, indicating that carrying a 
majority of communes was as or more important than the total vote.  Especially in the east, 
Poland carried the majority of communes – and, thus, also declared victory.  Further 
complicating matters was the presence of so-called ‘outvoters’ – those born in Upper Silesia but 
living elsewhere – who Polish nationalists claimed tipped the scale unjustly in Germany’s 
direction.  From this thorny knot of voting results, the Allied Powers would have to form the new 
border of Germany and Poland.  It is perhaps no wonder they eventually passed this decision off 
to the newly formed League of Nations as soon as possible. 
This final part will analyze the plebiscite results, examining the impact of outvoters while 
comparing the returns from the (German) cities and (Polish) communes.  In the press, both 
Germany and Poland claimed they had won the plebiscite, using much of the same language and 
tropes found in the material produced in the run-up to the plebiscite.  Now, however, their 
audience was not the residents of Upper Silesia, but rather the foreign leaders who would 
ultimately decide the region’s fate.  Wojciech Korfanty and the Poles accepted the likelihood that 
the region would be divided, and so focused their efforts on securing as much territory, 
especially the lucrative Industrial Triangle, as possible for Poland.  Meanwhile, Kurt Urbanek 
and the Germans instead campaigned to keep the region undivided and under German control, 
emphasizing the region’s cultural unity.  In May, in an attempt to secure his own line, Korfanty 
 
5 Treaty of Versailles, Article 88, Section 5, found in: The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923, compiled by Lt. Col. 
Lawrence Martin (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1924), 66. 
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ordered the launch of the Third Upper Silesian Uprising – by far the longest and bloodiest of the 
three.  Finally, this part will discuss the ultimate decision for the division of Upper Silesia. 
1. The Results of the Plebiscite 
The day of the plebiscite, in the words of Sanford Griffith, assigned to cover the event by 
the North American Review, “passed off with a calm and correctness which might well be copied 
in elections anywhere.”6  Despite claims of intimidation by both Germans and Poles after the 
fact, such incidents were largely unconfirmed, and, in spite of fears, the day proceeded calmly.  
Upon entering a polling place, the Upper Silesian received an envelope and two cards, one 
marked “Deutschland – Niemcy,” the other “Polska – Polen.”7  On the day of the plebiscite, 
Gazeta Robotnicza warned its readers that cards labelled “Polen – Polska” were invalid, “given 
out by Germans,” in an effort to annul these votes later.8  It advised its readers not to be fooled 
into accepting these sham ballots, although, in the course of this study, no evidence of such 
German deception was found.  For their part, the German papers had run advertisements in the 
days for the plebiscite, urging Upper Silesians to “supply yourselves with German ballots!”9 
from their local German Plebiscite Subcommissariats or newspapers, in order to ensure they, 
indeed, had the correct, official ballot.10  From there, he or she would enter the voting booth, 
where they would place the country of their choice in the envelope, and destroy the second card.  
“You must tear the Polish ballot into very small pieces and leave the shreds in the voting booth,” 
 
6 Sanford Griffith, “An Onlooker in Upper Silesia,” The North American Review 214, no. 788 (July 1921): 1. 
 
7 Karty, B.Śl., U.Śl. 927. 
 
8 “Ostatnia przestroga przed głosowaniem!”, Gazeta Robotnicza, 20 March 1921. 
 
9 “Zwölf Gebote für die Abstimmungsberechtigten.” 
 
10 Strange as it sounds, it appears Upper Silesians could pick up their own ballots and bring them to the polling 
places.  Given that each vote was put in a sealed envelope, available only at the time of voting, it would have been 
very difficult, if not impossible, to stuff the ballot box with previously obtained ballots. 
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advised the Kattowitzer Zeitung.  The Upper Silesian then placed the sealed envelope in the 
voting urn.  “Remember that voting is secret, and only God and you will know how you voted,” 
urged Gazeta Robotnicza.  “So that you won’t be tormented by remorse and cursed by your 
children and grandchildren, Vote for Poland!”11 
By the end of the day, 97.5 percent of eligible Upper Silesians had voted in the plebiscite.  
Of these, 81 percent were born in and had remained residents of Upper Silesia.  Those eligible to 
vote based on their residency in the region since 1904 made up 3.5 percent, while those born in 
Upper Silesia but no longer residents – the so-called “outvoters” – constituted just shy of 16 
percent of eligible voters.12  As stated above, Germany carried the vote for the region over all, 
earning 59.6 percent of the vote to Poland’s 40.3 percent.  The votes, however, were not evenly 
dispersed.  A large portion of Germany’s vote total came from the agricultural lands west of the 
Oder River, where it amassed enormous wins over Poland.  In the city of Leobschütz/Głubczyce, 
for example, only 60 of 9,968 votes were cast for Poland.  In the whole of Leobschütz county, 
only 259 votes were cast for Poland – out of a total of 65,428 votes; Germany carried the county 
with 99.6 percent.13  In Kreuzburg – long the home of the region’s sole German national party 
representative in the Reichstag – Germany earned 96.1 percent of the vote, with some of the 
smaller villages, such as Brinitze/Brynica and Frei Tschapel/Wolne Czaple, recording no Polish 
votes whatsoever.14  Germany won 95 percent of the vote in the city of Oppeln, and 69.4 percent 
 
11 “Ostatnia przestroga przed głosowaniem!” 
 
12 Wambaugh, Plebiscites since the World War, 250.  Wambaugh gives the following figures: 987,000 were born 
and still lived in Upper Silesia; 41,000 qualified based on domicile; 191,154 were outvoters.  Wambaugh, 250. 
 
13 “Oficjalne Wyniki Plebiscytu Górnegośląskiego,” printed in Franciszek Hawranek, Encyklopedia Powstań 
Śląskich (Opole: Instytut Śląski w Opolu, 1982), 687; Wambaugh, vol. 2, 247. 
 
14 “Oficjalne Wyniki,” in Hawranek, 685.  It should be noted that these truly were small villages.  Brinitze had a 
voting population of 151; Frei Tschapel had 37. 
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of the surrounding Oppeln Land vote.15  These vote totals were on par with the Allenstein and 
Marienwerder plebiscite results, and assured Germany, at the very least, that it would retain the 
territory west of the Oder. 
The Polish stronghold, meanwhile, was in the south, stretching from Pleß to Rybnik and 
west to Ratibor, on the Oder.  While both the towns of Pleß and Rybnik returned strong German 
majorities (76 and 71 percent, respectively), the countryside voted Polish by almost the same 
margins – 74 and 65, respectively.16  These results were not a surprise.  In 1903, the Polish Party 
Reichstag candidate had lost his run-off election with the Center nominee by only about 1100 
votes, and in the 1907 and 1912 elections, the district had voted overwhelmingly for the Polish 
Party.17  Given the decisiveness of the plebiscite results, it seemed clear that the Allied Powers 
would grant at least this area to Poland. 
The east, however, especially in the Industrial Triangle, was much more muddled, and it 
was this area that both Germany and Poland coveted.  Here, the vote spilt along several fault 
lines: German/Polish, middle/working class, urban/rural.  Germany carried the cities with large 
margins, although these were not as wide as those registered in the west.  In Kattowitz, 85 
percent of the city voted for Germany, while in Beuthen, Gleiwitz and Königshütte, the 
percentage was in the mid-to-high 70s.18  But in the industrial villages and communes 
surrounding these cities, where the working-class, Polish-speaking miners predominantly lived, 
Poland was triumphant, although, here again, the margin of victory became even smaller.  In 
 
15 Ibid, 690; “Groupement des Résultats du Plébiscite de Haute-Silésie,” in Wambaugh, vol. 2, 247. 
 
16 “Oficjalne Wyniki,” in Hawranek, 692 and 698; “Groupement des Résultats,” in Wambaugh, 246. 
 
17 Ilse Schwidetzky, Die polnische Wahlbewegung in Oberschlesien (Breslau: Verlag Ferdinand Hill, 1934), 
Reichstagswahlen Table. 
 
18 “Groupement des Résultats,” in Wambaugh, 246.  Germany earned 79 percent of the vote in Gleiwitz, and 75 
percent in Beuthen and Königshütte. 
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Kattowitz Land, Poland carried the vote with 55 percent; in Beuthen Land, it won 59 percent of 
the vote.19  The Polish victory is more impressive if we look at the number of communes won – 
21 out of 28 (75 percent) in Beuthen Land, 31 out of 38 (81.5 percent) in Kattowitz Land.20   
Again, these were not large cities, but rather small villages or towns; for every 
Rossberg/Rozbark or Bismarckhütte/Wielkie Hajduki, which each had over ten thousand votes 
cast, there was a Bobrek or Schomberg/Szombierki, where the number of total votes cast was 
less than 1000.  Rokittnitz/Rokitnica had 99 votes cast, Halemba had 92, and in Brynow/Brynów, 
a grand total of 34 votes were cast, out of 42 eligible voters.21  These numbers hardly matched up 
to those of Kattowitz Stadt, where 26,715 votes were cast, or Beuthen Stadt, where the vote total 
was 40,091.22  Thus, while Poland carried the countryside, when combined with the German 
gains in the large cities, the entire Industrial Triangle tilted slightly to Germany, 55 to 45 
percent.23  Sarah Wambaugh notes that, when the area east of Kattowitz, which was populated by 
small mining villages with Polish-speaking majorities – is excluded, the German majority rises to 
62.3 percent.24 
When recommending the new border, Article 88 of the Versailles Treaty stipulated that 
“regard will be paid to the wishes of the inhabitants as shown by the vote, and to the 




20 Calculated from “Oficjalne Wyniki,” in Hawranek, 677-8, 680-1. 
 




23 This calculation was derived from adding the totals in Kattowitz Stadt and Land, Beuthen Stadt and Land, 
Gleiwitz, Königshütte, Tost-Gleiwitz and Zabrze, as presented in Wambaugh, 246. 
 
24 Wambaugh, 251. 
 
25 Treaty of Versailles, Article 88, Section 5, found in Treaties of the Peace, 66. 
 265 
Industrial Triangle made such a recommendation almost impossible.  Carving out individual 
communes which had voted for Poland would have created an unsustainable series of enclaves, a 
Polish archipelago in a German sea.  Adding to this difficulty was not only the size of the 
communes – did a Polish win in a village of 100 mean the same as a German victory in a city of 
40,000? – but also the closeness of the final vote.  In Chorzow/Chorzów, for example, the Polish-
German vote was split nearly down the middle, 57 to 56.26  Instead of increased clarity, such a 
micro examination of the plebiscite results only served to muddy the waters further.  The only 
certainty was that Upper Silesia would have to divided, but just where that line should be was not 
yet clear. 
While, as will be discussed below, the Polish press declared the plebiscite a win for their 
national cause, for Korfanty and the other plebiscite leaders it was little less than a disaster.  The 
1910 Language Census for the whole of Upper Silesia had put the percentage of Polish- or 
bilingual speakers at 60 percent – the inverse of the overall percentage of the plebiscite vote.  
Throughout the plebiscite zone, Polish returns were less than the 1910 census would have 
projected.  The greatest differences were found in the western Kreise.  While nearly 76 percent 
of inhabitants of Oppeln Land reported to be Polish-speakers in 1910, only 30 percent of the 
region voted for Poland in the plebiscite – suggesting that 60 percent of Polish-speakers voted to 
remain in Germany.27  Rosenberg, Kreuzburg and Cosel saw similar gains, with the latter 
witnessing a shift of 55.6 percent.28  The eastern industrial zone also witnessed lower returns, 
although not as egregious.  Beuthen Land, for example, had a Polish-speaking population of 62.8 
 
26 “Oficjalne Wyniki,” in Hawranek, 681. 
 
27 Wambaugh, vol. 1, 250-1. 
 
28 Ibid.  In Rosenberg, the 1910 Census registered 79.3 percent Polish-speakers, but the Polish plebiscite result was 
31.8 percent; in Kreuzberg, the differential was 47.2 to 3.9 percent; in Cosel, 75 to 19.4 percent. 
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percent in the census, and voted 59 percent for Poland – a drop of only 3.8 percent.  The largest 
drop here was in Königshütte, from 34 percent in 1910 to 25.3 in the plebiscite.29  But while 
Poland won the industrial countryside, its margin of victory was disappointing when compared to 
the November 1919 municipal elections.  At the time, these elections were taken by both sides to 
be a harbinger for plebiscite, and the Polish parties had garnered massive returns.  In Beuthen 
Land, the Polish parties won 76 percent of municipal seats, but only 59 percent of plebiscite 
voters cast ballots for Poland.  Likewise, in Kattowitz Land, the Polish parties had captured 75 
percent of seats, but Poland only 55 percent in the plebiscite.30 
Korfanty and his fellow plebiscite leaders knew exactly who to blame for his discrepancy 
– the German outvoters.  During treaty negotiations at Versailles, it was actually the Polish 
delegation which had pushed for the inclusion of outvoters – Upper Silesians who had been born 
in the region but since moved away, who were allowed to return to take part in the vote.  The 
allowance of outvoters had originally been included in the protocols for the Allenstein and 
Marienwerder plebiscites.  The Polish delegation believed it would be able draw back those 
Poles who had emigrated to America and other parts of Europe for the vote, thus tipping the 
scales in their direction.  When it came time to finalize the Upper Silesian plebiscite, the Poles 
and French, reaching for this same advantage, again included the provision allowing native-born 
Upper Silesians to return and vote in the plebiscite.  The German delegation, fearing this 
potential Polish advantage, had argued that only those currently or very recently domiciled in the 




30 For November 1919 municipal election results and discussion, see: Edmund Klein, “Wybory komunalne na 
Górnym Śląsku z 9 listopada 1919r. a sprawa polska,” Studia Śląska 5, (1962): 7-76. 
 
31 T. Hunt Tooley, National Identity and Weimar Germany: Upper Silesia and the Eastern Border, 1918-1922 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 102-3. 
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The German plebiscite organizations then proceeded to turn the inclusion of outvoters to 
their fullest advantage.  Raising funds to support the travel and lodging of traveling outvoters 
was mainly the purview of the VVhO (Vereinigten Verbände heimattreuer Oberschlesier, or 
United League of Patriotic Upper Silesians).  In total, 191,154 outvoters returned home to vote, 
constituting 16 percent of all eligible voters.  They did not travel alone, as many brought their 
families and, according to the New York Times reporter, “on one of these amazing pilgrim trains 
three babies first saw the light of day.”32  The Polish delegation at Versailles had assumed those 
Polish-speaking Upper Silesians who had emigrated from the region, mainly to Ruhr, at the turn 
of the twentieth century would return and cast a ballot for Poland.  Instead, it seems their decades 
in the heart of the Reich had served to thoroughly Germanize these native-born Upper Silesians.  
They voted overwhelmingly for Germany.   
Almost immediately after the initial results were released, the Polish press decried the 
presence of outvoters, claiming their votes should not be counted, that they artificially tipped the 
scales towards Germany.  These “huge inflows into Upper Silesia of so-called emigrants…who 
in the vast majority voted for Germany, falsified the results of the plebiscite,”33 claimed Gazeta 
Robotnicza on 23 March 1921.  “Can the voices of emigrants be counted as well as those of the 
local population?” the paper asked two weeks later.  The answer, of course, was no.  These 
emigrants “are not connected with the fate of the country, and they should not have had the right 
to decide its fate.”  In addition to this, outvoters voted only for themselves and would then again 
leave, whereas “the voting native Upper Silesian also represents one’s own [swoją] family,” so 
 
32 “Picnic Atmosphere in Upper Silesia.” 
 
33 “Kto wygrał plebiscyt?  Polska!”, Gazeta Robotnicza, 23 March 1921. 
 
 268 
that vote should count for “at least three or four votes.”34  Gazeta Robotnicza also used math to 
prove that Poland, rather than Germany, had actually won the plebiscite.  It first dismissed 
90,000 German votes in the western area, claiming Poland did not even campaign in those areas.  
It then threw out an additional 200,000 German votes, which it claimed were from the outvoters.  
Once these had been “deducted from the garish 700,000 German votes,” Germany was left with 
“410,000 votes, mostly cast in the western counties.”  Put up against Poland’s “460,000” it was 
easy to see, the paper claimed, that Poland was the real, indisputable winner.35  
While the outvoters undoubtedly added to the German vote total, they were not the 
deciding factor in the overall plebiscite.  Even if we assume that every outvoter voted – and in 
Allenstein, only 71 percent of those who made the trip did36 – and that they all voted for 
Germany, that country still would have won the majority of votes, albeit by the much slimmer 
majority of 52 percent.  Outvoters constituted the highest percentage of eligible voters in the 
western cities and counties – 40 percent in Kreuzberg, 33 percent in Leobschütz, over 20 percent 
in both Oppeln Stadt and Land37 – areas where Germany was already expected to win.  Even 
omitting the outvoters in Leobschütz, Germany still wins the city with 99 percent of the vote.38  
In the south, Pleß registered only 8.5 percent outvoters, and taking them out of the equation 
raises the Polish percentage of votes from 74 to 81.39  Again, we must look to the eastern 
Industrial Triangle to determine the significance of the outvoters’ impact.  In Kattowitz Stadt, 
 
34 “Prawdziwy wynik plebiscytu,” Gazeta Robotnicza, 5 April 1921. 
 
35 “Co znaczy niemiecki jebel?”, Gazeta Robotnicza, 24 March 1921. 
 
36 Wambaugh, vol. 1, 134. 
 
37 Ibid, 250. 
 
38 “Oficjalne Wyniki,” in Hawranek, 687. 
 
39 Calculated from Wambaugh, vol. 1, 250, and vol. 2, 246. 
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outvoters were 12.5 percent of the eligible voting population.  Removing them from the vote still 
gives Germany 83 percent of the vote – a loss of only two percentage points.40  Removing 
outvoters from Beuthen Stadt and Gleiwitz produces a similar drop, from 75 to 71 percent and 
from 79 to 75 percent, respectively.41  Similarly, removing the outvoters from the surrounding 
communes raises the Poland’s percentage, but not significantly.  In Kattowitz Land, where 
outvoters constituted nine percent of eligible voters, omitting them raises Poland’s percentage in 
the plebiscite from 55 to 61 percent; in Beuthen Land, where outvoters were seven percent, 
Poland’s percentage goes up only four percentage points, from 59 to 63 percent.42  On the 
individual commune level, of Beuthen Land’s 28, only three were affected by outvoters.  That is, 
in three communes or villages, removing the outvoters would have resulted in a Polish, rather 
than German, win in that locality; in another, Miechowitz/Miechowice, removing the outvoters 
would have resulted in a tie – 58 to 58.43 
Thus, despite the Polish outrage, the outvoters did not have any great effect on the 
plebiscite results.  Were they removed, Germany would have still won a majority of the overall 
votes; individual cities and villages would have had the same results, although the ultimate 
percentages would have been slightly higher or lower.  Historian Brendan Karch also points out 
that between 50-100,000 Upper Silesian residents were disqualified from voting, as they moved 
to the region after the 1904 date stipulated in Article 88.  As these residents were likely German-
 
40 “Oficjalne Wyniki,” in Hawranek, 680. 
 
41 Ibid, 677-8. 
 
42 Calculated from “Oficjalne Wyniki,” in Hawranek, 677-81. 
 
43 Ibid, 677-8. 
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leaning, they would have tipped the balance even further in Germany’s direction had they been 
allowed to vote.44 
2. The Immediate Reaction in the Press 
While concern over outvoters did occur in the press, by and large the majority of 
reporting, by both Germans and Poles, touted their victory in the plebiscite – Germany based on 
the overall vote, Poland on the number of communes won.  Linguistically and visually, the initial 
days and weeks following the plebiscite were an extension of the pre-plebiscite propaganda.  
This was especially true in the Polish press, which continued to use the same language of 
oppression to describe its relationship with Germany, as well as depicting Germans in Prussian 
military dress.  The German press, on the other hand, urged for reconciliation between the 
German and Polish factions of Upper Silesia, stressing the cultural unity of the region in hopes of 
convincing the Supreme Council – as the Allied Powers were now known – to keep the region 
intact and under German rule.  Realizing that their plebiscite percentage alone might not be 
enough, the German press again returned to an economic argument, but with a twist.  Whereas 
during the plebiscite German propaganda had stressed the material well-being of Upper Silesians 
in Germany, now it argued that Germany’s own economic future depended on Upper Silesia, 
particularly its coal. 
In the immediate aftermath of the plebiscite, both the German and Polish press claimed 
victory.  A banner headline in the 22 March 1921 issue of the Kattowitzer Zeitung declared, “A 
Quarter Million German Majority!  Overwhelming German victory in the cities, majorities in the 
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industrial district as well!”45  In Kattowitz, the paper reported, “Almost everyone who went to 
the ballot box came with the conviction to save his German Upper Silesia.  On all the faces one 
could see the joyful excitement of participating in the sure German victory.”46  The next day, as 
returns were still coming in, Volkswille reported German percentages of between 63 and 60 
percent in one article, and 65 percent in another.47   
Meanwhile, Gazeta Robotnicza focused not on the overall vote, but on the number of 
communes won, as that was to play a significant role in the Allied Powers’ decision for the 
border.  “Despite German lies, despite German bribery, despite the overwhelming 160,000 
emigrants, we have the vast majority of municipalities and votes cast for Poland.  The Germans 
wanted to rob us of our land, but they failed.  The Polish people won!”48  Several articles contain 
long lists of plebiscite statistics, showing in painstaking detail just how many villages and 
municipalities voted for Poland.49  Germany may have won in the west, Gazeta Robotnicza 
conceded, but, “Above all, we won in the main plebiscite area, where the coal treasures are 
hidden underground…These are the counties of the proper industrial region, the economic heart 
of all Upper Silesia.  Apart from the artificially unchallenged cities, the overwhelming majority 
of communes were in favor of belonging to Poland.”50  “All German cities voted mostly for 
 
45 “Eine Viertel Million deutsche Mehrheit,” Kattowitzer Zeitung, 22 March 1921. 
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Germany, but we were prepared for that,” 51 claimed Katolik.  It was known that the cities had a 
“German character,”52 and while the Polish press did not challenge the outcomes there, they did 
seem to dismiss them as not being representative of how “real” or “true” – read: Polish – Upper 
Silesians voted.  “Our villages, however, did not disappoint.  These people, from their 
grandfather’s great-grandfather settled in the local land, listened to the voice of blood, which 
unites them unquestionably to the Polish motherland.”53    Those in the villages had lived there 
for generations, unlike the relative newcomers in the cities.  Those were “artificial” victories; the 
real ones were found in the industrial countryside, which Poland had won. 
In winning the plebiscite, Upper Silesia would at last be free of its Prussian oppressor.  In 
a series of announcements, written by Korfanty and published in the papers, we see again the use 
of this linguistic trope.  In his appeal written the day after the plebiscite, he pointed to those 
counties which, in voting for Poland, “shook off the yoke of Prussian captivity.”  He later 
thanked the staff at the Commissariat, noting that they “donated their time and strength, and 
often life and blood to free Upper Silesia from Prussian-German bonds.”54  The next day 
Korfanty wrote another address, in which he acknowledged that it was now up to the Supreme 
Council to draw the new border, which could result in Germany retaining part of Upper Silesia.  
This could not be allowed to happen.  “The Polish government will do everything so that the 
eternal enemy of our damnation cannot, with the help of satanic whispers, deprive us of our 
victory and won’t impose on us again the yoke of age-old slavery and brutal exploitation…We 
 
51 “W gorę serca.” 
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are liberated from the Prussian yoke.”55  The Prussians are not simply cruel; they are demonic, 
“eternal enemies,” leading Polish Upper Silesians to their “damnation.”  This echoes the 
language used in the press, especially in Kocynder, during the lead-up to the plebiscite. 
The German press, too, realized that their victory at the polls might not be sufficient to 
keep the Supreme Council from dividing the region.  Within a week of the plebiscite, the 
Kattowitzer Zeitung was running articles designed to convince this body that Upper Silesia must 
remain whole and with Germany.  The paper argued that Germany was absolutely dependent on 
Upper Silesian coal, and would not be able to pay down its war reparations without it.  “We 
reckon without any doubt that the Supreme Council, in the interest of a rapid recovery of the 
Upper Silesian situation, in the interest of the economic development of the industrial area for 
the supply of Europe, will draw as quickly as possible the necessary conclusion from the German 
victory; the administration of Upper Silesia must fall into the hands of the German 
government.”56  “Economic and geographical considerations necessitate the unity of Upper 
Silesia,” argued another advertisement sponsored by the major German political parties.57  The 
Chamber of Commerce for the Oppeln Regency, including Walther von Stoephasius, who had 
been instrumental in the founding of the Freie Vereinigung zum Schutze Oberschlesiens, penned 
an article as well.  It argued that unity with Germany was essential for the “success of the entire 
Upper Silesian economic life.  Upper Silesian industry was German, is German and will remain 
so.  This is the will of the people of Upper Silesia.”58  As in the propaganda, the German press 
 
55 “Rodacy!,” Gazeta Robotnicza, 27 March 1921.  For more of this language, see: “Rodacy!”, Gazeta Robotnicza, 
30 March 1920. 
56 “Nach dem Siege,” Kattowitzer Zeitung, 23 March 1921. 
   
57 “Oberschlesier!”, Kattowitzer Zeitung, 25 March 1921.  See also: “Oberschlesien muß ungeteilt bleiben,” in the 
same issue. 
 
58 “Der Entscheidungskampf ist vorüber!”, Kattowitzer Zeitung, 27 March 1921. 
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stressed the economic importance of the region to Germany’s economic future.  Germany needed 
Upper Silesia’s coal in order to pay back its war reparations; Upper Silesia needed Germany in 
order to assure its mines and industries remained successful.  The two depended on each other 
for economic prosperity.  As for Poland, the paper asked, “Does Poland need Upper Silesian 
coal?”59  The article argued that, “with the acquisition of Galicia, Poland has become a relatively 
rich coal country,”60 and thus was not as economically dependent on Upper Silesia as Germany 
was.  Taking all these considerations together with the plebiscite results, surely the Supreme 
Council would have no choice but to grant Germany the whole of Upper Silesia. 
 Geographic and economic were not the only types of unity promoted by the German 
press.  While the Polish papers were still demonizing their German counterparts, the latter 
attempted a tone of conciliation, promoting social and cultural unity among Upper Silesians of 
all ethnicities; again, this was done to convince the Supreme Council that Upper Silesia must 
remain undivided and under German control.  In the above-quoted advertisement, the main 
German political parties stated, “[A]fter the battle of spirits with the ballot, [Upper Silesians] will 
all be brothers and equals for the common, peaceful construction and reconciliation of our 
people, divided by the ballot into two common camps.  In brotherhood and unity with our fellow 
citizens, we want to build a new Upper Silesia.”61  It was almost as if the plebiscite was a rare tiff 
between otherwise loving family members; now resolved, the region could return to its normal, 
peaceful coexistence.  
 






Even Pieron, in its remaining two issues, promoted this message of unity and 
brotherhood.  The problem was never with Polish-speaking Upper Silesians, the magazine now 
argued, but those foreign “Polish (Großpolen) agitators,” who came in to stir up trouble before 
the plebiscite.  In one cartoon, these “agitators” are “swept away with an iron broom” as they 
tumble over the border.62  They look very much like the ruffians in a previous issue, the “bad 
sort” who voted for Poland.  These foreigners were the problem; Upper Silesians, both German- 
and Polish-speakers, simply wanted to live in peace, as demonstrated by the meeting between 
two such Upper Silesians in another illustration.  These two men are both young and strong, with 
friendly faces, each smoking a pipe as they clasp hands.  The man on the left is a miner, with his 
pickax and cap with the crossed mining tools, a clear indication that he is also Polish-speaking.  
The other man, while not a miner, is not the usual middle-class man who frequently appeared in 
Pieron prior to the plebiscite.  He looks to be a farmer, with his simple hat and clothes, and thus 
German-speaking.  He says, “So, brother Antek, now the Warsaw gentlemen have to get out of 
the country!  And now we want to work together for our own Upper Silesia!”63  The “Warsaw 
gentlemen” were the main obstacle; with them gone, German and Polish Upper Silesians can live 
in peace with each other.  In this new Upper Silesia, “anyone who speaks Polish will speak 
Polish without fear.  And anyone who speaks German will speak German without fear.”  This 
letter, “written” by the character of “Pieron,” noted, “The bad people are disappearing from 
Upper Silesia on their own, and the good, who are left, will help one another.  We are no longer 
Germans or Poles, but free Upper Silesians.”64 
 
62 “Raus!”, Pieron, Year 2, Number 13, 26 March 1921. 
 
63 “Nur noch Oberschlesier!”, Pieron, Year 2, Number 13, 26 March 1921. 
 
64 “Obberschlesche Wochenbetrachtung” [sic], Pieron, Year 2, Number 13, 26 March 1921. 
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Such sentiments in Pieron could only go so far, of course.  Yes, there would be unity and 
brotherhood among Upper Silesians of different ethnicities – but they would all continue to be 
German citizens.  This new Upper Silesia was to remain a German land.  “Pieron’s” above letter 
ended with a screed against Poland.  “The country of Poland, which after a few years still has no 
laws, the country of Poland, which has moved its Mark from sixty Pffenig to seven, the country 
of Poland, which has brought us to murder and manslaughter – that’s not for us!  Let us save 
ourselves to Germany!”65  A poem read, “They should not have you,/My Upper Silesian 
country/…And if, like wolves/ They shriek after you,/They shall not have you;/Because we want 
to be German!”66  Poland was still portrayed as a land of destitution and poverty; the trope of the 
wolf again made an appearance, coveting that which does not rightly belong to him.   
This was clearly illustrated in the frontispiece of the first issue after the plebiscite.  A 
young man, labeled “Upper Silesia,” in miner’s clothing rushes into the arms of woman – 
“Germany.”  While not overtly beautiful, she looks kind, motherly, and the light behind her casts 
a beatific glow.  To the side, “Poland,” stands, arms akimbo.  She is an old crone, with a gnarled 
face, dressed in rags and wearing a rogatywka.  “Where are you going, Upper Silesia?” she 
demands.  Upper Silesia replies, “To Mother!  To my true mother!”67  Upper Silesia truly 
belongs to Germany.  It has turned its back on Poland and its problems.  Now, with that question 
settled and the foreign “Warsaw gentlemen” away, all Upper Silesians can unite – but, crucially, 




66 “Sie sollen dich nicht haben, mein oberschlesisch Land!”, Pieron, Year 2, Number 14, 2 April 1921. 
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Pieron could not resist just a few more final jabs at Korfanty.  The Polish Plebiscite 
Commissar who had so often graced the pages of Pieron was brought back for a few final curtain 
calls.  “What will Korfanty do after the Plebiscite?” asked the magazine, before presenting a few 
possible scenarios: selling fly catchers, clearing out the stalls alongside his infamous cow (which 
defecates into a milk bucket), or “rais[ing] his numerous illegitimate children.”  The real answer, 
Pieron contended, was that Korfanty would end up alone and on the streets, “deaf and dumb,” 
begging for alms.68  In each panel, Korfanty is depicted as a grotesque figure.  In one, his open 
mouth, revealing numerous missing teeth, takes up more than half his face, pushing his eyes and 
nose under his hat; in the panel showing Korfanty as a beggar, he appears twisted and deformed. 
A full-page illustration was devoted to Korfanty and his cow in the first Pieron issue after 
the plebiscite.  Entitled, “The Trumpeter of Säckingen after the Plebiscite,” it was a parody of the 
1884 Viktor Nessler opera of the same name.  Korfanty, bedraggled and dressed in rags, plays a 
mournful tune on his trumpet.  He sits astride his “warhorse” – his faithful cow.  Emaciated, she 
looks tearfully at the reader as she scratches her udder, causing two flies to scurry away.  Behind 
her sits a large cow pie.  The two are on a road bound for Warsaw, but they give one last look 
back at Upper Silesia.  “Godspeed, you beautiful Upper Silesia!  I sit on my warhorse all alone,” 
says Korfanty, before quoting a song from the opera: “Godspeed, it would have been so 
beautiful/Godspeed, it was not meant to be!”69  Korfanty had been the face of the Polish 
plebiscite organization but now had been driven low in defeat.  Just like the other foreign 
agitators, his absence would ensure peace and unity throughout Upper Silesia. 
 
68 “Was wird Korfanty nach der Abstimmung tun?”, Pieron, Year 2, Number 14, 2 April 1921. 
 
69 “Der Trompeter von Säckingen nach der Abstimmung,” Pieron, Year 2, Number 13, 26 March 1921.  Korfanty’s 
lines are taken from the song, “Behüt dich Gott,” from Der Trompeter von Säckingen. 
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For Kocynder, the plebiscite heralded the beginning of a new era.  Its first issue post-
plebiscite, distributed on Easter Sunday and during the first week of spring, emphasized this 
period as a time of renewal and rebirth not just for the world at large, but for Upper Silesia 
specifically.  “Let the song of victory sound, the Polish song of joy./ New life is coming, Polish 
Spring is coming!” declared a poem.70  Accompanying the poem was the image of a young man, 
dressed in his Sunday best, ringing a bell embossed with the Polish eagle and the words, “Happy 
Easter.”  “We sing the song of freedom today,” the poem continued.   
The theme of Easter rebirth was also depicted on the magazine’s frontispiece, in which 
the Polish eagle breaks out of an elaborately decorated Easter egg.  Standing next to it is a Polish 
worker, with strong arms and an even stronger mustache, holding a large hammer; egg shells 
litter the ground at his feet.  This is who broke open the egg and freed the Polish eagle – the 
Upper Silesian worker.  It is through his efforts that Poland won the plebiscite – and in 
Kocynder, as in the rest of the Polish press, it was a Polish, not German, victory.  The caption 
read, “The Upper Silesian ‘kroszonka’ cracked.  The Polish eagle flew out of it and here he will 
also reign.  551 municipalities voted for Poland and 141 for Germany.  What’s ours is ours – we 
won’t give it away!”71  In an article, the magazine declared, “We have the most communes for 
Poland, and we also have the majority of votes for Poland.”72  While it acknowledged that the 
region would likely be split, Kocynder predicted that the majority of the territory, and all of the 
lucrative Industrial Triangle, would go to Poland. 
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There is no talk of unity or brotherhood in Kocynder.  Instead, the Germans are portrayed 
as they were prior to the plebiscite – militaristic Prussians, invaders, oppressors, “Hakatists.”  
“Germans lie, they assault and murder,”73 argued the magazine.  In the poem quoted above, the 
poet swears not to give the region’s riches to their “enemies;” “We won’t give up the land where 
our family comes from,/ The enemy dares not rule here any longer.”74  Another poem ordered, 
“Out with you, you Hakatists.”75  In a divided Upper Silesia, it was understood that Germans and 
Poles would also need to be divided, retreating to their own national corners, as it were.  
The centerpiece of this issue of Kocynder is a two-page spread depicting the “Withdrawal 
of the ‘Heimatstreuers,’”76 featuring all the characters and figures previously found in the 
magazine.  This sad parade is led by Urbanek, riding his goat, which Kocynder had tried to make 
into the equivalent of “Korfantys Kuh.”  Uliztka follows, using a walking stick but pulling a 
wagon; beside him, Heinz Quester, the head of the VHO, cries into his hands.  Next comes a 
thuggish Stosstrupp, carrying a pistol, and five anthropomorphized German papers, including 
Pieron, and several Prussian military men.  Bringing up the rear is the black German eagle, who 
hobbles along with a crutch and peg leg, most of his feathers picked off.  Behind the border 
fence, a cheeky man holding a Kocynder tips his hat.  “Say all you please about your total vote.  
Nothing will help you.  The peace treaty was about voting with municipalities and the division of 
Upper Silesia.  The industrial district is ours and you will march back to Germany.”77  The 
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In both Pieron and Kocynder, Upper Silesia needed to be rid of a “foreign” element if it 
were to prosper.  Even in the German press, which touted unity and brotherhood, Upper Silesia 
was to be a distinctly German place.  In the Polish press, Upper Silesia would only be secure if 
these “enemies” were removed entirely.  The mixed results of the plebiscite meant that both sides 
could claim victory – Germany on the total vote, Poland for the number of communes.  By 
proclaiming victory in the press, each hoped to persuade the Supreme Council that they 
deserved, if not all of Upper Silesia, then at least the lion’s share, including the all-important 
Industrial Triangle.  After the initial few weeks, excitement over the plebiscite and its results 
faded, and the reality of the situation began to set in.  By late April, it was clear that the Inter-
Allied Commission planned to suggest the region be divided.  The great unknown, as spring 
turned to summer, was where exactly this border would be drawn. 
3. Drawing the Line: The Third Silesian Uprising and the Final Border Decision 
 “We would prefer it if the Upper Silesian land was not divided,” wrote Gazeta 
Robotnicza several days after the plebiscite.  “The entire plebiscite area should be granted to 
Poland in accordance with the peace treaty.”  If that proved to be impossible, though, the paper 
put forth its own border proposal: “The Oder would constitute the border between Poland and 
Germany.”78  In the weeks following the plebiscite, numerous plans for redrawing the border 
were put forth.  Not even the members of the Inter-Allied Commission could agree on one 
border, as the French and British-Italian factions each submitted their own plans to the Supreme 
Council.  
 The German and Polish plans, put forth by Urbanek and Korfanty, respectively, as might 
be expected, gave the lion’s share of Upper Silesia to themselves.  In fact, Urbanek simply 
 
78 “Co znaczy niemiecki jubel?” 
 281 
requested the whole of Upper Silesia, with no division, on the basis of the German overall vote 
totals in the plebiscite, as well as the its economic dependency on the region.  Korfanty’s plan 
did include dividing the region – but granted the entire eastern industrial zone to Poland.  The so-
called “Korfanty Line” skirted east of Rosenberg and south of Oppeln before largely following 
the Oder south to the new Czechoslovak border.  The western countries, which had voted 
overwhelmingly for Germany, were omitted, but everything east of the Oder was to belong to 
Poland.  Korfanty calculated that Poland had won 444,054 votes, or 52 percent, to Germany’s 
404,891 votes in this region, carrying 662 of the 888 communes.  In addition, the Poles claimed 
that, since their families were larger than German ones, each Polish vote represented more 
people, and thus should be given more weight.79  This was the same claim made in the Polish 
press, suggesting there was a still a good deal of cooperation and coordination between the 
papers and the Plebiscite Commissariat even after the plebiscite. 
 The Inter-Allied Commission, which was tasked with presenting to the Supreme Council 
a recommendation on the border based on the plebiscite results, similarly found itself at an 
impasse.  At odds since the Second Silesian Uprising, the Inter-Allied Commission was split 
between the French, headed by Henri LeRond, and British and Italian factions, led by Henry 
Percival and Alberto de Marinis, respectively.  LeRond, who had continuously and, his 
detractors might say, openly supported the Polish cause in Upper Silesia, put forth a plan that 
could be called “Korfanty Lite.”  His plan gave Germany almost all of the Oppeln and 
Rosenberg Kreise, meeting the Oder roughly five miles north of Cosel, and then, as with the 
Korfanty Line, following the river south.  While more of the pro-German western counties would 
have gone to Germany, Poland still retained the entire Industrial Triangle under Le Rond’s plan.  
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In this territory, he estimated that a slim majority – 51.4 percent – had voted for Poland, but 
claimed, as did the Poles, that the outvoter vote here had artificially inflated the German totals.80  
The Percival-de Marinis Line, meanwhile, gave almost the entire Industrial Triangle to Germany, 
basing this decision on the fact that 60 percent of this area had voted for Germany.  Poland 
received the whole of Pleß and Rybnik, but only a slice of the industrial area east of Kattowitz 
and not the city itself, which had voted strongly for Germany.  In the plebiscite, Poland had won 
40 percent of the vote and 42 percent of the communes in this area, but the Percival-de Marinis 
Line would have given the country only 23 percent of the population and 25 percent of the 
communes.81  Unable to reconcile the two plans, the Inter-Allied Commission was forced to 
submit both to the Supreme Council on 30 April 1921. 
 The split provided Korfanty with an opportunity.  On 1 May, Grenzzeitung, a paper run 
by Korfanty, printed an article entitled, “The Diplomats have spoken!”  In it, the article described 
the Percival-de Marinis Line as the final border decision and a Polish betrayal, kicking off a 
supposedly spontaneous Polish revolt.  In reality, the uprising had been planned for some time.  
Korfanty met with leaders of the POW (Polska Organizacja Wojskowa, the Polish Military 
Organization) in a series of meetings from 25 to 30 April.  Hesitant at first, Korfanty ultimately 
was unwilling to risk the loss of the eastern industrial zone, and decided to take the territory by 
force in a fait accompli.  Against the wishes of Warsaw, Korfanty launched the Third Silesian 
Uprising – by far the largest, longest and deadliest conflict in Upper Silesia since the end of the 
First World War.82   
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 The day after the article, on 2 May, the Polish industrial workers’ unions declared a 
general strike.  That night, armed insurrection broke out.83  The POW, 40,000 strong, stormed 
the industrial region, taking control of all roads and railways at the border.  The Polish members 
of the APO deserted and joined the POW.  They were met with little resistance; the British had 
pulled their own Inter-Allied troops out of the region following the plebiscite to deal with the 
trouble in Ireland, and the French troops did little to stop the Polish insurgents.  Only the Italian 
forces attempted to subdue them, at the cost of twenty soldiers’ lives.84  By 6 May, the insurgents 
occupied the territory to the Korfanty Line.  The Polish government dismissed Korfanty from his 
position as Plebiscite Commissar, as punishment for his role in launching the Uprising.  
Historian F. Gregory Campbell, however, notes that the Polish government did little to stop the 
flow of men and aid into the region, indicating that the Uprising had, at the very least, Warsaw’s 
tacit approval.85  Korfanty, in an 8 May proclamation, claimed that the Uprising had been 
entirely spontaneous occurrence, one he had been powerless to stop.86  “I swear to it,” he stated, 
“that these people have quite made up their minds that they would sooner the Allied Army wiped 
them out to the last man than that they should again put their necks under the German yoke.  
These people would destroy all the mines and foundries, as well as all other workshops, rather 
than have to capitulate.”87 
 The German government requested permission to send its own troops into Upper Silesia, 
a proposal that the Inter-Allied Commission and Supreme Council resoundingly rejected.  
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Undeterred, the new German Chancellor, Joseph Wirth, spoke with Lt. Gen. Karl Hoefer on 18 
May – Wirth’s eighth day in office.  A veteran of the First World War and previous Silesian 
Uprisings, Hoefer was now tasked with launching a German paramilitary operation against the 
Polish insurgents.  In this endeavor, he was joined by other Freikorps units from around the 
country, including the Bavarian Freikorps Oberland.88  The Uprising had now entered a phase of 
all-out war.  On 21 May, German paramilitary forces launched a counteroffensive at Annaberg, 
where fighting lasted until 27 May.89  The Polish insurgents now went on the defensive.  
Fighting continued throughout June, but by early July the Inter-Allied Commission had managed 
to regroup and again take control of the region, forcing both German and Polish forces to 
withdrawal from Upper Silesia.90      
In all, about 50,000 Polish and 35,000 German paramilitary insurgents fought in the 
Third Silesian Uprising, resulting in 4,000 deaths.91  It was, by far, the deadliest fighting in 
Upper Silesia during the plebiscite period.  Historian T.K. Wilson asserts that, of all the Upper 
Silesian casualties between the end of the First World War to June 1922, 62 percent occurred 
during the Third Silesian Uprising.92  In it, we see again the tension between violence and the 
practice of democracy.  The Second Silesian Uprising was fought, in part, to demonstrate Polish 
strength in the region, to put the Poles in a better situation for the upcoming plebiscite.  It was 
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never about taking control of the region by force.  In the Third Silesian Uprising, we see the 
opposite.  The plebiscite – the practice of democracy – has failed to produce a clear-cut answer 
to the Upper Silesian question.  The only move left, in Korfanty’s view, was to take the region 
by force. 
 The Third Silesian Uprising left the main power players no closer to determining a 
border.  Unable to agree on which Inter-Allied Commission proposal to accept, the Supreme 
Council, on 12 August 1921, decided instead to make Upper Silesia someone else’s problem – 
namely, the newly formed League of Nations.  Representatives of Belgium, China, Spain and 
Brazil – chosen because they had no previous involvement with Upper Silesia – were now tasked 
with finding a solution to the Upper Silesian problem.  After two months of deliberation, on 12 
October 1921, the League of Nations unanimously recommended what would become the new 
German-Polish border.93  At the time, Poland was a member of the League, but Germany had not 
been invited to join.   
Starting north of Lubliniec, the border would sweep south, bisecting the Industrial 
Triangle between Beuthen and Gleiwitz (on the German side) and Königshütte (on the Polish).  It 
would then travel south-west, to just outside Ratibor, before following the Oder to the 
Czechoslovak border.94  The Polish territory amounted to just 32 percent of the overall plebiscite 
region but accounted for 47 percent of the population.  Germany was given the largest land area, 
but Poland had inherited the most productive part of the Industrial Triangle – 75 percent of all 
coal production, all the zinc mines, and half the steel works.  According to 1913 output numbers, 
the coal mines in the new Polish side had produced 32,500,000 tons, while the mines on the 
 
93 Tooley, 257; Karch, 143. 
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German side had produced 10,500,000 tons.  In area ceded to Poland, roughly 510,000 votes had 
been cast in the plebiscite, with Poland earning 56 percent of the vote.95  Naturally, neither 
Germany nor Poland were satisfied with this outcome, but both nations had no real recourse.  
Negotiations concluded in May 1922, when the treaty was signed in Geneva on 15 May.  The 
Polish Sejm ratified it on 24 May 1922.  The German Reichstag – “draped in mourning” – did 
the same on 30 May 1922.96 
On 20 and 22 June 1922, the Kattowitzer Zeitung and Górnoślązak each ran an article, 
bearing the same title, covering the same event: “The Entrance of the Polish Military into 
Kattowitz” – now the Polish city of Katowice.97  As can be imagined, the event was portrayed 
quite differently in each paper.  “Today on June 20, the city of Kattowitz was occupied by the 
Polish military,” declared the Kattowitzer Zeitung.98  For Górnoślązak, the day was one to be 
celebrated.  “A wonderful, unforgettable day!...It must first be stated that the people welcomed 
the approaching troops not only with ovation, but sincerely and cordially…[T]here was not a 
single house there, not even a window, not even one, not decorated with greenery, eagles and 
red-and-white ensigns.”99 
Kocynder likewise celebrated this area of Upper Silesia officially becoming a part of 
Poland.  In one illustration, the Polish military marches through town to a cheering crowd.  This 
is in the background, though; the focus is on two Germans, who observe from a distance.  “So,” 
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says one.  “The Polish Army is finally here and it doesn’t devour us Germans as the German 
newspapers promised.”  The other replies, “But the Breslau and Berlin papers will certainly bring 
news that we were chopped for Polish stew.”100  Now that they had gained the bulk of the 
Industrial Triangle, the Polish press could spare a little conciliation.  The Germans have nothing 
to fear in the new Polish Upper Silesia, they wrote; they will be treated fairly and with kindness.  
In the frontispiece of this issue, the Polish military is led into town by Polonia herself.  Depicted 
as a beautiful young woman in bright red medieval dress and with a crown of laurels, Polonia 
walks among her adoring public.  “To you, Poland, we return,” read the caption.  “After 
centuries of captivity, after centuries of longing, the day of golden freedom has come.  We 
welcome you Poland, our Mother!”101  Fifteen months after voting in the plebiscite, and a year 
after a bloody uprising, that which Polish nationalists had worked so hard for was finally a 
reality.  Upper Silesia, part of it, at least, had “returned to Poland.”  The people had done what 
was asked of them during the plebiscite campaign – they had become Polish. 
The celebratory atmosphere reflected in the Polish press on that mid-June day in 1922 
belied the tension still simmering beneath the surface.  Neither Germany nor Poland was pleased 
with the division of Upper Silesia, and the region would continue to be a source of consternation 
throughout the Interwar Period.  On 21 June 1922 – the day after Polish troops entered the city – 
the Kattowitzer Zeitung, now a minority-language German paper published in Poland, ran a 
poem entitled “Homesickness.”  In it, the paper lamented the heartbreaking loss felt at being 
separated from one’s fellow Germans.  Once so close, now “you seemed so far away from me 
today/ As if you had left me…The Homesickness touches me again./ It screams for your heart,/ 
 
100 “Wojsko polskie a Niemcy,” Kocynder, Year 3, No. 14, 20 June-1 July 1922. 
 
101 “Do Ciebie, Polsko, wracamy,” Kocynder, Year 3, No. 14, 20 June-1 July 1922. 
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In which it wants to go to rest,/ With all of its pain.”102  Kocynder, too, contemplated this pain, in 
an illustration depicting two Polish Upper Silesians separated by the border.  The man on the 
German side hangs his head in sadness.  “I must be separated by foreign force,” he laments.  “It 
is hard on my soul and my heart hurts.”  “Oh, my dear brother,” replies the man on the Polish 
side.  “Don’t lose heart.  This artificial border is so fragile…Although it separates you today, and 
it saddens and hurts, Poland will set you free, too!”103  Several months earlier, in February 1922, 
Kocynder ran this same illustration, under the title, “Bloody Border,” and with a more direct 
quote: “Brother, don’t lose heart!  I won’t rest until you are free!”104 
 
 
102 “Heimweh,” Kattowitzer Zeitung, 21 June 1921. 
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104 “Krwawa granica,” Kocynder, Year 3, Number 1, 1 February 1922. 
 289 
EPILOGUE 
On 14 November 1926, the residents of a small territory in East Central Europe went to 
the polls.  Unlike five years earlier, however, they were not asked to vote for which nation they 
wished to belong.  Instead, the residents of the Silesian Voivodeship, as the Polish partition of 
Upper Silesia was now known, went out this Sunday on a much more mundane matter: the 
election of local and municipal representatives.   
That is not to say, however, that the local press did not portray these elections as fiercely 
fought combat.  Gazeta Robotnicza, on 13 November 1926, advised its readers, “We are only a 
few days away from the battle…This battle must be won by the PPS.”1  “Comrades” were 
advised to talk about the PPS list wherever and whenever they could – “on the way to and from 
work…At work and on duty…At home at dinner.”  The kitchen table was especially important, 
as it was here that he could “convince the wife that she must support her husband and vote as he 
votes, for the PPS list,”2 – an echo of the same concerns voiced in the German Volkswille in 
1919.  For Gazeta Robotnicza, this was a strictly political election.  There was no discussion or 
definition of what it means to be a Pole.  Unlike during the plebiscite period, when there was at 
least a nod of conciliation towards centrist and right-leaning parties, here the paper drew a line 
between the PPS and other political parties.  This was not a decision between nations, but 
between political parties.     
 




For the Kattowitzer Zeitung, however, the very fate of the German minority in the 
Silesian Voivodeship hung in the balance.  “No one is allowed to stay home from the municipal 
elections on Sunday!” the paper declared.3  Otto Ulitz, who had served as Kurt Urbanek’s 
assistant in the German Plebiscite Commissariat and now was a leader in the Deutsche 
Volksbund für Polnisch-Schlesien and a representative in the Silesian Sejm, wrote an essay for 
the paper designed to grab at the heart strings of the German minority.  It was a “Polish fairytale” 
that “there [was] no Germandom here anymore, that it had died or was only artificially 
preserved.”4  The elections would save the German minority from “discrimination in all areas of 
public life.”  Ulitz framed this election as a battle between nations, between Germans and their 
Polish oppressors.  While Gazeta Robotnicza could stress the differences between the PPS and 
its political opponents, political discord would only divide the German electorate.  For this 
reason, the German Party and the German-leaning Catholic People’s Party (KVP) ran on 
combined lists.  Near the end of his essay, however, Ulitz turned away this overtly nationalist 
rhetoric.  “Our sense of community is not limited to Germandom,” he wrote.  “We are children 
of a homeland [Heimaterde], no matter whether Germans or Poles, children of a country, whose 
treasures can be wrested only in laborious work…[W]e cannot be excluded from participation in 
the history of our homeland [Heimat].”5  This Heimat was not Germany, but Upper Silesia.  
The German national slate won 42 percent of votes cast in the voivodeship,6 despite 
German-speakers comprising, after several years of emigration, only about 13 percent of the 
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population.7  In Katowice, they won 29 of 60 seats, while the SPD won five.  The results were 
even greater in Królewska Huta, where the German parties won 32 of 54 seats.8  The Kattowitzer 
Zeitung could not help but crow about their success.  “It is almost overwhelming how thoroughly 
election day has cleared up the fairy tale that there are no Germans left in the voivodeship.  The 
most remote villages, even in the supposedly pure Polish districts of Pleß [Pszczyna] and 
Rybnik, have German majorities.”9  The paper cited Wilcza Dolna/Nieder-Wilcza and Wilcza 
Górna/Ober-Wilcza as examples of this victory.  In the plebiscite, both villages had voted for 
Poland – the latter overwhelmingly so, with 72 percent.10  But in 1926, voters swung the other 
way.  In Wilcza Górna, the German national parties won 77 percent of the vote, almost the 
inverse of the plebiscite.  In Wilcza Dolna, the German victory was even more overwhelming, as 
it captured 84 percent of the vote.11  The plebiscite was supposed to divide Upper Silesians into 
their respective national corners.  What, then, explains the victory of the German national 
parties? 
In fact, Upper Silesians on both sides of the divide would continue to defy German and 
Polish national expectations at the ballot box throughout the 1920s.  While Tomasz Kamusella 
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rightly notes that the German victory in the 1926 municipal elections “represented a never-to-be 
repeated peak,”12 the German minority was still over-represented in the Silesian Sejm in terms of 
population.  Between 1922 and 1929, 14 of the Sejm’s 48 seats, or roughly 29 percent, were held 
by members of the German minority; they gained an additional seat in the 1930 election.13  In 
1926 specifically, though this may hold for the subsequent elections, as well, voting German was 
a form of protest against Piłsudski’s new political order.  The Silesian Voivodeship’s status as an 
autonomous province within Poland was deeply cherished by its inhabitants.  Piłsudski’s May 
Coup and new Sanacja government in 1926 threatened the region’s autonomy.  This was 
especially true after September 1926, when Michał Grażyński, the new governor of the region, 
attempted to curtail Silesia’s autonomous rights and bring it more firmly into the fold of the 
central, national state.14  Two months later, the people voiced their displeasure by voting for the 
German nationalist party. 
Meanwhile, in German Upper Silesia, both the German and Polish nationalist parties 
struggled to breakthrough at the polls.  The high-water mark for the Polish national party around 
Oppeln was during the three 1924 Reichstag elections, when they won between 23 and 25 
percent of the rural vote.  But its number of supporters continuously fell throughout the 1920s 
and early 1930s; by November 1932 – ten years after the division of the region – its vote share 
had plummeted to 4.6 percent.15  Meanwhile, the German Democratic Party (DDP) and German 
People’s Party (DVP) barely registered with voters; the strongest German national party was the 
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right-wing German National People’s Party (DNVP), which did well among the civil servants 
and members of the free professions clustered in Oppeln but failed to attract voters in the 
surrounding countryside.16   
Instead, Upper Silesians continued to navigate towards supranational parties.  For most of 
the 1920s this meant that old stalwart of the region, the Catholic Center.  While German-leaning, 
the Center was the strongest advocate for linguistic rights, especially in education and religious 
practice.17  Greater access to language education was a large part of what Karch calls “the 
widening gap” that developed between strident Polish nationalists and Polish-speaking Upper 
Silesians.  One of the most important aspects of the pre-war Polish nationalist movement was 
ensuring children could be taught in Polish.  In the 1920s, cultural and linguistic autonomy was 
largely granted by the Weimar government, effectively stealing the nationalists’ thunder and 
weakening the Polish nationalist movement.  After the economic collapse in 1929, however, 
Upper Silesians trended towards political outsiders – the Communist and Nazi Parties.  In the 
November 1932 Reichstag elections, the Communist Party earned 17.7 percent of the vote in 
Oppeln county, compared to the 4.6 percent of the Polish national party.18  The Nazi Party 
downplayed their anti-Polish rhetoric while campaigning in the region, stressing an economic 
message that earned support from a number of Polish-speaking voters in the rural counties.  In 
the July 1932 election, the Nazi Party won 47 percent of voters in the village of Malino – despite 
the fact that 95 percent of the village’s population was Polish-speaking or bilingual, and had 
voted for Poland in the plebiscite by 62 percent.  This was nearly double to vote earned by the 
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Catholic Center.  Still, in the region overall, the Center maintained a slim plurality even in the 
1932 elections.19 
For national activists, voting in an election was meant to be an expression of one’s 
national sentiment.  Yet throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s, Upper Silesians continuously 
frustrated these expectations, especially in German Upper Silesia.  For a good proportion of 
Upper Silesians, voting was not about loyalty to a national ideal, but rather a form of protest.  In 
the Silesian Voivodeship, this meant Polish-speakers voted for the German nationalist party as a 
way to demonstrate their discontent with Piłsudski’s Sanacja.  In Oppeln Silesia, both German- 
and Polish-speakers eschewed “their” national parties for the Catholic Center.  As the economy 
worsened and their faith in the democratic state faltered, some turned to anti-establishment 
political outsiders, including the party that would shape the next phase of Upper Silesian history: 
the Nazis. 
In the 1930s and ‘40s, a spate of English-language monographs was published which 
addressed Upper Silesia’s plebiscite and division in a manner bordering on hyperbolic.  Upper 
Silesia was a “country of contrasts,” a “drama” that had to be calmed, a “problem” that needed to 
be solved.  How was it that Germany had won the overall plebiscite vote, when the 1910 
Language Census, taken to illustrate the numbers of Germans and Poles in the region, had them 
in the minority?  Why had upwards of twenty percent of Poles voted against their national self-
interests and for Germany? 
The answer, unfathomable to both the national activists of the time and historians of mid-
century but borne out by recent scholarship, is not that Upper Silesians were voting against their 
national interests, but rather that did not have any.  Or, at least, feelings of national belonging 
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existed alongside other identities – Upper Silesian, Catholic, worker, mother.  But the plebiscite 
did not ask about the non-national.  On 20 March 1921, Upper Silesians submitted a ballot 
reading “Germany” or “Poland” not because they felt themselves to be definitively a German or 
Pole, but because no other option existed.  There was no “Upper Silesian” card, no “Catholic” 
card.  In the aftermath of the First World War, the only path available for Eastern Europe was the 
national, a choice handed down by foreign men nearly one thousand miles away. 
When given this choice of either/or, a large portion of Upper Silesians votes matched 
their professed “mother tongue.”  But a substantial minority did not, voting instead based on 
some criteria other than language.  It would also be wrong to assume that those who voted 
“correctly” based on their language did so for purely national reasons.  As the plebiscite 
propaganda demonstrates, nationality and ethnicity were only part of the overall arguments made 
by Germany and Poland.  Economic and material well-being featured prominently as well, and it 
is likely that many Upper Silesians decided to vote for the known-quantity of Germany rather 
than take a risk on the unknown, unproven Polish state. 
In the immediate aftermath of the First World War, various paths appeared before the 
people of East Central Europe.  The old order of empire was gone, and there were countless 
possibilities for what could replace it.  But the end of the First World War was also the 
culmination of decades of nationalist and nation-building movements.  It was in this paradigm of 
the nation that the Allied Powers, who would ultimately remake the map of Europe, operated.  
Thus, the choices available for Upper Silesians were filtered through a nationalist lens.  It was 
not enough to choose socialism; one had to decide between the German and Polish definitions of 
socialism.  One of the reasons the autonomous movement never truly gained traction was 
because it fell outside of the German-Polish dichotomy. 
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The plebiscite was designed to be the purest form of national self-determination, a chance 
for a people to definitively declare themselves to belong to a nation.  While not always the case 
for everyone who votes, the plebiscite campaign provided German and Polish nationalists a place 
in which they could define and redefine themselves and each other.  Germany attempted to shed 
its Prussian history and embrace a “new Germany” – one that replaced militarism with middle-
class respectability and comfort.  For Poland, it meant creating a new Polish family, centered 
around a strong, working class father and a mother who passed on the Polish language and 
Catholic faith to their children.  It is possible – likely, even – that the intense propaganda of the 
plebiscite campaign heightened national sentiment among a substantial portion of the population.  
And it is just as likely that, in the years that followed, as life began to settle after the chaos of the 
First World War, that national sentiment receded, and another identifier – regional, religious, 
gender, class – took its place.       
Upper Silesia’s “continuum of crisis” ended in June 1922.  In almost eight years it had 
endured the First World War, a revolution, three Uprisings, three elections, and one all-important 
plebiscite.  Upper Silesians were tasked with choosing their own fates, to declare their own national 
self-determination – and then had that decision was ultimately determined by four men who had 
no attachments whatsoever to the region.  The German-Polish border of 1922 – this “artificial,” 
“bloody” border – was not to last.  Within twenty-five years, this border would be erased, and 
erased again.  The division of Upper Silesia, then, was the ending of one era in the region, and the 
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